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1 Structure of the Dissertation 
The present investigation consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. The theo-
retical part comprises an introduction to the topic of safety-related rule violations (cf. sec-
tion 2), the definition and distinction of different rule types (cf. section 3), a description of 
the incidence of rule violations in different industrial sectors (cf. section 4) and a general 
theory part (cf. section 5). The general theory can be further subdivided into three parts: 
in the first part, the Human Factors Perspective (cf. section 5.1), the theories and findings 
of the Human Factors research are described; in the second part, the Industrial and Or-
ganisational Psychology Perspective (cf. section 5.2), the relevant concepts and theories 
in the area of Industrial and Organisational Psychology are outlined and in the third part, 
the Decision-Making Perspective (cf. section 5.3),  the relevant decision-making theories 
and their correlation with the decision-making process of rule violations are depicted. Fi-
nally the different perspectives are integrated into a holistic understanding of safety-
related rule violations (cf. section 5.4). 
The empirical evidence part consists of four distinct sections, which concentrate 
on the reporting of studies that were conducted within the scope of the present investiga-
tion, to identify the impact of several determinants of safety-related rule violations in a 
process control environment.  
The first study, which was conducted to investigate the impact of goods at stake 
and the framing of the production outcome (cf. section 6.1), showed no significant effect 
of the goods at stake and the framing on the amount of safety-related rule violations. 
However, the data revealed significant negative correlations between the skills and 
knowledge regarding the operation of the simulation and the violation of safety-related 
rules.  
The second study (cf. section 6.2), which addresses the impact of personality 
traits on safety-related rule violations, began with a questionnaire-based prestudy which 
found significant associations between cautiousness, self interest and injustice sensitivity 
and the intention to violate rules. In the main investigation only the integrity subscale cau-
tiousness correlated with safety-related rule violations in process-control environment.  
The third study (cf. section 6.3) deal with the impact of the accuracy of information 
about audit probability and the impact of just experienced audits on the amount of rule 
violations. Furthermore the framing of the production outcome and salary as gain or loss 
was again investigated. The framing as well as the accuracy of information about audit 
probability was found to have a significant impact on the amount of rule violations: When 
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the participants had accurate information about the audit probability, they violated signifi-
cantly more often than if they had no or only vague information about the audit probabil-
ity; and they violated more often in the loss-framed conditions than in the gain-framed 
conditions. Moreover violations occurred significantly more often when an audit had just 
been experienced (bomb crater effect).  
The fourth study (cf. section 6.4) investigated the framing of the production out-
come and salary and the impact of audit timing on safety-related rule violations. In the 
early audit group the audits were implemented early on, and moreover, only conducted in 
the first half of the production year. In the late audit group the same amount of audits was 
conducted, but they were placed only within the second half of the year. The early audit 
group initially violated the rule less often, but the amount of rule violation increased after 
audits stopped in the second half of the year. In the late audit group, participants violated 
the rule at the same level of frequency; they did not adapt their behaviour, when audits 
were implemented in the second half of the year. 
In the final part, the general discussion (cf. section 7), the results of all investiga-
tions are discussed as a whole. The internal validity, practical relevance and usefulness 
of the findings were assumed to be high. Although the external validity of the findings is 
estimated as quite low, it is assumed that due to the high internal validity, the findings can 
be transferred to other contexts. The findings corroborate the importance of a proper de-
sign of performance feedback systems (impact of framing); the relevance of highly skilled 
people with good knowledge about their work tasks for maintaining and improving safety; 
the usefulness of measuring certain personality traits in the personnel selection process 
to enhance rule compliance (impact of personality); the significance of the extent and 
type of information which is provided about audits and audit probabilities and the rele-
vance of considering the timing of audits within a certain time span or with respect to the 
gap between audits (bomb crater effect) in order to reduce the amount of rule violations.  
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2 Introduction 
Rules have been prescribed to regulate social coexistence for as long as we can 
remember; and as old as the prescription of rules is, so too is the consideration to violate 
them. A very prominent example from Christianity is the Bible story about Eve`s rule vio-
lation in paradise. Eve decided to violate the rule and taste the apple from the forbidden 
tree. This story, which is part of the Christian notion of the genesis of humanity, demon-
strates the significance of rules and rule violation for understanding human nature. Every 
day, every human being has to make frequent decisions about whether to comply with or 
violate rules. This applies to different rule types and different decision situations, from car-
driving situations, which are regulated by the road traffic act, to situations which are de-
termined by social norms, such as the behaviour in a family situation or when shopping, 
to decision situations at school or work, which are regulated by organisational rules and 
procedures.  
The story of Eve, as well as the rule violations committed in everyday situations, 
raises the question of the determinants of rule-related behaviour. Why do people decide 
to violate rules? And how can rule violations be prevented? With regard to Eve, or every 
other person, who has to make rule-related decisions, the decision might be due to per-
son-related factors, like age, gender, previous experience or personality, or it might de-
pend on situational factors, like the rule characteristics, the probability of audits, or bene-
fits and sanctions which are associated with rule violations. Like most psychological theo-
ries suggest, human behaviour is not exclusively determined by person-related or situ-
ational factors, but is a product of person-related factors, situational factors and interac-
tions between these determinants. In this regard it can be assumed that rule-related be-
haviour is also determined by a conglomerate of these determinants.  
The present investigation deals with the identification of rule violation determi-
nants in general, but addresses in particular the violation of safety-related rule violations 
in High Reliability Organisations, since the violation of these rules is associated with es-
pecially severe consequences. Several industrial disasters have been caused at least 
partially by rule violations, such as the refinery explosion in Texas City in 2005, or the 
Deep Water Horizon oil spill in 2010, which illustrate vividly the need for more rule com-
pliance to prevent the disastrous consequences which are associated with these acci-
dents.  
Gaining a better understanding of the determinants of safety-related rule violations 
is the basis for developing and implementing more effective and sustainable rule violation 
reduction measures. The present investigation should enhance a more holistic under-
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standing of safety-related rule violations and their determinants. This should be achieved 
by summarizing different theoretical perspectives, supplying new empirical evidence and 
finally integrating both into a new adapted conception of the processes and factors which 
determine safety-related rule violations. 
Although there is research from several areas regarding the determinants of rule 
violations, the respective findings are only noticed and applied within the research com-
munity in which the particular research was conducted. The theoretical part of the present 
investigation aims to close this gap by including the definition and distinction of different 
rule types; describing the incidence of rule violations in different industrial sectors; de-
scribing the theories and findings of the Human Factors research; exposing relevant con-
cepts and theories in the area of Industrial and Organisational Psychology; and describ-
ing the relevant decision-making theories and their correlation with the decision-making 
process of rule violations. Finally, the different perspectives will be integrated into one 
holistic understanding of the processes and determinants of rule violations. 
The new empirical evidence regarding the determinants of rule violations will be 
provided by presenting four studies, which were conducted within the scope of a project 
funded by the “Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft” (DFG; project ID: KL 2207/2-1). 
These studies aimed to discover the impact of several situational and person-related de-
terminants of safety-related rule violations in a process control environment. The first 
study will address the impact of the framing of the production outcome and salary and the 
impact of the goods at stake on rule violations; the second study will focus on the impact 
of personality-related determinants of rule violations; the third study will concentrate on 
the impact of the accuracy of information about the audit probability as well as the impact 
of a just experienced audit on the amount of rule violations; and the fourth study will be 
concerned with the impact of audit timing on the amount of rule violations 
In the conclusions part, the findings of all four studies will be summarised, the va-
lidity, practical relevance and usefulness of the results will be discussed, and future re-
search questions and lessons learned will be described. Afterwards, the current results 
will be integrated into the theories on the determinants of safety-related rule violations 
which were described previously in the theoretical part and finally, the practical implica-
tions of the findings will be outlined. 
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3 Rule classification 
The following section begins by defining and classifying different rule types. Since 
the present investigation is about the violation of (safety-) rules, it is necessary to de-
scribe the term rule and to distinguish it clearly from other, similar terms. In the following 
section the terms law, social norms, rules and procedures will be defined and described, 
and their implications for the present investigation will be outlined.  
3.1.1 Law 
According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, law is defined as “[...] profession 
concerned with the practices, and rules of conduct of a community that are recognized as 
binding by the community." (Gwinn, Norton, & Goetz, 1991, p. 200). Furthermore, accord-
ing to the authors, the compliance with the legislation is enforced through a controlling 
authority.  
The violation of law is only indirectly relevant to the research questions addressed 
in the present investigations. The common law has required organisations to provide safe 
workplaces for their employees for about 100 years (cf. for example Wickens, Lee, Liu, & 
Gordon Becker, 2004). In the 1960s, years most countries introduced a set of laws con-
cerning the regulation of industrial safety; these regulations are usually summarised un-
der the heading of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). In Germany, the first 
laws regulating industrial safety even came into force back in 1869 (Kreck, 2001, p. 5).  
If an accident occurs, organisations have to prove that they expended a “reason-
able amount of care” to prevent accidents (Wickens et al., 2004). In order to prove this 
and to ensure safety, organisations are increasingly implementing safety-related rules (cf. 
Safety-related rules, 3.1.3), which are based on the OSHA of the respective country in 
which the organisations operate.  
However, not only organisations are required to enhance safety; employees too 
have to meet certain obligations to contribute to safety at work (Friend & Kohn, 2007). For 
instance, according to Friend and Kohn (2007), they are required to check whether their 
work place meets the safety requirements. Moreover they are constrained to comply with 
all safety-related rules which are prescribed by the organisation. 
3.1.2 Social Norms 
Social norms are defined, according to Cialdini and Trost (1998, p. 152), as “rules 
or standards that are understood by members of a group, that guide and/or constrain so-
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cial behaviour without the force of law.” This definition emphasizes the behaviour-guiding 
function of norms and simultaneously draws a clear distinction between social norms and 
law based on their different enforcement mechanisms.  
The definition by McAdams (1997) emphasises on the enforcement mechanisms 
of social norms. He defines social norms as “[…] informal social regularities that individu-
als feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of 
external non-legal sanctions, or both." (McAdams, 1997, p. 340) 
Biel and Thogersen (2007) stress the mechanisms of action of social norms. They 
assume that social norms regulate social life by guiding behaviour in the context in which 
the respective norm is activated. According to Biel and Thogersen, the activation of 
norms is an unconscious process which is triggered by certain stimuli. As a function of 
these stimuli, different types of norms are activated. 
Kerr (1995) differentiates between general interaction norms and benevolence 
norms: Whereas general interaction norms refer to a person’s beliefs regarding appropri-
ate behaviour in certain situations, benevolence norms refer to a person`s value con-
cepts. Compliance with general interaction norms is enforced through external mecha-
nisms (like rewards and punishments by other group members), whereas compliance with 
benevolence norms is only enforced by internal mechanisms (like feelings of guilt). 
This means that the violation of safety-related rules comprises not only the viola-
tion of the respective rule, but also the violation of (social) norms. Both general interaction 
norms and benevolence norms are affected by the violation of safety-related rules. The 
affected benevolence norm is the generally accepted norm to comply with rules which are 
prescribed by the organisation/employer. The affected benevolence norm involves doing 
nothing that can endanger fellow human beings (if a safety-rule is violated, the person 
risks the consequence that persons might be injured or even killed).  
The impact of norm activation on rule-related behaviour is also one of the main 
concerns of the following investigations. The first experimental study, described in the 
section about the impact of the goods at stake (cf. 6.1), takes a closer look at the impact 
of the activation of benevolence norms on the violation of safety-related rules. 
3.1.3 Rules  
The General Clauses Act (1960) defines a rule as a regulation which is enforced 
by the exercise of power. According to Lawton (1998), rules are used to exercise control. 
Rules as measures of behaviour control are associated with certain disadvantages, as 
time, effort and resources are necessary to enforce them (Lawton, 1998). The advantage 
   
Rule classification    
 
7 
 
of rules is that quite complex tasks can be accomplished without a deeper understanding 
of the system, meaning that less skilled people can perform the respective tasks. Accord-
ing to Lawton (1998) rule-regulated tasks are less demanding, because a person merely 
needs to follow the rule rather than thinking about and deciding what to do. However this 
leads to tasks being perceived as more monotonous and boring; people may feel con-
trolled and restricted, and moreover it may no longer be possible to manage new or ex-
ceptional situations (Lawton, 1998). Therefore, Lawton argues that rules should be only 
used to regulate routine activities.  
Rule is very broad concept, which needs greater specification in order to obtain an 
appropriate understanding of what is meant in the respective context. The types of rules 
which are here relevant are organisational rules and safety-related rules, which will be 
described in the next sections. 
Organisational rules 
According to Zhou (1993, p. 2236) organisational rules are defined as “part of the 
formal structure that constitutes and defines stable patterns of relationships and activi-
ties." He described organisational rules further as “the storage of organizational memory" 
(Zhou, 1993, p. 1137) and considered the existence and increasing implementation of 
formal rules as a necessary feature of modern organisations.  
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) suggest a differentiation between internal and 
external organisational rules: Internal rules are internally developed and determined by 
the individual characteristics and policies of an organisation, while external rules are de-
termined by external factors, such as the statutory provisions regarding, for example the 
safety in an organisation. Whereas external rules are usually the same across an indus-
trial sector, internal rules differ between different organisations. Besides this differentia-
tion, there are several more rule characteristics which Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) 
believe to influence the probability that a rule will be violated, such as the enforceability of 
a rule or the connectedness with other rules (cf. determinants of safety related rule viola-
tions, section 5.1.5).  
Zhou (1993) also described also the motivation and background of the implemen-
tation of organisational rules, which are used to convey organisational knowledge to the 
organisational members and to make them as effective as possible in the shortest possi-
ble time. The rules should be a support measure for employees to establish a time-tested 
behaviour pattern, enabling them to achieve the targets of the organisation.  
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Achieving the maximum financial profit and guaranteeing safety are common but 
frequently conflicting goals of organisations (cf. section Safety-related rules above). The 
achievement of both of these goals is required, and several organisational rules describe 
in detail how the goals can be accomplished. Employees have to trade off safety-oriented 
against profit-oriented goals in order to decide which rules they will comply with and 
which they will violate. These considerations are essential elements in understanding the 
decision-making process concerning the violation of safety-related rules in organisations.  
In the experiments which were conducted in the present investigation, this kind of 
conflict between different organisational goals and organisational rules was specifically 
induced in the participants (cf. Empirical evidence 6). Further aspects of organisational 
decision making will be described in the decision-making section (cf. Decision making in 
organisations 5.3.3). 
 Safety-related rules 
Hale and Swuste (1998) considered a safety-rule as “[…] a defined state of a sys-
tem or way of behaving in response to a predicted situation, established before the event 
and imposed upon those operating in the system, by themselves or others, as a way of 
improving safety or achieving a required level of safety" (Hale & Swuste, 1998, p. 164). 
This definition includes the technical as well as the behavioural aspect of safety and de-
fines a rule as something which is determined and communicated before an action in or-
der to acquire a certain level of safety. In this respect, Hale and Borys (2013b) found in 
their review that safety-related rules are an important tool for risk and safety manage-
ment. Moreover, they found strong evidence for the assumption that the safety climate 
and safety culture is associated with rules and with the attitudes of employees towards 
these rules. They further state that safety-related rules are necessary to assign responsi-
bilities and guide behaviour in working situations. Like organisational rules, the function of 
safety-related rules is also the provision of (safety-relevant) information to support the 
respective employee. The safety-related rules define which behaviour is still safe, and 
which behaviour is already dangerous and therefore forbidden by the rule. It can be said 
that the safety-related rules define the boundaries of safe behaviour (Hale & Borys, 
2013b).   
A differentiation can be made between different types of safety-related rules. In 
their review Hale and Boryc (2013a) termed the different types of safety-related rules 
(which were originally described by Hale & Swuste, 1998) as performance goals, process 
rules, and action rules. Hale and Swuste (1998) described the rules from the most gen-
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eral to the most specified one. Performance goals are a type of rule which only specify 
which goals should be achieved and what sanctions will result if the goals are not met. 
They do not describe how the goals can be achieved. Process rules, according to Hale 
and Swuste describe how one comes to a decision about the necessary steps or how one 
reaches a solution to restore or maintain safety. Process rules contain only methods; no 
detailed steps of behaviour are specified. This specification of each step forms part of the 
action rules, which contain very detailed information which may be advantageous be-
cause everyone knows very precisely how to achieve safety, but is also disadvantageous 
because this rule type restricts freedom of choice more than any other (Hale & Swuste, 
1998). The action rule is quite similar to the concept of procedures, which is described 
below (cf. Procedures 3.1.4). The rule types are not mutually exclusive but rather usually 
merge into each other. First, there is usually a performance goal. If the goal is quite com-
plex, process rules and then action rules are needed to ultimately achieve the goal.  
The safety-related rule which is used for the experimental studies of the present 
investigation (cf. Empirical evidence 6) is an action rule, which describes in detail which 
steps have to be taken to achieve system safety. The safety-related rules thus facilitate 
the clear detection of violations. This is necessary for valid data collection, which is the 
basis for new insights into the determinants of rule-related behaviour.  
3.1.4 Procedures 
On a very general level a procedure is defined according to Gove (1963), as a 
well-established course of action consisting of several steps that have to be taken in a 
certain order to accomplish a goal. In process control environments, which are addressed 
in the present investigations (cf. Empirical evidence 6), actions are regulated by so-called 
“Standard Operating Procedures” (SOPs). SOPs are predefined processes which are 
required either in routine situations or in non-routine, infrequent, but nevertheless normal 
situations (Kluge, 2014). In these situations, the SOPs are sufficient for task completion. 
If the situation is abnormal there are no SOPs which can be applied in the respective 
situation. Such abnormal situations have to be handled by knowledge-based rather than 
rule-based behaviour (Kluge, 2014).  
Although procedures are, by their very definition, well established and usually ap-
plied in certain situations, the application of the procedures is not necessarily strictly pre-
scribed. Some procedures are optional, while others may be recommended in certain 
situations, but there are also procedures, for example safety procedures, which are man-
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datory or become a rule respectively. The safety-related rules which are investigated in 
the empirical section can be also described as prescribed safety procedures. 
Decker (2005) describes the characteristics of safety procedures as resources of actions. 
He emphasizes that procedures entail a detailed course of action, but often do not in-
clude information about the circumstances in which the procedures should be applied. 
Therefore, the application of procedures is a cognitive activity which requires a certain 
skill level. Although safety procedures are prescribed to improve safety, sometimes these 
procedures even enhance the dangerousness of situations, because some (less skilled) 
people strictly comply with the procedure without questioning whether the procedure is 
suitable for the respective situation (Dekker, 2005). Accordingly, it cannot be assumed 
that safety is necessarily the result of compliance with the procedure; rather, it is the re-
sult of the insight into the determinants of the respective situation. To corroborate safety, 
it should be monitored and understood whether, when and why people comply with or 
violate procedures. Furthermore, the skills to recognise in which situations the procedures 
are suitable and in which they are not should be supported (Dekker, 2005).  
3.1.5 Distinction between and common features of rule types 
Although the previous sections did not include all conceivable rule types, the 
range which were presented in the current context make it clear that there are many rule 
types which differ according to various characteristics (for an overview of the definitions, 
cf. Table 1). The rule types can be differentiated based on their degree of obligation, their 
type and the extent of applied enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms. Moreover, they 
can be distinguished regarding their function and application context or regarding their 
degree of specification. The characteristic shared by all rule types is that they assign cer-
tain behaviour patterns to certain situations  
This broad range of rule types shows that rules, and the compliance with or viola-
tion of rules, is a topic which is relevant in many different societal contexts and situations. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the different rule types are not independent, but are associ-
ated with each other. Although the present investigation addresses the topic of safety 
rules and the determinants of the compliance with or violation of these rules, other rule 
types and their definitions provide a valuable source of information in order to come 
closer to a holistic understanding of the characteristics of safety-related rules and their 
determinants.  
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Table 1. Rule types and their definitions 
Term  Definition 
Law  “[...] rules of conduct of a community that are recognized as bind-
ing by the community." (Gwinn et al., 1991, p. 200); enforced by a 
controlling authority  
Social norms  “informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow 
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of ex-
ternal non-legal sanctions, or both" (McAdams, 1997, p. 340) 
Organisational rules “part of the formal structure that constitutes and defines stable 
patterns of relationships and activities."; “the storage of organiza-
tional memory" (Zhou, 1993, p. 1137)  
Safety rules “[…] a defined state of a system or way of behaving in response to 
a predicted situation, established before the event and imposed 
upon those operating in the system, by themselves or others, as a 
way of improving safety or achieving a required level of safety" 
(Hale & Swuste, 1998, p. 164) 
Procedure Well-established course of action that consists of several steps, 
which have to be taken in a certain order to accomplish a goal 
(Gove, 1963). 
Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) 
Predefined processes, which are required in process control envi-
ronments in either routine, or normal but infrequent situations 
(Kluge, 2014). 
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4 Incidence and consequences of rule violations in organisa-
tions  
Zeitlin (1994) assumed that a considerable amount of industrial accidents are at-
tributable to the conscious decision to violate safety-related rules. Although, according to 
Mason (1997), the frequency of rule violations varies across different industries, he as-
sumes that in certain industries, about 70% of all accidents are caused by the violation of 
rules. Mason supposes further that rule violations, and the accidents which are caused by 
them, account for enormous costs, such as damaged plants, compensation payments, 
lost production and poor quality of work. Since some of these impacts are not clearly as-
sociated with the accidents caused by the violation, he assumes that the management 
frequently does not consider the full cost implications of rule violations (Mason, 1997).  
More recent evidence comes from Hobbs and Williamson (2002), Mascini (2005), 
Mendeloff and Gray (2005), Bell and Healy (2006) and Ko, Mendeloff and Gray (2010). 
Hobbs and Williamson (2002) found that rule violations account for about 18% of the 
variance of the reported safety-critical incidences in the aircraft maintenance sector. Bell 
and Healey (2006) also identified the violation of safety-related rules as factor, which con-
tributes to major accidents in organisations and Mascini (2005) propose that man-made 
disasters are mostly due to the violation of rules. A positive correlation between rule 
compliance and safety is also found in the OSHA studies, which are concerned with the 
investigation of safety-critical incidences in manufacturing plants described by Ko, Men-
deloff and Gray (2010) and Mendeloff and Gray (2005). 
Considering that the frequencies of violations vary across different industries (Ma-
son, 1997), the frequencies and costs of rule violations will be described separately for 
each industrial sector in the following section. Several investigations into the prevalence 
and costs of violations have been conducted in: 
• the aviation (Helmreich, 2000; Hobbs & Williamson, 2002; Li & Baker, 
1995; Rebok, Qiang, Baker, McCarthy, & Li, 2005) and aircraft sector 
(Cushing, 1994; Wenner & Drury, 2000), 
• the surface transportation sector, such as railway (Evans, 2011; Free, 
1994; Holmgren, 2005; Lawton, 1998), driving (Kontogiannis, Kossiavelou 
& Marmaras, 2002; Parker, West, Stradling, & Manstead, 1995; Parker, 
Reason, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995), or shipping (Chauvin, Lardjane, 
Morel, Clostermann, & Langard, 2013);  
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• and the healthcare sector (Alper et al., 2006; DeJoy, Searcy, Murphy, & 
Gershon, 2000; Dubbert, Dolce, Richter, Miller, & Chapman, 1990; Hersey 
& Martin, 1994; Horning & Smith, 1991; Nelsing, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 1997; 
Patterson, Rogers, Chapman, & Render, 2006).  
• Furthermore, some investigations have been conducted in other industries, 
such as energy industry (Hudson & Verschuur, 1995; Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Reason, 1987; Smith, 2011, Verschuur, Hudson 
& Parker, 1996), mining (Laurence, 2005),  or the manufacturing sector 
(Nyssen & Cote, 2010) 
4.1.1 Aviation and Aircraft sector 
Although the total amount of violations appears to be quite small, with 5.5 viola-
tions per million flight hours (Rebok et al., 2005), according to Rebok et al., their occur-
rence is a strong predictor of future crashes. The relatively small violation rate detected is 
due to the fact that Rebok et al.`s (2005) analysis is based on multiple data files compiled 
by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration. 
These institutions are concerned with accident and incident investigation and have no 
possibility to acquire information about the rule-related behaviour of pilots which does not 
lead to incidents or accidents. It can be assumed that many safety-related rule violations 
are not detected and consequently not considered, because they do not spark an incident 
or accident.  
Li and Baker (1995) also found a significant association between accident in-
volvement and violation rates. They found that pilots who were involved in a crash were 
caught committing a violation in the first three years after their crash two to three times 
more often, than pilots of the control group who had not been involved in a crash. Accord-
ingly, Li and Baker (1995) consider pilots who hold a violation record to be a “high-risk 
group” for future violations and crashes. Another investigation by Helmreich (2000), who 
used several data resources including the Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) data, re-
vealed another interesting coherence: They found an association between violations and 
errors. A team that violated procedures was also 1.4 times more likely to commit errors. 
Violations are associated not only with accidents during the flight but also with 
ground damages (Wenner & Drury, 2000) and quality incidents in the maintenance phase 
(Hobbs & Williamson, 2002). Wenner and Drury (2000) identified different hazard patterns 
accounting for the very cost-intensive ground damages, one of which describes problems 
with guidelines, a category in which violations can be also be subsumed: 8% of accidents 
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are caused by this hazard pattern. Hobbs and Williamson (2002) found a link between 
violations and the quality of maintenance, which affects the safety of an aircraft. They 
identified routine violations as the strongest predictor of incidents in the area of mainte-
nance (Hobbs & Williamson, 2002). 
4.1.2 Surface transportation sector (Railway, Driving, Shipping) 
In the railway industry the analysis of accidents had led to the insight that viola-
tions are often relevant to the causation of accidents in shunting situations (Free, 1994; 
Lawton, 1998). Free (1994) collected data regarding the frequency of violations concern-
ing different rules, and found that according to the shunters, a fixed portion of rules (15 
%) were violated quite even though the riskiness of violating these rules was estimated to 
be quite high. Evans (2011) analysed the fatal train accidents in Europe between 1980 
and 2009 and found that most serious level-crossing accidents are due to errors or viola-
tions by the road users. An investigation focusing on the examination of accidents in rail-
way maintenance (Holmgren, 2005) found violations to be the second most frequent 
cause of accidents during maintenance execution.  
Parker, Reason, Manstead and Stradling (1995) found that the tendency to violate 
a rule (questionnaire-based measure) is associated with accident involvement, while the 
tendency to commit an error is not related to the occurrence of accidents. Another inves-
tigation by Parker, West, Stradling and Manstead (1995) also demonstrated the associa-
tion between violation and accident involvement; the authors even found that the ten-
dency to disregard driving norms is associated with the severity of the accident. A more 
recent investigation by Kontogiannis et al. (2002) further corroborates the association 
between accidents and violations in the road traffic sector: The self-reported tendency to 
commit rule violations was found to be associated with accident liability and speeding 
convictions.  
The analysis of the collision reports of 27 accidents which occurred between 1998 
and 2012 in the shipping sector identified rule violations to be the cause of accidents in 3 
% of cases (Chauvin et al., 2013). 
4.1.3 Health care sector 
In the healthcare sector, the violation of general precautions to prevent infections 
(DeJoy et al., 2000; Dubbert et al., 1990; Hersey & Martin, 1994; Horning & Smith, 1991; 
Nelsing et al., 1997) and the compliance with medication administration procedures (Al-
per et al., 2006; Patterson et al., 2006) have been investigated.  
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The evidence concerning the rate of rule violations of general precautions to pre-
vent infections is quite inconsistent. Dubbert and colleagues (1990) investigated the 
hand-washing of nursing staff after critical procedures and found a violation rate of 30%, 
which could be reduced to about 8% through certain interventions. DeJoy et al. (2000) 
investigated not only hand-washing, but also the violation of other precaution rules. Their 
survey revealed similar findings concerning hand-washing, sharps disposal, use of 
gloves, waste disposal and handling of scalpels. These rules were violated in only 10% of 
cases. Other rules, such as needle recapping or eating and drinking in the work area, 
were found to be moderately violated (in 20-30% of cases). The use of eye shields or 
face masks are, for instance heavily violated (up to 50% of cases). The investigation by 
Nelsing et al. (1997) focused on the rule violation rate of doctors from different disci-
plines. The authors found that 65% of the physcians violated the basic principles of pre-
cautions (principles to avoid infections).  
A study by Hersey and Martin (1994) included not only the patient care staff and 
the physicians but also the housekeeping staff in hospitals. Participants were asked to 
make estimates regarding the application of several precautions, such as wearing gloves 
when drawing blood, recapping used needles after giving injections, and using the dis-
posal box. An average of 70% of the patient care staff violated these precautions occa-
sionally, and 65% of the surveyed physicians occasionally violated the precautions. The 
housekeeping staff were asked to estimate their behaviour concerning the changing of 
gloves before going to another patient and hand-washing. 26% of them violated these 
precautions at least occasionally or even more frequently (all percentages were calcu-
lated on the basis of the data of Hersey & Martin, 1994). Overall it can be summarised 
that at least occasional violations of the precautions in place to prevent infections, seems 
to be quite commonplace in most hospitals. 
Violations in hospitals concern not only general precautions, but also medical ad-
ministration regulations. Alper et al. (2006) reported that nurses violated the protocol in 
medical administration in 8 – 30 % of routine situations. In emergency situations, even 32 
% up to 53 % of nurses were found to violate the protocols. Due to the comparatively high 
percentage of nurses who violate protocols at least in emergency situations, the occur-
rence of medication errors was quite likely. In contrast to most other investigations, which 
are based on surveys and the voluntary disclosure of information, Patterson et al. (2006) 
acquired observational data. They observed the frequency of prescribed scanning of 
wristbands before giving the respective medication, and found that in acute care situa-
tions, the rule of scanning the wristband was violated in 53% of cases. In long-term care 
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situations, in which the patients are well known by the healthcare staff, the prescribed 
scanning rules were violated in 92% of cases.  
It is possible to influence the awareness of and sensitivity to the topic of rule viola-
tions. Horning and Smith (1991) measured the frequency of violations before and after 
they introduced an educational program providing information about the topic of rule vio-
lation and encouraged the staff of the hospital to report observed violations using a newly 
implemented violation form. The frequency of reported violations increased from 15 
(baseline measure before the program) to 197 reported violations per year (5 years after 
the implementation of the violation form). 
4.1.4 Energy, mining and manufacturing sector 
One very prominent example of the occurrence and extreme impact of rule viola-
tions is the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986. Reason (1987) analysed the sequence 
of events which led to the disastrous accident in the nuclear power plant.  In accordance 
with Hollnagel and Sakuda (2010) who assume that 80-90% of industrial accidents in the 
nuclear power industry are due to human-related factors, Reason (1987) also found that 
the Chernobyl accident was caused by human behaviour, Reason even identified rule 
violation as the main cause: Overall, he found only two errors, but six violations which 
contributed to the disaster. 
In the gas and offshore industry the occurrence of accidents like explosions, 
where many workers on the respective platform lose their lives, is a serious problem (cf. 
Mearns et al., 2001). Mearns et al. (2001) found that among other management failures, 
the violation of safety procedures contributed to these accidents. They also revealed that 
people who violated rules more often were more likely to be involved in near misses and 
accidents. A prominent example of a very disastrous accident in this sector, which was 
caused to some extent by the violation of several safety-related rules, is the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in 2005 in the Gulf of Mexico (Smith, 2011). The association between 
accidents and committed violations in the oil and gas sector is also emphasised by Ver-
schuur et al. (1996) and Hudson and Verschuur (1995), who propose that many acci-
dents within the Shell group were caused by safety-related rule violations.  
The violation of rules also seems to be a great problem in the mining industry. Ac-
cording to Laurence (2005), more than 90 % of mineworkers expressed misgivings about 
safety rules and one third indicated not always complying with the prescribed rules. They 
also indicated that they are aware of the fact that other workers violate the rules and that 
the management is aware of these violations. 
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A study by Nyssen and Cote (2010) investigating the manufacturing of medication 
found that although violations occurred in only 3% of the total number of tasks, the tasks 
which were violated were done so in an average of 95% of cases.   
.   
4.1.5 Conclusions regarding the incidence and possible consequences 
of rule violations in the different sectors 
As the previous paragraphs demonstrated, there is a wide variance in the preva-
lence rates of rule violations and the amount of accidents which are caused by the viola-
tion of rules. The prevalence rates differ depending on the industrial sector or the method 
of measurement (questionnaire-based versus observation-based). Even in studies using 
the same method of measurement in the same industrial sectors, there are great differ-
ences regarding the ascertained amount of rule violations between different investiga-
tions. This is due to the large amount of rule types and situational and person-related 
factors, which promote or weaken people`s willingness to commit rule violations.  
Although the prevalence rates of rule violations and estimates regarding the 
amount of accidents caused by rule violations differ between the investigations, an analy-
sis of the literature nevertheless reveals that rule violations are a central problem in many 
industrial sectors. To address this problem it is necessary to develop a deep understand-
ing of safety-related rule violations. Although investigations of rule violations have been 
carried out in different scientific communities and areas of practice, a holistic understand-
ing of the concept of safety-related rule violations which integrates all of the information 
and knowledge gained from these studies is lacking. This holistic understanding can be 
achieved by considering different rule types (cf. Rule classification 3) and summarising 
the different theories and insights which have already been gained from different re-
search perspectives (cf. Human Factors Perspective 5.1, Organisational and Industrial 
Psychology Perspective 5.2 and Decision-Making Perspective 5.3). Furthermore, it is 
deemed necessary to generate additional knowledge about the determinants of rule re-
lated behaviour by conducting further studies (cf. Empirical Evidence 6) and which inte-
grate the insights into a knowledge base (cf. General discussion 7). This should generate 
an improved understanding of the processes determining rule-related behaviour and en-
able the development of more effective measures to reduce the amount of safety-related 
rule violations in organisations.  
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5 General Theory 
In the following section, the concept of rule violation will be thematically integrated 
into the research areas “Human Factors”, “Industrial and Organisational Psychology” and 
“Decision Making”, and the relevant theories of each research area will be described in 
detail. 
5.1 Human Factors Perspective  
The topic of rule violations can be considered from different perspectives. The first 
and for the present investigation most relevant is the Human Factors Perspective. Human 
Factors research is concerned with the investigation of factors of the human-system in-
teraction (Wickens et al., 2004). According to Wickens et al., the goals of Human Factors 
research are to enhance performance, user satisfaction and safety. Human Factors re-
search investigates factors which influence these goal criteria and develops tools to sup-
port their achievement (Wickens et al., 2004). Although the violation of safety-related 
rules is quite common in the human system interaction of various industries and, more-
over, is linked to the prevalence of accidents (cf. Incidence and consequences of viola-
tions in organisations, section 4), so far, this topic has received comparatively little atten-
tion from the Human Factors research community.  
The description of the Human Factors perspective begins with the definition of 
safety. Then, the determinants of safety in organisations will be outlined and different 
measures of safety management in organisations, such as the implementation of safety-
related rules, will be described. Following this, the different kinds of rule-based behaviour, 
which also include different types of rule violations, will be described, categorised and 
distinguished from each other. Finally, in the last paragraph different models, which are 
concerned with the determinants of rule violations will be described and discussed. 
5.1.1 Safety 
Safety is defined on a very general level as "a state or a place where people are 
not in danger or at risk.” (Walter, 2008). The Encyclopaedia Britannica differentiates be-
tween public and occupational safety, describing occupational safety as “concerned with 
risks encountered in areas where people work: offices, manufacturing plants, farms, con-
struction sites, and commercial and retail facilities” (Gwinn et al., 1991). Although com-
mon law obligates organisations to provide safe workplaces for their employees, in many 
industrial sectors a certain level of accidents is unavoidable and publicly accepted (Wick-
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ens et al., 2004). Although accidents cannot be prevented in all cases, most organisa-
tions in these sectors run certain risk and safety management programs in order to re-
duce the harms and losses in their organisation to a minimum (Reason, 2008). In particu-
lar, so-called High Reliability Organisations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003) have to undertake 
huge efforts in this regard. High Reliability Organisations are defined by Kluge, Sauer, 
Schüler and Burkolter (2009) as organisations which operate on an extremely high reli-
ability level because technical malfunctions as well as action slips result in fatalities both 
for humankind and for environment. Due to the severity of accidents, the prevention of 
every single incident is especially important here. 
5.1.2 Determinants of industrial safety 
The analysis of major accidents supports the conclusion that most accidents are 
caused by a complex chain of technical malfunctions, individual misbehaviour and organ-
isational failures (Bell & Healey, 2006). Consequently, for the development and imple-
mentation of effective safety management measures, different safety issues have to be 
addressed.  
With regard to the Human Factors Perspective, the individual as well as the organ-
isational failures are of interest. Hofmann, Jacobs and Landy (1995) differentiate in this 
regard between three levels of determinants: the individual level, the micro-organisational 
level and the macro-organisational level.  
The individual level describes the “individual attributes that contribute to unsafe 
behaviour” (Hofmann et al., 1995, p. 132). These attributes include, for example, the atti-
tude toward safety topics, the knowledge about the system in general as well as poten-
tially hazardous behaviours of employees. The potentially hazardous behaviours are fur-
ther divided by Hofmann et al. (1995) into two subtypes. The first subtype, routine short-
cutting, describes a behaviour pattern in which certain steps of a procedure are generally 
skipped. This routine deviation already becomes an unofficial standard procedure. The 
second type refers to the violation of actually accepted rules, which are violated by only a 
few employees.  
The micro-organisational level refers to an organisation’s approach to dealing with 
safety topics (Hofmann et al., 1995). According to Hofmann et al., this can consist of the 
connivance of hazardous situations as well as emphasising production goals over safety 
goals, but can also include targeted safety management efforts of an organisation. To 
enhance safety on this micro-organisational level, the management could make efforts to 
promote a positive attitude toward safety, change the work environment to reduce unsafe 
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behaviour, or introduce a regular and systematic analysis of safety-related problems 
which have occurred within the organisation (Hofmann et al., 1995).  
The macro-organisational level (Hofmann et al., 1995) describes the influence of 
the organisational structure on industrial safety. According to Hofmann et al., the struc-
ture includes, for example, topics of the workforce organisation as well as the communi-
cation paths within organisations. 
The individual as well as the micro-organisational level are especially relevant for 
the present investigation. The impact of certain aspects of both levels was systematically 
investigated. The individual level was mainly focused on the second section of the em-
pirical evidence part (cf. 6.2), whereas the micro-organisational level of safety was con-
sidered in the other three investigations (cf. Empirical Evidence, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4). Neverthe-
less, the individual level variables were also considered in these investigations as covari-
ates. 
The next section will describe how these different levels can be addressed by 
safety management. 
5.1.3 Safety management 
All efforts of safety management are conducted to adhere to legal safety regula-
tions (cf. Law: 3.1.1.). These regulations legally obligate organisations to provide a safe 
working environment for employees and to prevent the endangerment of the environment 
of the organisation. To achieve these goals, organisations implement safety management 
programs, which according to Wickens et al. (2004) should be performed following certain 
steps: 1) The hazards of the workplaces need to be analysed. 2) The hazards need to be 
identified and classified, and then 3) appropriate measures can be developed and imple-
mented. Following implementation, 4) the effectiveness of the safety measures should be 
evaluated. The following section deals with the methods of risk analysis and the evalua-
tion of safety program effectiveness, before presenting the different human factors-
oriented safety management measures in the subsequent section. 
According to Wickens et al. (2004), risk analysis includes the analysis of relevant 
documents, for example the analysis of previous incidents and accidents, and the acqui-
sition of further data, for instance through interviews with the employees. Furthermore, it 
is recommended to collect data by making observations or conducting quantitative sur-
veys (Wickens et al., 2004). The data serve on the one hand as a basis for choosing an 
adequate safety management measure, but on the other hand can be used for the pre-
post comparison which should be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the measure 
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after the implementation. The effectiveness of the measures can, moreover, be deter-
mined by analysing objective data such as the amount of accidents or injuries (Wickens 
et al., 2004). In the following, the most common safety management measures are pre-
sented. To ensure a best possible effect of these measures, it is recommended to involve 
the executive management of the organisation in the different implementation processes 
of all these measures.  
Safety promotion refers to measures which enhance a positive attitude toward 
safety issues and improve the motivation to engage in safe behaviour. This can be 
achieved by providing feedback on the frequency of safe behaviour or accident rates and 
by setting incentives for the achievement of certain safety goals (Wickens et al., 2004). 
The attitude toward safety can be further enhanced by carrying out certain activities 
which emphasise the importance of safety and possibly change negative attitudes toward 
this topic.  
The training of employees as a safety measure includes a training which is espe-
cially focused on risk and safety topics. These training programs support a kind of collec-
tive mindfulness regarding safety issues (Reason, 2008). Deficiencies in safety perform-
ance, are according to Reason (1990), not only due to a lack of mindfulness to safety 
issues, but are also caused by a lack of competence. Therefore, the training of job-
related issues which enhances the development of skills and expertise promotes indus-
trial safety, as does risk or safety training. 
The prescription of safety-related rules is one of the most common measures of 
safety management (cf. Dekker, 2005; Mol, 2003). Safety-related rules should be devel-
oped in close cooperation with the respective job holder (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 
1998). To prevent rule violations, it should be ensured that the rules are well defined and 
do not conflict with each other. Furthermore, the rules should be clearly prioritized accord-
ing to their impact on safety (Battmann & Klumb, 1993). Besides a proper definition of the 
safety-related rules, it is highly recommended to regularly evaluate and if necessary re-
vise rules (Wickens et al., 2004).  
According to Wickens et al. (2004), the communication of the safety-related rules 
is also very important. The rules should be visible and generally accessible to all employ-
ees concerned. If there are many or quite complex rules it is recommended to conduct 
training sessions to introduce, refresh and test the retention of safety-related rules (Rea-
son et al., 1998). Moreover, the organisation has to determine how the violation of safety-
related rules should be audited and sanctioned (Wickens et al., 2004). Even if the rules 
are well defined and implemented, it will never be the case that all people comply with 
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rules. There will always be people who violate rules quite often or at least sometimes 
(Reason et al., 1998). 
Audits are a necessary measure to reinforce rule compliance, but audits are very 
expensive (Power, 1997). To achieve the maximum impact with the minimum amount of 
audits, the timing of audits and the quality and extent of information which is revealed 
about the audit procedure should be carefully planned. To gain new insights into this topic 
with the aim of deriving recommendations for the optimal implementation of safety audits 
two studies were conducted. The respective studies will be described in the empirical 
evidence part: The effect of the accuracy of information about audit probabilities will be 
focused in the third section (cf. 6.3) and the effect of audit timing will be described in the 
fourth section (cf. 6.4 ). 
5.1.4 Rule-based behaviour  
In every situation that is regulated by safety-related rules, there are two behaviour 
patterns which can occur: Either the individual complies with the rule and acts in a safe 
manner, or the individual does not comply with the rule, or shows the so-called “unsafe 
act” (Reason, 1990). According to Reason, “unsafe acts” are defined as non-compliance 
with safety-related rules in a potentially risky situation. Although the observable unsafe 
act is always the same, the underlying causes of the unsafe act can be quite different.  
Definition and categorisation of errors 
If the unsafe act occurred unintentionally (slips and lapses) or due to false inten-
tion (mistakes), these behaviours are regarded as errors (cf. Figure 1, Reason, 1990). 
Reason (1990, cf. p. 9) defines the error term as a “[…] generic term to encompass all 
those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to 
achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the inter-
vention of some chance agency”. This can be either due to certain failures concerning the 
attention (slips), memory failures (lapses), or rule- or knowledge-based mistakes (cf. Fig-
ure 1). Reason (1990) describes slips and lapses as errors which occur due to failures 
during the retention or execution of actions. By contrast, he defines mistakes as attribut-
able to failures in inferences concerning the selection of objectives or the choice of 
measures or actions to achieve the objectives.  
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Figure 1. Depiction of different types of unsafe acts based on Reason (1990) 
 
Reason (1990) also suggests allocating these error types to different cognitive 
stages of planned actions: the planning, retrieving and realisation of actions. Mistakes 
can occur during the planning phase, lapses during the retrieval phase, while slips occur 
during the realisation of the respective action sequences. Reason (1990) further suggests 
allocating the error types to different performance levels, which were originally described 
by Rasmussen (1982). Rasmussen distinguished between the skill-based, the rule-based 
and the knowledge-based levels of performance. Accordingly, in common situations, 
people take recourse to routine, mostly unconscious behaviour patterns. In these situa-
tions, people rely on their skills, and the performance on this level can therefore be con-
sidered as skill-based. Although the skill-based behaviour patterns are highly routine and 
often automated, during the retrieval and realisation of the routines, slips and lapses can 
occur. These failures can be categorized as skill-based errors (Reason, 1990).  
In situations which are indeed familiar, but which are not the same every day, 
there are stored rules which help to determine the most appropriate behaviour for the 
respective situation (Rasmussen, 1982). Errors occur also on this rule-based perform-
ance level. According to Rasmussen, an example of a rule-based error is a wrong classi-
fication of situations and the subsequent application of wrong rules. These errors are 
classified by Reason (1990) as rule-based mistakes.  
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In highly uncommon situations, the properties of the situation must be carefully 
analysed and the priority of the different goals has to be considered before appropriate 
action sequences can be planed. This process depends strongly on the person`s knowl-
edge (knowledge-based performance level, Rasmussen, 1982). Errors on this level are 
knowledge-based mistakes; they occur, for example, due to limited resources or a lack of 
knowledge (Reason, 1990). 
Definition and categorisation of violations 
The analysis of certain disasters, such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant dis-
aster, resulted in the insight that the error concept does not comprise all unsafe acts 
which lead to the respective disaster (Reason, 1990). There are unsafe acts which are 
not due to any kind of failure, but are the result of a deliberate decision to act in an unsafe 
manner. This kind of unsafe acts is labelled as violation (cf. Figure 1). The violation of 
safety-related rules is defined by Lawton (1998, p. 78) as “[…] deliberate departures from 
rules that describe the safe or approved methods of performing a particular task or job.”  
Categorisation of violation 
The concept of rule violation can be categorized further. If a rule is unintentionally 
violated, this behaviour is labelled as unintentional or erroneous violation. This type of 
violation mainly arises from a lack of understanding or from inexperience (cf. for example 
Lawton, 1998). Although some authors also subsume this behaviour under the construct 
of rule violations, according to the definition by Lawton which we assume here, this be-
haviour should be categorized as a rule-based error and not as a violation.  
If a rule is deliberately violated, the violation can be committed due to different 
motivations. Reason (2008) differentiates between malevolent violations/sabotage, which 
were undertaken to damage the system, and non-malevolent violations, which were not 
committed to harm an organisation. Malevolent violations/sabotage are related to the 
concept of Counterproductive workplace behaviour (cf. Counterproductive workplace be-
haviour 5.2.2), which is defined as behaviour that is contrary to the interests of the or-
ganisation (Sackett, 2002). 
Although malevolent violations do also occur, most violations are not committed to 
harm an organisation (cf. for example Mason, 1997). The motivations for non-malevolent 
violations are quite different. According to Reason (2008), there are violations which were 
committed to demonstrate skills in handling difficult, risky situations (optimizing violation), 
or to arouse a thrilling experience (thrill-seeking violation). The optimizing or thrill-seeking 
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violations are defined by Reason as violations which are not due to functional aspects, 
but which optimise positive emotions during the rule violation. Examples are the violation 
of speed limits just for fun (thrill-seeking violation) or the violation of safety procedures to 
demonstrate a high skill level in presence of other people (optimizing violation). Reason 
(2008) states that these violation types are determined by demographic characteristics, 
such as gender or age (young people and men tend to perform this violation type more 
frequently than older people or woman). 
Most non-malevolent violations are nevertheless not due to the thrill-seeking or 
optimizing motivation of people. Like errors, violations can also be categorized based on 
the different performance levels of Rasmussen (1982). According to Reason (2008), 
there are skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based violations (cf. Table 2). Besides 
this categorisation Reason (2008; 1990) also labels these different violation types accord-
ing to their incidence. He describes skill-based violations also as routine violations; rule-
based violations also as situational or necessary violations; and knowledge-based viola-
tions also as exceptional violations (cf. Table 2). 
Skill-based (or routine) violations are highly habitual forms of corner cutting which 
occur very frequently and especially often if compliant behaviour is rarely rewarded, or 
violations are not often punished, respectively (Reason, 2008). Reason attributes skill-
based or routine violations to the general human tendency to choose the most comfort-
able, less effortful behaviour (Reason, 1990), and believes that they are also due to con-
trol illusions (Reason, 2008).  
Illusions, or dangerous beliefs, are not only distinctive for routine rule violations; 
other violation types are also associated with certain illusions like the illusion of invulner-
ability, the feeling of being able to overcome every hazard, or the illusion of superiority, 
meaning on the one hand the conviction that one is especially skilled and on the other 
hand the belief that other people violate at least as frequently as oneself (Reason, 2008). 
Rule-based (situational or necessary) violations are non routine behaviour pat-
terns; each rule-based violation is deliberately elaborated and the rule is only violated if 
the benefits outweighed the costs (Reason, 2008). There are, according to Reason, cer-
tain factors which promote rule-based violations, for example the over-specification of 
situations by too many rules. If too many aspects of the situation are regulated, excep-
tional events can lead to situations in which the violation of a rule seems to be the only 
solution. The causes of these necessary violations are, besides over-specification, also 
deficient rules which do not fit the situation. Moreover, problems concerning the design of 
the workplace also lead to necessary violations (Reason, 2008). 
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Table 2. Types of non-malevolent violations (based on Reason, 2008; Reason, 1990) 
Non-malevolent violations. 
“[…] deliberate but non-malevolent deviations from safety procedures, rules and regula-
tions.” (Reason, 2008, p. 49) 
categorisation according to performance level/ incidence 
Skill-based violation  
or routine violation 
Rule-based violations 
or situational/necessary viola-
tions 
Knowledge-based violations  
or exceptional violations 
“These violations form 
part of a person`s reper-
toire of skilled or habitual 
actions” (Reason, 2008, 
p. 51); 
 
corner cutting (Reason, 
2008); 
 
compliance rarely  
rewarded, violations 
rarely punished (Rea-
son, 2008);  
 
“routine and optimizing 
violations are clearly 
linked to the attainment 
of personal goals […]” 
(Reason, 2008, p. 53)  
“[…] are shaped by cost-benefit 
trade-offs, where the benefits 
are seen as outweighing the 
possible costs” (Reason, 2008, 
p. 54);  
 
“[…] violations can be provoked 
by regulatory and systemic over-
specification of permitted ac-
tions.” (Reason, 2008, p. 53); 
 
are more deliberate than skill-
based violations (Reason, 2008)  
 
“[…] necessary violations have 
their origins in the deficiencies 
of the workplace and system. 
Initially, noncompliance is seen 
as essential in order to get the 
job done.” (Reason, 2008, p. 54) 
“[…]take place in novel 
atypical circumstances;  
 For which there is unlikely 
to be any specific training or 
procedural guidance” (Rea-
son, 2008, p. 54); 
 
[“…] involve the unex-
pected occurrence of rare 
but trained-for situation, or 
an unlikely combination of 
individual familiar circum-
stances” (Reason, 2008, p. 
54-55); 
 
“[…] product of a wide vari-
ety of local conditions. “ 
(Reason, 1990, p. 196) 
 
 
Knowledge-based (or exceptional) violations occur in new or uncommon situa-
tions. The rule is violated because the compliant behaviour is not or insufficiently trained 
(Reason, 2008), meaning that people are unable to apply the prescribed behaviour. The 
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occurrence of exceptional violations is complex and depends on different situational influ-
ences (Reason, 1990).  
The type of rule violations which is addressed by the present investigations is non-
malevolent skill-based routine violations. This type of violation is the most common and is 
often also assumed to be the most harmless violation. However, the high frequency and 
the routinization of this behaviour pattern in fact make this violation type very hazardous. 
People become used to the risk which is associated with the rule violation and become 
increasingly convinced that the rule violation will not have any negative consequences. 
Therefore, people even often lack a sense of guilt when committing this type of rule viola-
tion. The high incidence and the lack problem awareness provide sound arguments for 
taking a closer look at this rule violation type and its determining factors. 
5.1.5 Determinants of safety-related rule violations 
The determinants of safety-related rule violations are very diverse. There are vari-
ous models which deal with the description and explanation of (safety-related) rule viola-
tions. Although the models overlap in some respects, each model places their emphasis 
on different aspects. In the following, first, the process-oriented aspects of the models will 
be described, before different levels of rule violation determinants are then outlined. Sev-
eral theories such as the theory about the selectivity of rule violations by Lehman and 
Ramanujam (2009) make assumptions about both the process and the level of determi-
nants. Therefore, these theories will be part of both sections, but will be viewed in each 
section from different perspectives. 
Process-oriented aspects of rule violation determination models 
The theory about the selectivity of rule violations of Lehman and Ramanujam 
(2009), Lawton`s model of factors promoting rule violations (1998), as well as the theory 
of the direct motivators and behaviour modifiers of Mason (1997) provide information 
about the processes which determine the occurrence of rule violations. The Integrated 
Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to Violations (IMV, Kluge, 2010; Kluge, Badura, 
& Rietz, 2013) is also concerned with the process determinants of safety-related rule vio-
lations. Due to the decision-making focus of this theory the IMV will be described in the 
decision-making section (cf. paragraph 5.3.4). 
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) investigated rule violations in the organisational 
context and developed their theory about the selectivity of rule violations. In the theory, 
they assume that rule characteristics, contextual conditions, as well as interactions be-
   
General Theory    
 
28 
 
tween these factors influence the focus of attention and the risk perception, which in turn 
determine the likelihood that a certain rule will be violated (cf. Figure 2).  
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) further assume in their theory that the decision to 
violate a rule is a decision which has to be made under risk. The aspects of risk taking 
and their impact on rule-related decisions will be addressed in the section focusing on 
decision making and risk taking (cf. paragraph 5.3.2).  
The rule characteristics and contextual conditions which, according to Lehman 
and Ramanujam (2009), determine the focus of attention and perception of risk will be 
described in detail in the level theories section. 
 
 
Figure 2. Selectivity in organisational rule violations, depiction based on a figure by Leh-
man and Ramanujam (2009) 
 
Although, in her theory Lawton (1998) mainly describes certain factors promoting 
rule violations, she also has a process-oriented focus, as she links the influencing factors 
with different violation types (cf. categorisation of rule violations 5.1.4). In her model, 
Lawton (1998) describes three violation routes in this regard: 
(1) Violations which occur within the knowledge route are assumed to be due to a 
lack of knowledge about the rule. This lack of information is mostly attributable to or-
ganisational factors, meaning either defective rules, or poor training, monitoring or 
sanctioning mechanisms. The rule violation types which occur due to this knowledge 
route are mostly the unintentional or erroneous violations. Lawton (1998) describes 
this violation type as more dangerous than the intentional rule violations (like situ-
ational or routine violation), because people do not even know that they are violating 
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rules and it is therefore not possible for them to take at least some precautions during 
the rule violation. Since, based on our definition of rule violation (cf. definition and 
categorisation of rule violations 5.1.4), the unintentional violation of a rule is more an 
error rather than a violation, this route is not so relevant for an appropriate understand-
ing of the rule violation process.  
(2) The situational route describes the emergence of situational or exceptional viola-
tions. Rules are appropriate for most situations, but by their definition, rules lack flexi-
bility. There might be new or exceptional situations in which a rule is not appropriate or 
even cannot be applied. Furthermore, there are many situational factors like staff 
shortage or high workload that promote so-called situational rule violations, which are 
committed getting the job done. 
(3) The attitudinal route refers to rule violations which are committed because of a 
negative attitude toward the rule. This can be due to defective or obsolete rules, unfair 
sanctioning mechanisms, or the perception that the management is not committed to 
the respective rules. These factors affect the perception of the cost and benefits of rule 
violations, which in turn influences the decision for or against a rule violation. The atti-
tudinal route can cause situational as well as routine violations. 
Like Lawton (1998), who assumes that the perception of the costs and benefits of 
the violation influences the decision, Mason (1997) also describes the costs and benefits 
of an act as decisive. He described two levels of factors which determine rule-related de-
cisions with different mechanisms of action, differentiating between direct costs and 
benefits of rule-violating behaviour (direct motivators) and indirect determinants (behav-
iour modifiers). Direct motivators for rule violations are, according to Mason (1997), that 
they usually make life easier, lead to financial gains and time savings, and can be a pos-
sibility to enhance self-esteem or demonstrate one`s skill level. Further direct motivators 
can be the perceived or real pressure to violate or comply with rules which is implicitly or 
explicitly exerted by colleagues or the management.  
The behaviour modifiers exert no direct influence on the rule-related decisions, but 
indirectly increase or decrease the probability of a rule being violated (Mason, 1997). Ma-
son provides the following examples of behaviour modifiers: deficits regarding the per-
ception of safety risks, inadequate management practices, poor accountability, or ineffec-
tive disciplinary mechanisms or reward structures, respectively.  
The assignment of the factors to the different levels direct motivators or behaviour 
modifiers is not always clear, because the levels are not mutually exclusive but rather 
overlap in some aspects (Mason, 1997). Moreover, Mason emphasised that the factors of 
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both influence levels and accordingly, the amount of rule violations are susceptible to 
managerial influences. The direct motivators, as well as the behavioural modifiers, de-
scribe the mechanisms of action of the determinants and not the source of influence, 
meaning that both the motivators and the modifiers can be found on all levels which will 
be described below in the level model section. 
Mason`s (1997) assumptions regarding the impact of the direct motivators and 
behaviour modifiers are quite close to the assumptions of the rational decision-making 
theories (cf. Decision making under uncertainty, section 5.3.1). Mason assumes that the 
actual costs and benefits of a decision option (direct motivators), as well as the percep-
tion of the costs and benefits of the decision options (behaviour modifiers) influence 
which option is chosen.  
Several other authors like Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998), Reason (2008) or 
Phipps et al. (2008) also assume that the decision to violate a rule is a decision which 
can be explained by the assumptions of rational decision-making theories. They propose 
that people will choose the option which is associated with a minimum level of cost and a 
maximum level of benefit. They assume that people will violate a rule if the perceived 
benefits exceed the potential costs of the violation (Reason, 2008). The probability of the 
costs and benefits is also considered in the rule-related decision. Whereas the benefits of 
rule violations are mostly quite small, but very immediate and likely, the costs by contrast, 
are mostly severe, but remote and unlikely (Reason, 2008).  
The perceived benefits of rule violations described by Reason are almost congru-
ent with the direct motivators of Mason (1997). Reason (2008) refers to the advantages 
regarding time and easiness, but also mentions the aspects of thrilling and macho dem-
onstration which can be achieved by a rule violation. The perceived costs of rule viola-
tions are, according to Reason (2008), causing accidents, injuring of people, damaging 
property or losing the job. As these examples illustrated, the costs are indeed quite 
unlikely, but are also much more negative and serious than the benefits are positive.   
Phipps et al. (2008) also explain rule violations by the endeavour of people to op-
timise the use of behavioural resources, and suppose that people violate rules when the 
existing rules are contrary to these efforts. In accordance with this assumption, Phipps et 
al. (2008) recommend the following measures to decrease rule violations: increasing the 
costs and decreasing the benefits of violations, and increasing the benefits and decreas-
ing costs of rule compliance.   
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The impact of the processes of rational decision making will be also discussed 
from the decision-making perspective (cf. section on decision making under uncertainty 
5.3.1).  
Summing up the different aspects of the processes which determine rule viola-
tions, it can be stated that rule violations are determined by the attention focus and the 
risk perception, that different determinants lead to different rule violation types, and that 
the direct and indirect benefits and costs, respectively, are considered before rule viola-
tions are committed. 
Level models  
Hofmann, Jacobs and Landy (1995) already developed a level model for safety-
related performance almost 20 years ago. Besides safety-related rule violations, the 
model also includes human error in general. They propose individual, micro-
organisational and macro-organisational impact factors for safety performance-related 
indicators in High Reliability Organisations (HROs). Hofmann et al. (1995) assume that on 
the individual level, the attitude, e.g. the conviction that behaving safely is a sign of 
weakness, the behaviour, e.g. routinely cutting corners in procedures, and a lack of 
knowledge are factors which negatively affect safety performance.  
On the micro-organisational level Hofmann et al. (1995) mention the following 
relevant impact factors: the safety-related self-regulation of the organisation, such as the 
organisational policy, which should promote the link between compliance and safety; and 
elements of the work environment and management activities, such as the emphasis that 
the most important thing is to get the job done no matter what, or the accurate formulation 
of job descriptions.  
On the macro-organisational level, Hofmann et al. (1995) regard several charac-
teristics of HROs as relevant determinants, for example the centralisation or decentralisa-
tion of certain decision-making processes, the vertical and horizontal communication pro-
cedures, or the redundancy of technology and management structures typical for HROs. 
If the centralized decision-making procedures are all agreed and decentralized decisions 
are also applied if the situation requires it, the information is continuously transmitted 
within and across different organisational levels, and the redundancy of technology-based 
and human-based decision-making procedures do not lead to a decrease in the personal 
responsibility for certain activities, this will contribute on the macro-organisational level to 
more safety in HROs (Hofmann et al., 1995). This level model of Hofmann et al. (1995) is 
already quite similar to the following level models, which do not consider safety-related 
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performance or the determinants of unsafe behaviour in general, but rather the determi-
nation of safety-related rule violation in particular. 
The level models which are specially geared to the violation of safety-related rules 
include the Macroergonomic Framework of safety violations of Alper and Karsh (2009; cf. 
Figure 3), the Behavioural Cause Model of Verschuur et al. (1996), aspects of Lehman 
and Ramanujam`s (2009) theory about the selectivity of rule violations and further inves-
tigations and aspects of theories which make assumptions about the determinants of rule 
violations. 
 
 
Figure 3. Alper and Karsh`s Macroergonomic framework of safety violations (depiction 
based on a figure by Alper and Karsh, 2009), bold variables are empirically validated) 
 
Alper and Karsh (2009) conducted a systematic review of safety-related violations 
in industry and developed a macroergonomic framework of safety violations to summarise 
the influencing factors, which are or might be relevant for the decision to violate safety-
related rules (cf. Figure 3). They considered 13 articles and found 57 variables to be sig-
nificant predictors of safety-related rule violations. They categorize the predictors and 
describe four levels of influences: the individual level, the work system/situational level, 
the organisational level and the external environment level. Each level includes variables 
which have already been experimentally validated (marked in bold in Figure 3) and vari-
ables which have not been investigated but are assumed to be relevant. The following 
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sections are based on the Macroergonomic framework of rule violations by Alper and 
Karsh (2009). All other determinants, which were described by various authors, are sub-
ordinated to the levels of Alper and Karsh (2009). 
 
Individual level  
On the individual level Alper and Karsh (2009) assume demographic variables, 
such as age, gender and ethnicity as well as a person`s experience, knowledge, needs, 
biases, or attitudes to be relevant.  
Based on her investigation of rule violations in the area of railway shunting, 
Lawton (1998) proposes different levels of influencing factors, similar to Alper and Karsh 
(2009). One of the levels to which Lawton refers is the level of individual influences. The 
contents of Lawton`s (1998) individual differences level are largely the same as the indi-
vidual level of Alper and Karsh`s Macroergonomic framework (2009).  Besides the effect 
of sex and age, which were also mentioned by Alper and Karsh, Lawton mentions sobri-
ety, rigidity, pessimism and reserve as associated with rule compliance, whereas she 
describes aggression, excitability, impulsivity, optimism and changeableness as related to 
rule violations. 
Additionally, Reason (2008) described various individual factors as relevant for the 
determination of rule violations. As high-risk groups, he identified young men and people 
who were previously involved in an accident. Furthermore, Reason found (2008) that 
people who are less constrained by what others think, people who have a high opinion of 
their working skills, and people who are experienced and at the same time not error-
prone are more likely to violate safety-related rules. Battmann and Klumb (1993) assume 
that experienced workers may think that they do not have to follow the procedures, be-
cause they are convinced that, in contrast to inexperienced workers, they have a “proc-
ess feeling” which enables them to violate the procedures without any risk or with only 
very low risk. Furthermore, rule violations quickly become routine if they are rarely sanc-
tioned or rarely lead to other negative consequences, while compliance with the rule is 
not associated with positive consequences (Reason, 1997). On the other hand, Mo-
lesworth, Tsang and Kehoe (2011) found that inexperienced pilots were more likely to 
engage in rule-violating behaviour and that simple rehearsal measures led to more rule 
compliance. Combining these results it can be assumed that a medium level of experi-
ence is most beneficial regarding the promotion of rule compliance.  
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A further influencing factor, which fits into the individual level of Alper and Karsh`s 
(2009) framework is the person`s beliefs. According to Reason (2008), beliefs are quite 
relevant regarding the determination of rule violations. He investigated driving violations 
and found that rule violations are associated with several dangerous beliefs or illusions: 
the control illusion, the illusion of invulnerability and the illusion of superiority. People who 
have the control illusion feel powerful and overestimate their ability to control the situa-
tion; the illusion of invulnerability leads people to underestimate the probability of nega-
tive consequences of rule violations, and people with the illusion of superiority are con-
vinced that they are more skilled than others. People with these illusions are more likely 
to violate rules than people without these illusionary beliefs. Beliefs are, moreover, an 
integral part of the Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to violations 
(Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013), which is described in paragraph 5.3.4. 
On the individual level, a person’s motivational background is also considered as 
relevant for the rule-related decision. If the violation satisfies personal goals, this is per-
ceived as rewarding for the respective person, which will in turn reinforce the respective 
behaviour (Reason, 1997). According to Reason, the motivation for violations can be di-
verse. The motivation can be the effective use of resources (routine violations, situational 
violations), to manage the situation (situational violation), or to achieve a pleasant activa-
tion and emotional state (thrill-seeking violation). The motivation is determined through 
situational influences, but is also based on interpersonal differences. There are people 
who generally feel good violating rules, while others might even feel uncomfortable and 
guilty if they violate a rule even if the rule was not appropriate for the situation (Reason, 
1997).  
The behavioural cause model (described on the basis of Hudson, Verschuur, 
Parker, Lawton, & van der Graaf, 1998) proposes four major factors which determine the 
motivation to violate rules: (1) the expectation, (2) the powerfulness, (3) the opportunity 
and (4) the work planning. These four factors were found to explain 62 % of the variance 
in violating behaviour (Verschuur et al., 1996). In the following, the factors expectation 
and powerfulness, which belong to the individual level, will be described. The determi-
nants work planning and opportunity will be described in the section regarding the work 
system/situational level and the organisational level. Expectation describes the conviction 
that rules have to be violated to get the job done. The higher the expectation that rule 
violations are necessary for accomplishing the task, the more likely the respective subject 
will be to violate the rule. Powerfulness describes the extent of the conviction that one 
has the abilities and the experience to accomplish the work task without strictly following 
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the procedure. This determinant is also positively associated with rule violations (Ver-
schuur et. al., 1998).  
Work system/situational level 
According to Alper and Karsh (2009), the work system level includes several work 
task characteristics, like task difficulty, time, or sequence demands, the availability of 
technology, the prescription of goals, as well as physical conditions like the noise level 
and lightning conditions (cf. Figure 3).  
Several factors of the work system level were also addressed by other authors in-
vestigating rule violations. For example, Lawton (1998) described that time pressure is 
conducive to the occurrence of rule violations. Moreover, Phipps et al. (2008) also de-
scribe time pressure and design of equipment as factors which influence both the occur-
rence of errors and the occurrence of rule violations.  
An aspect which belongs to the work system level and which is of fairly central im-
portance regarding the determination of rule violations is described by Battmann and 
Klumb (1993) as well as Reason, Lawton and Parker (1998). They assume that in the 
majority of the cases, rule violations are due to conflicting goals and constraints. Accord-
ing to Battmann and Klumb (1993), there are several constraints which are imposed on 
employees. These include external (for example organisational) and internal constraints, 
general constraints based on global rules, and local constraints which are only valid in 
certain areas. Since the different constraints often contradict each other (sometimes even 
the constraints on one level are contradictory, for example when different constraints of 
the organisation are in conflict), people have to decide which rule or constraint they want 
to comply with and which rule they have to violate.  
According to Battman and Klumb (1993), the different rules/constraints and their 
outcomes are evaluated on different evaluation levels. For example, moral or material 
aspects are taken into account, and short-term and long-term outcomes are considered 
(cf. Decision making under uncertainty, paragraph 5.3.1). The different rules and con-
straints are ordered according to these criteria, and then the rule-related decisions are 
made in a hierarchical top-down process (Battmann & Klumb, 1993).  A conflict which 
occurs very often in the organisational context is the conflict between performance- and 
safety-oriented goals (Reason et al., 1998). To make the decision situation in the experi-
mental investigations (cf. Empirical Evidence paragraph 6) as realistic as possible, a con-
flict between safety and performance goals was simulated. First the participants were told 
that their compensation for participation would be based on their performance, and later 
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on they were also given certain safety instructions which were incompatible with their 
performance goals, meaning that they were forced to decide whether they wanted to 
achieve their safety goals or their performance goals (with the latter including a good re-
muneration). 
The behavioural cause model (described on the basis of Hudson et al., 1998) also 
proposes works system/situational determinants. One of the factors proposed by the be-
havioural cause model is work planning, which describes the extent to which the respec-
tive work activity is scheduled and prepared. Inadequate planning and preparation en-
hance rule violations. Hudson et al. (1998) recommend supervision in order to coach 
people to improve their work planning skills. 
Organisational level 
According to Alper and Karsh (2009), influencing factors of the organisational level 
include the social climate, social norms and pressures as well as the management struc-
ture in an organisation. Additionally, the impact of organisational policies, the financial 
state and the staffing level of the organisation as well as the extent of training that is pro-
vided by the organisation are subsumed in the organisational level (Alper & Karsh, 2009).  
Fogarty and McKeon (2006) investigated rule violations in the medical sector and 
found that a positive organisational climate was negatively correlated with rule violations 
in medication administration. The organisational climate was conceived by Fogarty and 
McKeon (2006) as positive if supportive leadership was practised, and the employees 
were involved in decision making and had the possibility to participate in professional 
development measures.  
The determinant opportunity of the behavioural cause model (described on the 
basis of Hudson et al., 1998), is also subordinated to the organisational level. According 
to Hudson et al. (1998) the extent of perceived occasions to violate rules determines the 
amount of rule violations. The more opportunities for violations were perceived, the more 
likely people were to violate the rule. They suggest analysing the background of viola-
tions, investigating the violation potential of certain situations, and if necessary revising 
rules. 
In her theory about factors promoting rule violation Lawton (1998), also describes 
certain organisational factors such as staff shortages, supervisory pressure, equipment 
non-availability, or high workload. All of these factors increase the pressure to violate 
rules in order to meet targets in the prescribed time period. Moreover, not only formally 
prescribed rules exist in an organisation; there are also rules which were developed and 
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enforced by the people who work in the organisation (Lawton, 1998). These group norms 
are used by the organisational members as a framework for actions within the respective 
organisation. Olson Grosshuesch, Schmidt, Gray and Wipfli (2009) provided evidence for 
the impact of social norms and pressures: They found that when role-models wore pro-
tective equipment, the number of people who did not wear the prescribed equipment de-
creased. A high frequency of rule violations can be due to group norms which conflict with 
the rules prescribed by the organisation. According to Lawton (1998), the organisation 
should corroborate norms which coincide with their rules, whereas conflicting group 
norms should be addressed by appropriate measures. 
Although rules are considered on the organisational level in the Macroergonomic 
framework of Alper and Karsh (2009), the rule characteristics are not further specified 
and, moreover, do not assume a central position in their theory. The theory of the selec-
tivity of rule violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009) takes a closer look at the rule char-
acteristics, the contextual conditions and the interaction between these factors.  
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) describe rules as constraints on people`s behav-
iour. The organisation prescribes the compliance with certain rules. Nevertheless, the 
organisation requires from its members not only this compliance with rules, but also the 
achievement of other organisational goals, such as the achievement of certain perform-
ance levels. Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) assume in this regard that people tend to 
violate rules if they are convinced that they are below the required aspiration level. This is 
congruent with the assumptions of the Prospect Theory by Kahnemann and Tversky 
(1979), which will be described in the section regarding decision making under uncer-
tainty (cf. 5.3.1). Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) assume, moreover, that the decision to 
violate a rule depends on the consideration of the characteristics of that rule. As relevant 
rule characteristics, Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) considered the enforceability of a 
rule, the procedural emphasis and the connectedness with other rules (cf. Figure 2).  
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009, p. 649) define the enforceability of a rule as “the 
extent to which regulatory agencies are able to monitor compliance with the rule and pur-
sue justice for violations, as well as the extent to which such pursuit is likely to occur”. 
The enforceability of a rule is determined by the amount of audits and the magnitude of 
sanctions or fines which are prescribed if a rule violation is detected (Lehman & Ramanu-
jam, 2009; Zhou, 1997). Also, the supervision and punishment model, which is based on 
the assumption that people are generally bad and lazy, assumes that rules are generally 
violated unless people are not forced into compliance by control and punishment meas-
ures (Hudson et al., 1998). The determinants control and punishment, which are pro-
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posed in the supervision and punishment model explained 20 % of the behavioural vari-
ance regarding rule violations (Verschuur et al., 1996). The impact of audits, and in par-
ticular the impact of the accuracy of information about audit probabilities and the timing of 
audits on the occurrence of safety-related rule violations, is investigated in the studies 
described in the impact of audit probability section (cf. 6.3) and the section about the im-
pact of audit timing (cf. 6.4). 
The procedural emphasis is described by Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) as the 
extent to which the procedure and not the outcome is emphasised by the rule prescrip-
tion. If the procedural emphasis is high, there is more ambiguity regarding the rule com-
prehension; therefore, people interpret the rules in such a way that they can legitimate 
the rule violations. If, by contrast, the procedural emphasis is low, there is no room for 
interpretation, therefore, rule violations are perceived as more risky and consequently 
these rules are violated less often. 
The connectedness to other rules describes the extent to which a rule is linked to 
or interdependent with other rules and prescriptions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The 
authors assume that the higher the connectedness of a rule, the less likely it is that the 
rule will be violated. The connections between rules make the consequences of rule vio-
lations less controllable and the violation more risky, because other connected rules 
might be unintentionally affected by the violation.  
The impact of rule characteristics on rule violations is also described by several 
other authors. Reason (1997; 2008) and Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998) assume that 
clumsy, inappropriate or bad rules and procedures increase the perceived benefits of rule 
violations, which in turn lead to more rule violations. According to Reason (1997) and 
Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998), the prescription of too many rules, which leads to so-
called procedural overspecification, also increase the amount of (situational or necessary) 
rule violations. The procedural overspecification of situations, but also new exceptional 
situations which are not considered in the rule, can lead to a mismatch between the rule 
and the situation, making a rule violation necessary to get the job done (Reason, 1997; 
Reason, 1990; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). If these situations occur repeatedly, these origi-
nally situational or exceptionally committed violations can become routine violations 
(Reason, 1997).  
Battmann and Klumb`s (1993) approach also considers the role of rule character-
istics regarding the determination of rule violations. They assume that most violations can 
be explained by either unclear or conflicting rules, the absence of standards to prioritise 
between high- und low-level safety regulations, or finally, delayed or no feedback.  
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As these various outcomes of the influence of rule characteristics on the violation 
of rules shows, the content and formulation of rules has to be well conceived. Further-
more, the interplay between different rules and possible future situations should be re-
garded as far as possible. If a rule is violated very frequently and the goal is to reduce the 
amount of violation, one of the first priorities should be to review the rule characteristics.  
The contextual conditions which are described by Lehman and Ramanujam 
(2009) are the secrecy of compliance structures and the coupling between violations and 
outcomes. The secrecy of the compliance structures refers to the extent to which organi-
sations monitor and detect rule violations and how this is communicated to the organisa-
tional members. If the structural secrecy is high, the detection and control is concentrated 
in one organisational unit and only a small number of organisational members are in-
formed about the monitoring, detection and regulation practices in the organisation (Leh-
man & Ramanujam, 2009). If the secrecy of the compliance structures is low, the monitor-
ing activities are distributed to different units and the procedure is transparent for the or-
ganisational members. Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) found that a high secrecy of the 
compliance structures is associated with a high amount of rule violations.  
The extent to which rule violations are monitored and detected varies according to 
the frequency with which audits are conducted and is also influenced by the amount of 
information which is revealed about the audit frequency. This aspect is addressed in the 
empirical part (cf. impact of audit probability, paragraph 6.3). The study described in this 
part focuses on the impact of the accuracy of information about audit probabilities on the 
occurrence of safety-related rule violations. On the basis of the theory of the selectivity of 
rule violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), it can be assumed that the higher the ac-
curacy of information about audit probabilities, the less secret is the compliance structure, 
which in turn leads to a decrease in rule violations. If no information about the audit prob-
abilities is supplied, this should result, by contrast, in a comparatively high amount of rule 
violations. 
An example of possible interactions between rule characteristics and contextual 
conditions, which is mentioned by Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), is that the low proce-
dural emphasis may facilitate the enforceability of a rule, because the low procedural em-
phasis makes the detection of rule violations easier. Conversely, rule characteristics can 
also influence contextual conditions, for example a high interdependence of rules leads to 
a low level of compliance structure secrecy, because the interdependence of the rules 
makes it difficult to concentrate the responsibility for rule compliance to only one unit. 
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A further determinant on organisational level is the organisational culture. The or-
ganisational culture is determined by organisational standards and objectives, which are 
implicitly or explicitly communicated to the organisational members (Lawton, 1998). As an 
example of influences of the organisational culture, Lawton refers to the quite common 
conflict between the performance- and safety-oriented goals of an organisation, which is 
also mentioned by Reason (1998) and Alper and Karsh (2009). In contrast to Lawton, 
Reason and Alper and Karsh assign the occurrence of goal conflicts to the work sys-
tem/situational level.  
According to Lawton (1998), three requirements have to be met by an organisa-
tion in order to support rule compliance. The first requirement refers to the rule quality: 
the rule should be accurate, comprehensible, user-friendly and should be updated and 
reviewed regularly. The second requirement is that people must be aware of the rule and 
the hazards which are risked if the rule is violated. This can be achieved by the proposi-
tion of regular training measures, which should be also used to introduce new rules and 
procedures. The last requirement which should be met by the organisation is the monitor-
ing of rule-related behaviour and the fair and consistent sanctioning of rule violations in 
order to increase the costs of violating (Lawton, 1998). By implication, this means that 
bad rules, rules which are not known or rules which are not enforced by corresponding 
sanctioning mechanisms are factors which promote rule violations.  
External environment level 
The external environment level includes all exogenous influences on the organisa-
tion (Alper & Karsh, 2009). These influences can be legal regulations and governmental 
standards, as well as influences of the respective industrial sector (cf. Figure 3). 
5.1.6 The Human Factors perspective – Conclusions 
Human Factors research is associated with the continuous improvement of safety 
by focusing on the human contribution to safety in the man-machine-organisation interac-
tion. The prevention of unsafe behaviour is in this regard one of the main research inter-
ests in this area. Whereas the topic of human error has been very central in the research 
community, the conscious decision to violate safety-related rules received comparatively 
little attention. Nevertheless, over the years, several Human Factors researchers have 
discovered the significance of this topic. They have identified different rule violation types 
and formulated models which describe different levels of factors determining rule viola-
tions. The previous section gave a summary of these research activities. To integrate the 
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various sources of information into one holistic understanding of the determinants and 
processes regarding safety-related rule violations, the Process-Level Model of safety-
related rule Violations (PLMV) is developed by the author. The PLMV summarises on the 
one hand different levels of influencing factors, which are proposed by various authors 
and models, and on the other hand additionally considers the characteristics of the deci-
sion-making process and the determination of different rule violation types. 
The PLMV (cf. Figure 4) is based on the findings of Alper and Karsh (2009) dis-
played in grey boxes, Lawton (1998) displayed in light blue elements (although this article 
is also considered by Alper and Karsh, it is nevertheless regarded secondly because dif-
ferent further aspects which have not yet been considered by Alper and Karsh are inte-
grated), Parker Verschuur and Lawton (1996) displayed in light red, Reason, (1997; 
2008), Reason, Parker and Lawton (1998), and Phipps et al. (2008) displayed in light 
orange, Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) in light ochre, Battmann and Klumb (1993) in 
yellow, and Mason (1997) displayed in light purple. 
The levels proposed by the PLMV 
The PLMV differentiates between three levels of influences on safety-related rule 
violations: the individual level, the situational/organisational level and the external envi-
ronment level.  
The individual level consists of the determinants by Alper and Karsh (cf. Figure 4), 
but is extended by the influential factors expectation, powerfulness (Verschuur et al., 
1996), motivation (Reason, 1997) and beliefs/ illusions (Reason, 2008).  
The next level is the situational/organisational level. In contrast to Alper and Karsh 
(2009), who differentiate between four levels, the PLMV proposes only three levels. Since 
the assignment of certain determinants to either the work-system or the organisation level 
is difficult and does not make sense in many cases, these levels are summarized in the 
PLMV in one level. For example, the time or task demands, as well as the department 
goals, which are assigned by Alper and Karsh (2009) to the work-system/situational level 
are inextricably linked with the organisational policy, the organisational culture or the so-
cial norms in an organisation. This makes it difficult to assign, for example, conflicting 
goals to the work-system/situational level or the organisational level.  
The situational/organisational level which is proposed by the PLMV consists of the 
determinants which are proposed by Alper and Karsh (2009) in the work-system/ situ-
ational and the organisational level. As further determinants, work planning, opportunity 
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Figure 4. Process-Level Model of safety-related rule violations (PLMV) 
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(Verschuur et al., 1996), rule characteristics, contextual conditions (Lehman & Ramanu-
jam, 2009) and conflicting goals (Battmann & Klumb, 1993; Reason et al., 1998) are re-
garded as relevant and were therefore added to this level. 
The third level is the external environment level, which is also proposed by Alper 
and Karsh (2009). Although the external environment, such as the legislation or trends in 
the respective industrial sector, is relevant for the decision to violate a safety-related rule 
both as a direct and indirect influence, this level is usually not open to influence and is 
therefore regarded as a rather negligible source of influence. Therefore, this level is de-
picted in lighter font in the PLMV (cf. Figure 4).  
The decision-making process proposed by the PLMV 
The PLMV not only includes the definition of different influential levels, but also 
considers the processes which determine the occurrence of safety-related rule violations. 
All process aspects of the PLMV are marked by frames and arrows. The red elements are 
relations which are originally proposed by the PLMV. 
The determinants rule characteristics and contextual conditions, which are as-
signed to the situational/organisational level are described by Lehman and Ramanujam 
(2009) as interdependent and interacting factors which influence the likelihood that a rule 
will be selected for a violation by influencing the focus of attention and the perception of 
risk (cf. Figure 4, light ochre elements). In the PLMV, it is assumed that the rule charac-
teristics and the contextual conditions do not influence the focus of attention and the per-
ception of risk directly. Rather, It is assumed that this influence is mediated by the direct 
motivators and behavior modifiers which are proposed by Mason (1997). The PLMV sup-
poses further that not only the rule characteristics and the contextual conditions, but also 
the determinants of all levels, can be assigned to the category direct motivators or behav-
ior modifiers (depicted by the large red bracket in the model). The differentiation between 
the direct motivators and the behavior modifiers is derived from the theory of Mason 
(1997), who assumes that every influential factor can be assigned to one of these catego-
ries. Whereas the direct motivators influence the actual, real benefits and costs of viola-
tions, the behavior modifiers influence the perceived benefits and costs (Mason, 1997). 
Both the real and the perceived costs and benefits are assumed to influence the amount 
of rule violations (proposed by Phipps et al., 2008; Reason et al., 1998; Reason, 2008) by 
determining the focus of attention and perception of risk, which in turn influence the likeli-
hood that a rule will be chosen for a violation.  
Although the observable behavioural response, the rule violation, is identical, the 
violations are caused by different sets of motivations. The categorisation of violations 
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depends on these different motivational backgrounds. The violation of rules can, for ex-
ample, be unintentional and due to different error types (unintentional violation); they can 
be committed in order to harm an organisation (malevolent violation); they might be due 
to situational circumstances (situational violation); or they may be the result of a simple 
shortcut which was taken to make life easier (routine violation). In the PLMV, only the 
non-malevolent rule violations were considered, because it is assumed that these rule 
violation types are most relevant in the organisational context. 
The connection between rule violations and rule violation types proposed by the PLMV 
The different motivational backgrounds and violation types are closely connected 
to the determinants of rule violations. This becomes especially apparent in Lawton`s 
(1998) theory of factors promoting rule violations. In her theory, she describes different 
rule violation routes (cf. Figure 4, labelled arrows). Each route is characterised by differ-
ent determinants, which lead to different rule violation types. For example, if people are 
not sufficiently informed about the rule, this will lead to unintentional/erroneous rule viola-
tions. If people have a negative attitude toward a rule, this can lead to skill-based/routine 
violations as well as rule-based/situational/necessary  violations, and if there are situ-
ational aspects which lead to the rule violation, this violation can be assigned to the rule-
based/situational/necessary violation or the knowledge-based/exceptional violation. 
A further violation route is proposed in the PLMV. On the basis of the findings of 
Reason (2008), who describes that young males are more prone to violations, and in 
view of the assumption that certain personality traits are also associated with the violation 
of rules (cf. for example Lawton, 1998), the PLMV proposes the personal route (cf. Figure 
4, red arrow). According to the personal route certain demographic variables such as age 
and gender as well as certain personality traits are associated with skill-based/routine 
violations as well as optimising and thrill-seeking violations. Both violation types are not 
triggered primarily by situational cues, but rather by habits and preferences which are 
assumed to be determined by demographic variables and personality traits. 
Conclusions 
The knowledge gained in the area of Human Factors research about the levels of 
determinants, the process and the types of rule violations is the first step in developing a 
holistic understanding of safety-related rule violations. The PLMV is a summary of the 
knowledge about rule violations gained in the area of Human Factors research and can 
be used as starting point for further investigations in this area. Furthermore, the PLMV 
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can be used as guideline for practitioners who want to reduce the level of rule violations 
in their organisation. In order to develop effective rule violation reduction or even better 
prevention measures, it is essential to understand the determinants and processes which 
lead to the rule violation in the specific situation. Moreover, the type of rule violation, 
which is committed in the respective situation, provides a valuable source of information 
which should be utilized. Prevention and reduction interventions can only be successful if 
they are specially geared to the causes of the respective rule violations. 
Although the Human Factors research has made, and continues to make, major 
contributions to the understanding of safety-related rule violations, the view of the rule 
violation concept is rather restricted to evidence from their community. Rule violations are 
also investigated in other areas of research. To broaden and gain inspiration and new 
insights into the understanding of safety-related rule violations, the next paragraphs deal 
with the topic of rule violations from the perspectives of Industrial and Organisational 
Psychology and Decision Making.  
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5.2 Industrial and Organisational Psychology Perspective 
Up to this point the topic of rule violations has been considered only from the Hu-
man Factors perspective, but the violation of rules is investigated in other areas as well, 
such as the field of industrial and organisational psychology. Industrial and organisational 
psychology is defined by Muchinsky (2006, p. 3) as “an area of scientific study and pro-
fessional practice that addresses psychological concepts and principles in the work 
world”. In this area, rule violations are investigated and discussed under the heading of 
deviant behaviour, dysfunctional behaviour or misbehaviour in organisations, as well as 
under the most commonly investigated counterproductive workplace behaviour (CWB). 
Whereas these terms are general and very broad concepts, there are further concepts 
which describe certain subtypes of these behaviour patterns (such as organisational re-
taliation behaviour or mobbing). Although there is quite a lot research activity concerning 
the investigation of these phenomena, the different areas are not well interconnected (cf. 
Ones, 2002). The following sections should close the gap between the Human Factors 
and the Organisational Psychology Perspective by connecting the organisational con-
cepts with the concept of safety-related rule violations, which is commonly used in the 
area of Human Factors research. 
The following section begins by defining the general terms deviant behaviour, dys-
functional behaviour and misbehaviour in organisations. By comparing the different con-
cepts with each other common features as well as inconsistencies among the terms will 
be described. As the next general term, the concept of counterproductive workplace be-
haviour (CWB) will be considered. Since this concept is the most popular and most inves-
tigated concept in the organisational psychology community, it will be described in greater 
detail. Moreover, its prevalence and measurement will be outlined, and finally, the deter-
minants and relevance of the construct and the relation to rule violations will be dis-
cussed. 
Besides the general terms, there are many other terms which are associated with 
the area of counterproductive workplace behaviour or rule violations in organisations. In 
the final section, the terms which describe different behaviour-oriented categories, such 
as theft or misuse of information, and certain subtypes of CWB, such as organisational 
retaliation behaviour or workplace incivility, will be defined. Finally, suggestions for the 
further classification of the behaviour-oriented categories will be described and discussed 
with regard to their relation to safety-related rule violations.   
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5.2.1 Deviant behaviour, dysfunctional behaviour /misbehaviour in or-
ganisations 
Deviant behaviour, employee deviance, or workplace deviance are different terms 
for the same concept, which according to Robinson and Bennett (1995, p. 556) is defined 
“[…] as voluntary behaviour that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing 
threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or both” The authors further 
describe the norms as “dominant administrative coalitions of organizations rather than the 
norms of work groups or subcultures” (Robinson & Bennett, 1995, p. 556).  
Dysfunctional behaviour in organisations is defined by Griffin, O`Leary-Kelly and 
Collins (1998, p. 19) as “[…] motivated behaviour by an employee or group of employees 
that has negative consequences for an individual within the organization, a group of indi-
viduals within the organization, and/or the organization itself.” In contrast to the definition 
of dysfunctional behaviour in organisations the definition of workplace deviance includes 
the violation of norms. All other aspects are the same in both definitions: both behaviour 
patterns are motivated and/or voluntary, meaning not unintentionally, and both are de-
fined by their consequences, which are negative or threatening for individuals in an or-
ganisation or for the organisation as a whole.  
Misbehaviour in organisations is, according to Vardi and Wiener (1996, p. 151), 
defined as “[…] any intentional action by members of organizations that violates core or-
ganizational and/or societal norms" Like the definition of deviant and dysfunctional behav-
iour, the definition of misbehaviour in organisations also includes the aspect of intention-
ality; like the definition of deviant behaviour, it also emphasises the aspect of norm viola-
tions. In contrast to the other constructs, misbehaviour in organisations is not defined by 
the negative consequences of the behaviour. 
5.2.2 Counterproductive workplace behaviour (CWB) 
The concept of CWB can be seen as a special concept insofar as it has received 
more scientific attention than the other concepts of deviant behaviour in organisations. 
Some authors (cf. for example Gruys & Sackett, 2003) even use the term CWB as ge-
neric term for all concepts which describe any form of deviant behaviour in the work con-
text, meaning the more general terms which were already described above, as well as 
the subtypes which will be described below.  
Sacket and DeVore (2001, p. 145) define CWB as “[…] any intentional behaviour 
on the part of an organization member viewed by the organization as contrary to its le-
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gitimate interests.” Marcus and Schuler (2004) refine this definition, describing three crite-
ria which have to be met for behaviour to be categorized as CWB. They describe CWB as 
a volitional act, which has to be at least potentially harmful and has to be due to, but is 
not allowed to outweigh, other legitimate interests. The violation of safety-related rules 
meets all these criteria and can therefore be considered as a subtype of CWB. 
The estimated incidence of CWB differs between studies and depends strongly on 
the type of occupation (blue vs. white collar worker) and the cultural background of the 
employees. Whereas some authors estimated that 33 - 75% of all employees sometimes  
engage in CWB (Harper, 1990), the investigation of white collar workers in Turkey re-
vealed that about 13% of all employees engaged in CWB at some time (Bayram, Gursa-
kal, & Bilgel, 2009), while another study showed that 44% of Chinese production workers 
showed CWB (Peng, 2012). As these quite high prevalence rates of CWB already sug-
gest, the costs which are attributable to this behaviour are substantial (cf. for example 
Hogan & Hogan, 1989). Murphy (1993) even estimated that the annual organisational 
costs of CWB lie anywhere between 6 and 200 billion US dollars. 
As the level of CWB and the associated costs are high, organisations are interested in 
reducing this behaviour (which also includes safety-related rule violations as a subtype of 
CWB).  
To come closer to a holistic understanding of CWB (or safety-related rule viola-
tions, respectively), it is useful to understand the process which determines its occur-
rence. The Paradigm for Counterproductive Behaviour (Martinko, Gundlach, & Douglas, 
2002, cf. Figure 5) offers a valuable framework in this regard. The paradigm draws a dis-
tinction between Situational Variables and Individual Differences which affect the Cogni-
tive Processing, which in turn determines the CWB. Martinko et al. used the Paradigm for 
Counterproductive Behaviour as a framework to categorise the results of the investigated 
variables of all papers considered in their review. Based on this model, in the following, 
first the Individual Differences will be discussed under the heading Person-related predic-
tors of CWB. The Situational Variables are described in the paragraph entitled Situation-
related predictors of CWB. Since safety-related rule violations are considered as a sub-
type of CWB, the paradigm and the identified predictors might also be relevant for eluci-
dating the processes which determine the compliance with safety-related rules. 
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Figure 5. Simplified illustration of the “Paradigm for Counterproductive Behaviour” based 
on Martinko et al. (2002) 
 
Person-related predictors of CWB 
According to the review by Martinko et al. (2002), CWB is associated with sex 
(males engage more in CWB than females), locus of control (the external locus of control 
is associated with CWB), attribution style (the ‘pessimistic’ attribution style is positively 
related to CWB), core self-evaluations (self-esteem is negatively associated with CWB), 
negative affectivity (negative affectivity is positively related to CWB) and integrity (integrity 
is negatively related to CWB).  
Integrity tests are explicitly developed to predict CWB, usually in the context of 
personnel selection. The test development is not based on theoretical considerations, but 
is criterion-oriented, meaning that the items are selected on the basis of their predictive 
validity instead of their theoretical background (Marcus, Ashton, & Lee, 2013). As a con-
sequence, integrity tests have no theoretical foundation. They often consist of a mixture 
of measurements of different constructs like conscientiousness, reliability and honesty 
(Hakstian, Farrell, & Tweed, 2002). This procedure of criterion-oriented test development 
nevertheless guarantees a good quality of integrity as predictor of CWB (cf. for example 
Goldberg, Grenier, Guion, Sechrest, & Wing, 1991; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 
1993), but the interpretation of the test results are difficult (Marcus et al., 2013). Other 
disadvantages are the obvious purpose of the test and the resulting susceptibility to ma-
nipulation. However, integrity is the most frequent construct used by organisations to pre-
dict CWB. 
Although integrity tests are still the most common method of CWB prediction, re-
searchers have also considered other personality traits, such as the Big Five (cf. for ex-
ample Gonzalez-Mulé, DeGeest, & Mount, 2013; Hakstian et al., 2002). Hakstian et al. 
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(2002) found negative correlations of conscientiousness and agreeableness with CWB 
and a positive correlation between extraversion and CWB. Gonzales et al. (2013) consid-
ered not only the classic Big Five, but also the traits morality and dutifulness, which are 
theoretically located between agreeableness and conscientiousness. Gonzales et al. 
(2013) define morality as respect for authorities, following of rules and harmony prefer-
ence, whereas dutifulness describes people`s tendency to behave well and to be thought-
ful. Both morality, and dutifulness were identified as important predictors of CWB. The 
benefit of these CWB predictors compared to integrity tests lies in their inconspicuous-
ness, which makes the manipulation of these personality tests at least less likely.  
As a subtype of CWB, it can be assumed that safety-related rule violations are de-
termined by person-related factors as well. Hence, there is a necessity to identify person-
related predictors of safety-related rule violations. In the section about the impact of the 
goods at stake (cf. 6.1)  risky decision making (measured by the GDT cf. Brand, Labudda, 
& Markowitsch, 2006) and conscientiousness (measured by the Mini-Markers of Saucier, 
1994) were used as person-related predictors, but turned out not to be related to safety-
related rule violations. The studies described in the impact of personality section (cf. 6.2) 
were conducted to identify other personality predictors of safety-related rule violations. In 
this regard, several concepts of undesired behaviour, like employee deviance, antisocial 
behaviour, lying behaviour, and imprudent and criminal behaviour were considered with 
regard to their associations with personality traits.  
Situation-related predictors of CWB 
The review by Martinko et al. (2002) revealed in addition to the person-related 
variables, several situational variables which influence CWB. Organisational constraints 
like inflexible organisational policies or rules, leadership style, wages, audits and punitive 
measures are only a few examples of the situational variables which were identified as 
influential concerning the determination of CWB (Martinko et al., 2002). Since safety-
related rule violations are considered as a subtype of CWB it can be assumed that the 
violation of safety-related rules is determined by similar organisational factors.  
The impact of certain situational variables on safety-related rule violations (and 
potentially also of CWB) will be addressed by the empirical investigations in sections 6.1, 
6.3, and 6.4. In these investigations, the impact of the framing of the hourly wage as gain 
or loss was addressed. In the goods at stake study (cf. 6.1), it was additionally investi-
gated how social norms influence safety-related rule violations. In the audit probability 
study (cf. 6.3), different accuracy levels of information about audit probabilities were in-
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vestigated, whereas in the audit timing study (cf. 6.4), the impact of the timing of the audit 
was examined.  
Since it is assumed that there are similar situational factors determining both 
safety-related rule violations and CWB, research into CWB should investigate whether 
the effects described in the empirical evidence part can be replicated for other CWB pat-
terns besides safety-related rule violations. 
5.2.3 Subtypes of undesired behaviour in organisations 
The review of the literature on the construct of CWB, used here as a general term 
to undesired behaviour in organisations, resulted in a long list of behaviour patterns. 
Gruys and Sacket (2003) classify these patterns into eleven categories which range from 
theft and destruction of property, to misuse of information, time or resources, to unsafe 
behaviour, poor work quality, substance abuse and inappropriate verbal and physical 
actions.  
In addition to these behavioural based categories, there are even more terms 
which are used to describe different subtypes of CWB, such as: organisational retaliation 
behaviour, workplace aggression, mobbing, organisational delinquency, social undermin-
ing, workplace incivility and emotional abuse (Nerdinger, 2008; O'Leary-Kelly, Duffy, & 
Griffin, 2000). Some of these terms are defined by their motivational background; for in-
stance the organisational retaliation behaviour is defined by Skarlicki and Folger (1997, p. 
435) as “[...] subset of such negative behaviors, those used to punish the organization 
and its representatives in response to perceived unfairness […]”. Other behaviour de-
scribes certain well-defined subtypes of CWB such as mobbing (cf. Zapf & Einarsen, 
2005) or emotional abuse (cf. Keashley & Harvey, 2005).  
Furthermore, there are terms which are used to describe a certain intensity of 
CWB, such as workplace incivility, which Pearson, Andersson and Porath (2005, p. 179) 
define as “[...] low intensity deviant (rude, discourteous) behavior with ambiguous intent to 
harm the target in violation of workplace norms for mutual respect". The term organisa-
tional delinquency, in contrast, describes more severe and criminal behaviour patterns 
such as theft, substance abuse, excessive absences, malingering, and equipment dam-
age.  
Hollinger and Clark (1982) propose a categorisation of CWB patterns into two 
broad categories: property deviance and production deviance. They suggest that all sub-
types of CWB, from theft to inappropriate physical actions, can be assigned to one of 
these categories. Property deviance is described as “[...] instances where employees 
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acquire or damage the tangible property or assets of the work organization without au-
thorization” (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, p. 333), whereas production deviance describes “[...] 
behaviors which violate the formally prescribed norms delineating the minimal quality and 
quantity of work to be accomplished“ (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, p. 333-334). The violation 
of safety-related rules, as it is investigated in the present investigation, refers to behav-
iour which can be categorised as production deviance. 
5.2.4 The Industrial and Organisational Psychology Perspective –
Conclusions  
As the previous sections have illustrated, in the area of organisational psychology, 
a large number of terms and concepts circulate regarding deviant, counterproductive or 
rule-violating behaviour in organisations. Although there are already some attempts to 
describe the interrelation between these concepts (cf. for example Nerdinger, 2008; 
O'Leary-Kelly et al., 2000), there remains a lack of conceptual clarity concerning the dif-
ferent terms and the transferability of the research results between these concepts. A 
valuable step in this direction is the comprehension of CWB as a general term for all de-
viant behaviour patterns in organisations (Gruys & Sackett, 2003; Martinko et al., 2002). 
This aggregation enables a systematic consideration of many empirical investigations into 
different but similar concepts in order to gain a consistent understanding of the determi-
nation of these counterproductive behaviour patterns, as was undertaken by Martinko et 
al. (2002). Although a great deal of work remains to be done in terms of summarising the 
different findings regarding counterproductive behaviour in the area of Organisational 
Psychology, the first step in this regard has already been taken.  
The consolidation of the research results regarding rule violations from different 
disciplines like the Human Factors area, the Organisational Psychology area or the area 
of Decision Making is yet to be undertaken. As Ones (2002) noted, there is practically no 
exchange and communication between the different areas investigating CWB, or as a 
Human Factors researcher would call it, safety-relevant rule violations. The current inves-
tigation should close this gap by providing ideas about possible correlations between the 
concepts from the different areas. The results of industrial and organisational psychology 
research on different CWB behaviour patterns and personality traits are used to derive 
new predictors of safety-related rule violations (cf. Impact of Personality, section 6.2). 
Furthermore, this investigation should encourage the researcher from different areas to 
see the bigger picture and to also consider the findings from other research areas in 
which this type of behaviour is investigated. If the different perspectives are combined, 
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this should lead to a “truer” conception of this behaviour, and should prevent the research 
efforts investigating similar questions in different areas from being wasted.  
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5.3 Decision-Making Perspective 
The Human Factors Perspective (cf. section 5.1) as well as the Organisational 
Psychology Perspective (cf. section 5.2) consider the topic of safety-related rule violations 
in a practical tangible context, in which either the consequences of the violations for (in-
dustrial) safety or the achievement of organisational goals are taken into account. This 
topic can also be seen in a more process-oriented context. The Decision-Making Per-
spective considers rule violations in relation to their process characteristics. The decision-
making situation regarding the violation of rules is seen as decision making under uncer-
tainty, therefore, first of all, the most relevant theories in this area, are described (cf. De-
cision making under uncertainty, section 5.3.1). The decision to violate a safety-related 
rule is, moreover, a risk-taking decision (cf. Decision making and risk taking, section 
5.3.2), which is often committed in an organisational context (cf. Decision making in or-
ganisations, section 5.3.3). The final section is initially concerned with models which ex-
plain and predict the decision-making process and the emergence of certain behaviour 
tendencies on a general level. These models are ultimately integrated and applied to the 
decision-making process concerning the violation of safety-related rules (cf. Decision 
making regarding rule violations, 5.3.4).  
Finally, the different theories and their impact on the understanding of the deci-
sion-making process regarding safety-related rule violations are discussed (cf. The Deci-
sion-Making Perspective – Conclusions, section 5.3.5). 
5.3.1 Decision making under uncertainty 
Most decisions are made under uncertainty; important decisions which are well 
thought out, such as the decision to change job, as well as everyday decisions which are 
made very quickly, such as the decision to cross the road when the lights are red. All 
such decisions have to be made under uncertainty, and the decision maker has to take 
into account different options. It has to be considered which consequences are associ-
ated with each respective option, and it has to be estimated how desirable and how prob-
able these different consequences are. Since these decisions are determined by expecta-
tions as well as evaluations, the decision-making theories are referred to as expectancy 
(value) theories. 
The expectancy theories can be assigned to two different theoretical approaches. 
The normative or rational decision-making theories (cf. for example Keeney & Raiffa, 
1976; March, 1994; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1972; Wilkinson & Klaes, 2008) as-
sume that the decision-making process is determined by consequential and preference-
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based procedures. It is assumed that the decision maker performs certain steps to come 
to a decision: first, all possible actions are considered, second the expectations regarding 
the consequences of the actions and the likelihood of the consequences are considered, 
and finally, a preference regarding the different actions, and the consequences associ-
ated with them, is developed (March, 1994). 
The empirical investigation of the rational decision-making theories showed that 
some decisions could not be explained by the assumptions of these theories. The incon-
sistencies between theory and reality led to the development of new, more descriptively 
oriented theories such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In the following, 
two rational decision-making theories are described. Following this, the descriptive deci-
sion making will be addressed by outlining of the most popular concept, the prospect the-
ory, which also plays an important role in the empirical part of the present investigation 
(cf. Empirical Evidence, section 6). 
Rational decision making 
There are plenty of theories which describe decision making as a rational process. 
In the following, only the Expected Utility Theory (EUT, Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1972) and the Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) are described. The EUT was chosen 
because this theory represents the historical origin of the rational choice theories; all 
theories which followed refer to this theory and describe their theories in differentiation to 
the EUT. Whereas the EUT is a mathematically oriented theory, which was developed by 
a mathematician and an economist, the Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) is more psy-
chologically oriented. The Expectancy Theory was developed by the business psycholo-
gist V. H. Vroom and is one of the most popular motivation theories in psychology. 
Vroom`s theory bridges the gap between mathematical and psychological theory con-
struction by combining a short simple mathematical formula consisting of terms which are 
not only mathematically defined but are also based on a precise psychological under-
standing of the involved processes and terms. In the following paragraph, first, the Ex-
pected Utility Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1972) will be outlined, and subse-
quently, the Expectancy Theory of Vroom (1964) will be described. 
 
The Expected Utility Theory (EUT). In 1947, Neumann and Morgenstern formu-
lated the axioms of the Expected Utility Theory (described in Von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 1972). They assume that the decision-making process is determined through the 
evaluation of the consequences of choices and their associated probabilities, which are 
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called expected utilities (defined here according to Wilkinson & Klaes, 2008). Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1972) assume that the expected utility is determined by the following 
axioms: 
1. Completeness: describes the assumption that each consequence can be 
assigned to a preference level, which can be described by numerical  val-
ues, these values can be ordered, so that the consequences (or utilities) 
can be sequenced according to their preference value, for example from 
the least preferred consequence to the most preferred consequence 
2. Transitivity: if certain preference values (of consequences) are known, the 
relation between the remaining consequences can be concluded, if for ex-
ample the consequence a) is evaluated as more preferable than conse-
quence b), and consequence b) is less preferable than consequence c), 
than it can be concluded that consequence c) is more preferable than con-
sequence a) 
3. Continuity: if certain consequences are highly preferred, but are at the 
same time very unlikely, the value of this choice decreases, whereas the 
choice, of consequences which are not that preferred but are very likely in-
creases in value  
4. Independence: the preferability of choices (determined by the preference 
value and the possibility of the consequence) is not influenced by the com-
bination with choices which refer to other decision situations 
If the option with the greatest expected utility is determined according to these 
axioms, this option will be chosen and realised. Although the EUT is a very influential 
theory which had an enormous impact on subsequent theories, there is extensive empiri-
cal evidence contradicting the assumptions of the EUT (cf. for example Schmook, Ben-
drien, Frey, & Wänke, 2002).  
 
The Expectancy Theory. The Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) is a motivation 
theory which predicts the force/motivation to perform a certain act on the basis of psycho-
logical events which occur contemporaneously with the resulting behaviour. The motiva-
tion regarding the realisation of a certain act can be determined by a function of the 
strength of the expectancy and the valence and the consequences of the outcome. The 
term valence refers to an “affective orientation toward particular outcomes” (Vroom, 1964, 
p. 15) and is similar to the preference term used in other theories (for example in the 
EUT). The term valence as it is used in Vroom`s formula is not only defined by the affec-
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tive orientation toward the outcome and the outcome consequences, but also takes into 
account the instrumentality with which the outcome leads to the respective consequences 
(Vroom, 1964). According to Vroom, the term expectation describes the degree to which 
a person believes that the achievement of the outcome is probable through the respective 
act.  
Although the Expectancy Theory is assigned to the rational decision-making theo-
ries, the psychologically oriented definition of both the terms valence and the expectation 
implies that the processes are not completely due to rational deliberations. Rather, they 
are based on subjective estimations which are susceptible to several cognitive biases 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These effects cannot be explained by the rational decision-
making theories, because they assume that the decision-making process is completely 
determined by rational cost-benefit calculations (cf. for example Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
These shortcomings are addressed by the descriptively oriented decision-making theo-
ries, and especially by the most prominent and successful of these theories, the Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which is described in the next paragraph. 
Descriptive decision making  
As the rational decision-making theories are unable to predict and explain several 
decisions, Kahnemann and Tversky proposed (1979) the Prospect Theory, which is a 
descriptive decision-making theory that has been widely accepted and frequently investi-
gated (Schmook et al., 2002). Kahnemann and Tversky (1979, p. 263) define a prospect 
as “a contract that yields outcome with probability". As in the rational decision-making 
theories, it is assumed that decision options or prospects are mainly evaluated on the 
basis of their outcome as well as their probability characteristics. But the Prospect Theory 
assumes, in contrast to these theories, that the evaluation of the prospects is not linear 
and includes several exceptions. In the following, first the conception of the decision-
making process in the prospect theory will be described, before finally, the differences 
between the rational and descriptive decision-making theories are discussed. 
The Prospect Theory. In the Prospect Theory of Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), 
it is assumed that there are two phases of decision making: the editing phase and the 
evaluation phase. The editing phase includes five steps: the information is (1) coded, (2) 
combined, (3) segregated, and some aspects of the prospect are furthermore (4) can-
celled and (5) simplified. In contrast to the rational decision-making theories, the coding 
(1) is not determined by absolute conditions and values, it is based on comparisons be-
tween the outcomes and a certain reference point. This implies that people do not per-
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ceive their state on an objective level, but evaluate the outcome in comparison to a previ-
ous situation or an expectation as gain or loss. This perception can be influenced by the 
description of the prospects.   
The next step in the editing phase is the combination of information (2), which 
means that different probabilities that are associated with identical outcomes are com-
bined into one general possibility (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the segregation step 
(3), the prospects which consist of risky as well as risk-free components, are segregated. 
The components with sure outcomes are segregated from the components in which there 
is only a certain possibility that the outcomes can be achieved.  In the cancellation step, 
(4) the components which are equal between the prospects are ignored, and only the 
components which differ between the prospects will be regarded. The simplification step 
(5) concerns the simple upward and downward adjusting of probabilities. After the infor-
mation has been edited according to these steps, each prospect is considered in the 
evaluation phase.  
According to Kahnemann and Tversky`s (1979) assumptions, the evaluation 
phase is determined by the attributes of certain value functions. The basis of these func-
tions is the relation to a certain reference point, which is determined by expectations and 
situational influences like the prospect description. The outcomes of prospects are evalu-
ated on the basis of deviations from this certain reference point. The value function is 
different for loss and gain perceptions: The value function of gain is concave, and less 
steep than the function of loss, which is convex (cf. Figure 6 ). Loss looms larger than  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Hypothetical value function of Prospect Theory; depiction based on Kahnemann 
and Tversky (1979) 
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gain, meaning that if, for example, a certain amount of money is lost, the aggravation is 
higher than the pleasure if the same amount of money is gained. This can be transferred 
to the presentation of certain prospects: If a prospect with objectively the same value is 
displayed as loss, this should be perceived as comparatively more unpleasant and should 
be avoided more strongly than if the same prospect is merely presented as gain. Since 
people wish to avoid the loss situation, they are content to engage in more risky behav-
iour to have a chance of preventing this experience. However, if the same outcome is 
displayed as gain, people try to retain the situation by preferring more risk-averse deci-
sion options. 
Comparison between rational and descriptive decision making 
The descriptive decision-making theories, like the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), capture the contradictions which arose during the empirical validation of 
the rational decision-making theories and consider and explain these effects.  
The first example, in which the rational decision-making theories fall short, be-
cause the prospect with the highest expected utility is not chosen, concerns situations in 
which the choice has to be made between prospects where a positive outcome is possi-
ble but very unlikely. According to the Prospect Theory, in these situations, most people 
tend to choose the prospect which is associated with the larger gain, disregarding the 
exact probabilities of the prospects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
In contrast to the rational decision-making theories, which assume that the pure 
value of outcomes is considered, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) assumed in their Pros-
pect Theory that people’s decisions are not only influenced by the value of outcomes. As 
already described in the evaluation section, if outcomes are displayed as gains, people 
decide in a more risk-averse manner and choose the prospect which is associated with 
comparatively less outcome value, but with higher outcome probability. If the same out-
come is described as possible loss, people tend to be more risk-seeking, choosing the 
prospect which is associated with maximal outcome values and accepting less high out-
come probabilities. 
Whereas the rationally oriented theories propose that every aspect will be appre-
ciated equally, the Prospect Theory assume that decision makers try to minimize their 
cognitive workload during the decision-making process by focusing on the aspects of the 
prospects which distinguish between the decision alternatives and ignoring those aspects 
which the prospects have in common (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
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The rational choice theories represent the historical origin and foundation of a 
proper understanding of the Prospect Theory, which is most relevant for the present in-
vestigation (cf. Empirical Evidence 6.1, 6.3, and 6.4). In these studies, it was investigated 
whether the framing of the production outcome and salary as gain or loss influences the 
decision to violate a safety-related rule. Participants were brought into a goal conflict be-
tween a good salary on the one hand and safety on the other hand, under the assumption 
that if the production goals and the salary are framed as loss, the participants would pre-
fer the more risky choice of a rule violation in order to at least have a chance of avoiding 
the loss situation. If the production goal and the salary are, however, displayed as gain, 
people should tend to choose the safe option of rule compliance.  
5.3.2 Decision making and risk taking 
The violation of (safety-related) rules is associated with certain risks, which are 
considered during the decision-making process. In this regard, it seems to be worthwhile 
to outline the theoretical background regarding the decision making of risk taking. In the 
following, first, the term risk taking will be defined, and subsequently, the determinants of 
risk taking and risk acceptance, respectively, will be described.  
According to Trimpop (1994, p. 9), risk taking is defined as “any consciously, or 
non consciously controlled behavior with a perceived uncertainty about its outcome, 
and/or about its possible benefits or costs for the physical, economic or psycho-social 
well-being of oneself or others." In contrast to the definition of rule violations (cf. Rule-
based behaviour, section 5.1.4), the risk-taking decision is not by definition a conscious 
decision, but the decision has to be made under uncertainty and should have an impact 
on the well-being of oneself or other people.  
There are several factors which determine the decision-making process regarding 
risk taking. There are neurocognitive processes, certain cognitive biases, and person-
related, situational and social influences. Since the decision to violate a safety-related 
rule is a risk-taking decision, the following determinants of risk taking are also relevant 
regarding the determination of safety-related rule violations. 
Neurocognitive processes of decision making under risk 
Brand, Labudda and Markowitsch (2006) proposed a model which describes the 
neurocognitive processes that determine risk-taking decisions (cf. Figure 7). Brand et al. 
(2006) assume that the prefrontal cortex and the structures which are summarized under 
the term “frontostriatal loops” are relevant neurological structures that are involved in risk-
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taking decisions. These structures are associated with executive functions that seem to 
be relevant in the decision-making process of risk taking. Brand et al. (2006) assume fur-
ther that the neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin modulate the risk-related deci-
sion-making processes on the neurochemical level.  
  
 
 
Figure 7. Brand`s model of decision making under risk, depiction based on Brand, et al., 
(2006)  
 
Brand et al. (2006) propose the following neurocognitive processes in their model: 
first several aspects of the decision situation, like the outcome probabilities, or the 
amount and probability of rewards and punishments, are analysed in the working mem-
ory. This analysis is regulated by the categorisation and selection processes of the ex-
ecutive function (located in the prefrontal cortex and frontostriatal loop). Additionally, rele-
vant information which is stored in long-term memory is retrieved. In working memory, 
this information is combined to generate an appropriate decision strategy for the current 
situation (“rational route”). The decision strategy determines the decision, which is in turn 
associated with either positive or negative feedback (like the gain or loss of certain re-
sources). In the next step, the feedback leads to associations between emotional states 
and physiological signals (which thereby become somatic markers). These somatic 
markers influence future decision-making processes on the “emotional route”. On the 
emotional route, decisions are made without rational considerations only on the basis of 
certain physiological signals (somatic markers). These trigger emotional states, which in 
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ing to Brand et al. (2006), overall there are three routes of decision making: The decision 
can be made on the basis of rational considerations, on the basis of emotional states 
(triggered by somatic markers) or by a mix of the two. Brand et al. (2006) assume that the 
integration of emotional and rational information will lead to superior decisions and per-
formance compared to the processing on only one of the informational “routes”. 
Due to the fact that the decision to violate a safety-related rule is also a decision 
which has to be made under risk, it can be assumed that the processes described by 
Brand et al. (2006) can be transferred to this decision-making process, i.e. that the deci-
sion to violate a rule is controlled by similar neurological structures and neurochemical 
and psychological processes. 
Cognitive biases and risk taking 
In the following, certain biases of risk taking (Yates & Stone, 1992) will be de-
scribed. First, on a general level, not all biases of risk taking will be described, but only 
those biases which are considered as relevant in the decision-making process of rule 
violations. Following this, the relationship with and application to rule-related decisions 
will be outlined.  
Value bias: If a certain event and its outcome are strongly desired and the event 
does not occur particularly rarely, people tend to overestimate the likelihood of success 
and underestimate the risk of failure (Yates & Stone, 1992). Transferring the value bias to 
a rule-related decision would mean that the desire to achieve a certain benefit by violating 
a rule will lead to an overestimation of the likelihood that the rule-violating behaviour will 
succeed, or an underestimation of the risks associated with the violation, respectively.  
The personal role bias refers to the overconfidence in one`s own abilities (Yates & 
Stone, 1992). According to Trimpop (1994), there is one personal role bias which is es-
pecially relevant with respect to the evaluation of risks: The belief that the risks of the 
situation can be controlled (illusion of control) leads to the underestimation of these risks. 
In particular, routine rule violations (cf. section 5.1.4), which are investigated in the em-
pirical section (cf. section 6) occur due to the illusion that the risks associated with the 
violation can be controlled (Reason, 2008). This control illusion belittles the dangerous-
ness of these violations and leads to a lack of guilty conscience and the normalisation of 
these rule violations. 
Mood effects: People in a depressive mood overestimate the probability of failure 
in risk situations (Yates & Stone, 1992). In the decision-making process regarding rule 
violations, failure probabilities have to be considered as well; therefore, it can be as-
sumed that the tendency to violate a rule is also influenced by a person`s mood. People 
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who are in a negative or depressive mood should be more likely to show rule-compliant 
behaviour (because the risk of failure is overestimated), whereas people who are in a 
good mood should decide comparatively more often to violate a rule. 
Level effects: The wording of the task description or question can lead to different 
estimates of risks (Yates & Stone, 1992). The formulation of information about the risks 
which are associated with rule violations should influence how the risks are perceived 
and evaluated. This refers, for example, to the framing effect, which was already de-
scribed in the scope of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, cf. section 
5.3.1) and is investigated in the empirical studies described in the sections 6.1, 6.3, and 
6.4.  
The person-related determinants of risk taking 
The individual differences regarding risk taking are also referred to as risk propen-
sity, which is defined as “[...] the tendency of a decision maker either to take or to avoid 
risks” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p. 12). A person`s risk propensity can be measured by as-
sessing all risk-related decisions across different situations and times (Nicholson, Soane, 
Fenton‐O'Creevy, & Willman, 2005). Nicholson et al. (2005) investigated risk propensity 
and found that there are people who are generally more risk-averse, while others are 
more risk-seeking. A third group turned out to differ in their risk propensity in different 
areas (cf. Motives of risk taking, section below). 
What are the determinants of risk propensity? Several researchers, such as Trim-
pop (1994), assume that the risk propensity is determined by evolution. He argues that 
the skill to choose the optimal amount of risk is a very valuable advantage in the fight for 
the survival of the fittest. In order to acquire resources for oneself and one`s own de-
scendants, it is necessary to run risks. People who are successful in this regard will sur-
vive longer, will have more descendants, and their genetic code will spread in the long 
term. However, if the risk is too high, the person will possibly die even before reproduc-
tion (Trimpop, 1994).The optimal risk level is not always the same, and also differs from 
person to person; the person`s own abilities and environmental influences have to be 
estimated (Buss, 1988). Trimpop (1994) assumes in his evolutionary approach that risk-
taking behaviour is regulated on a physiological level: Choosing the optimal risk level is 
rewarded with a pleasant level of activation and positive emotional experiences, which 
are triggered by certain neurological processes. If risky situations are mastered, this 
again leads to positive emotions due to the pleasant arousal, the experience of control 
and the achievement of the objectives (Trimpop, 1994). Considering these different rein-
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forcement mechanisms, the determination of risk taking can be described as controlled 
by physiological, as well as emotional and cognitive influences (Brand, et al. 2006, Trim-
pop, 1994).  
A theory which also proposes that individual differences in risk propensity are due 
to physiological differences is the theory of sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979). Sensa-
tion seeking is defined as the "need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and ex-
periences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such ex-
periences” (Zuckerman, 1979, p. 10). Zuckerman assumes further that people differ re-
garding their sensation seeking because they have varying dispositional arousal levels. 
All people feel comfortable at a medium level of arousal. He assumes that depending on 
their dispositional arousal level, people prefer different extents of risks to achieve the 
pleasant medium level. People who have a low dispositional arousal level are sensation 
seekers, meaning that they are willing to run risks to achieve a medium level. People who 
have a high dispositional arousal level tend to avoid risks, because they have already 
achieved their preferred arousal level. Lauriola, Panno, Levin and Lejuez (2013) investi-
gated the correlation between risk taking and sensation seeking and found in their meta-
analysis a small to moderate association between sensation seeking and risk-taking be-
haviour.  
Lauriola et al. (2013) also found a small correlation between impulsivity and the 
occurrence of risky behaviours. Besides sensation seeking and impulsivity sex is also 
associated with risk taking (Nicholson et al., 2005). In the questionnaire-based investiga-
tion by Nicholson et al. (2005), it was found that men reported more risk-taking behaviour. 
This effect of sex was also found in several investigations regarding rule violations, indi-
cating that men violate rules significantly more often than woman (Reason, 2008). 
Nicholson et al. (2005) also investigated the correlation between self-reported risk taking 
and the Big Five, and found that high extraversion and openness were positively related 
to the tendency to run risks, and neuroticism, agreeableness and conscientiousness were 
negatively related to the tendency to run risks.  
Summing up the person-related influences on risk taking, Trimpop (1994) con-
cluded that person-related factors admittedly have a certain impact. He assumed that 
these factors explain 5-25% of the variance in risk-taking behaviour. Although the influ-
ence of person-related variables on risk taking is certainly not trivial, Trimpop proposes 
(1994) a stronger impact of situational influencing factors (cf. next paragraph).  
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Situational determinants of risk taking 
Trimpop assumed (1994) that situational determinants are more influential regard-
ing the determination of risk taking then person-related variables. The situational deter-
minants of risk taking are omitted in this section because some factors, like the valence 
and the probability of the outcomes, are already sufficiently outlined in the section regard-
ing Decision making under uncertainty (cf. 5.3.1). Other situational influencing factors 
which are relevant for the decision-making process of risk taking, as well as for the deci-
sion-making process regarding rule violations, will be described in the section on Deci-
sion making of rule violation (5.3.4). 
Motives for risk taking 
The section regarding the person-related determinants of risk taking already al-
luded to the topic of the motives for risk taking. There are, for example, people who need 
the stimulation for intrinsic pleasures (sensation seekers), while others only run risks in 
order to achieve extrinsic benefits, such as material profits (Trimpop, 1994). Nicholson et 
al. (2005) propose that due to the great diversity of risk-taking situations, the motives for 
risk taking are complex and vary intraindividually according to the respective situation. 
The goal classifications of Nicholson et al. (2005) which are described in the following are 
not mutually exclusive, meaning that depending on the situation, one person can have 
different motives for running risks. 
Stimulation motive: People with this motive run risks because they are psychologi-
cally rewarding, giving them gratification and positive excitement. This motive is satisfied, 
for example, by dangerous sports or gaming. Not many people run risks due to the stimu-
lation motive; the other motives are much more common (Nicholson et al., 2005).  
Achievement of goals/Avoidance of loss motives: People with this motive run risks 
because they want to achieve goals, such as success, or popularity. Evidence showed 
that the personalities of people who run risks to achieve certain outcomes tend to feature 
a stronger manifestation of emotional coolness, toughness and insensitivity to rules and 
control (Nicholson et al., 2005).  
The avoidance of loss appeals to the framing effect, which is described in the 
Prospect Theory of Kahnemann and Tversky (1979). According to the framing effect, 
people are willing to accept risks only to avoid the loss of certain properties. In both cases 
(achievement of goals and avoidance of loss), people would prefer to avoid running the 
risk. They bear the risk only to achieve their goals or prevent the emergence of the loss 
situation, respectively.   
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Risk adaptation motive: People of this motive group differ in their risk propensity 
depending on the situational background (Nicholson et al., 2005). The interaction of skills, 
interests and individual dispositions determine the risk propensity in the respective area. 
Several people run risks on a professional level, such as finance specialists who even 
receive specific training from their employer to raise the willingness to run risks (Nichol-
son et al., 2005).  
Social determinants of risk taking 
Society influences risk taking, for example by judging people according to certain 
stereotypes (Trimpop, 1994). People who risk their health or lives are evaluated favoura-
bly, e.g. pilots, racing car drivers or boxers, who are admired for their willingness to take 
risks. They are associated with the stereotype of “hero”, whereas risk-avoidant persons 
are linked to the negative “coward” stereotype (Trimpop, 1994).   
The influence of society on risk taking is also described by Slovic (2000) as social 
amplification of risk. He assumes that risk perception is a social experience which is de-
termined by institutional structures, social-group behaviour and individual responses. Ac-
cording to Slovic (2000), there is no true or absolute risk value. The perception of risk is 
determined by social influences, the information system and the public opinion.  
Slovic (2000) uses a metaphor for the social determination of risk; he describes 
the social influence as stereo receiver which intensifies, weakens and filters the risk-
related information. In his Social Amplification Model, Slovic (2000) proposes key amplifi-
cation steps. Besides the classical perception-oriented steps of filtering, decoding and 
processing of risk information, he describes that social values are attached to the infor-
mation and that the risk information is validated by the interaction with certain peer 
groups. After the social validation, of information people formulate a behavioural intention 
to accept, ignore, tolerate or change risks (Slovic, 2000). Slovic`s Social Amplification 
Model illustrates that risk perception is a process which is socially influenced and closely 
connected to the determination of the intention and behaviour regarding risk taking.  
The social values, which according to Slovic (2000) are attached to the risk-
related information, are also referred to in the literature as social norms. Although nearly 
every situation is regulated by social norms, there are differences between the binding-
ness of norms. Kerr (1995) differentiates in this regard between general interaction norms 
and benevolence norms. Benevolence norms are only activated if important values, like 
the sanctity of human life, are threatened (Kerr, 1995). If these norms are triggered, they 
induce a stronger effect on the behaviour than the general interaction norms. The general 
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interaction norms are described by Kerr (1995) as beliefs regarding the appropriateness 
of behaviour in certain social situations. These norms are comparatively less binding. 
Whereas the general interaction norms affect the wellbeing of other people only indirectly, 
the benevolence norms refer directly to the preservation of the wellbeing of people (Kerr, 
1995). 
Social values and social norms are considered as relevant factors not only regard-
ing the determination of risk taking but also with respect to the violation of rules. The 
Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to Violations (Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013), 
which is described in the section Decision making regarding rule violations (cf. 5.3.4) also 
includes the norms as one determinant of rule violations. The impact of the activation of 
different norm types on the violation of safety-related rules is furthermore investigated in 
the first empirical investigation (cf. Impact of the goods at stake, section 6.1). 
5.3.3 Decision making in organisations 
The decision to violate a safety-related rule can be made in the private as well as 
in the professional context. Although the prevention of safety-related rule violations is 
important in both contexts, especially in the professional or organisational context, rule 
violations are associated with more severe and extensive consequences. The empirical 
investigations (cf. 6 Empirical Evidence) refer to safety-related rule violations in a profes-
sional context. Although the studies had to be conducted in a laboratory setting, a simula-
tion was used in order to come close to the real working conditions of people in the or-
ganisational context. In this regard, the decision making in organisations will be consid-
ered in the following section in order to get a holistic understanding of the decision-
making process as it was investigated in the present context. 
To understand the process of organisational decision making, it is necessary to 
consider theory about organisational structure and mechanisms of organisational control. 
Since rules are, according to Zhou (1997), one of the most relevant determinants of deci-
sion making and behaviour in organisations, organisational rules and their characteristics 
will be considered, before the different views of organisational decision making are sub-
sequently addressed. It will then be discussed whether organisational decision making 
can be better described by rational choice or rule-following theories. Finally the paragraph 
about organisational decision making will be closed with a section about organisational 
conflicts. 
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Organisational structure and mechanisms of organisational control 
The organisational structure is a quite fixed compilation of “formal authority and 
responsibility relationships and information sources and flows” (Huber, 2011, p. 132). 
According to Huber, the organisational structure determines the roles of the employees 
as well as the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisors, which in turn influence the 
employees’ satisfaction and identification with the organisation. Since the organisational 
structure is quite tangible and therefore easy to visualise and communicate organisational 
change is quite frequently induced through the communication of new organisational 
structures (Huber, 2011).  
Organisational structures can be described by several attributes and dimensions. 
Huber (2011) suggests describing organisational structures by their degree of specialisa-
tion, formalisation and centralisation. Regarding the specialisation, he further distin-
guishes between two dimensions, the vertical and the horizontal specialisation. Whereas 
the vertical specialisation is defined by Huber (2011, p.133) as “the number and distinct-
iveness of hierarchical levels”, he describes the horizontal specialisation as “the func-
tional scope and distinctiveness of horizontally located positions or units” (Huber, 2011, p. 
133). The degree of specialisation is a decisive factor regarding the complexity of the 
organisational integration mechanisms, such as the organisational communication and 
coordination structures and routines.  
This leads to the next dimension, the formalisation of policies, routines or job de-
scriptions. The formalisation can be described by the degree of rigidity (or flexibility, re-
spectively), the extend of (in-)formality and whether the formalisation mainly emerges due 
to mechanical or organic mechanisms (Huber, 2011). 
The degree of centralisation of organisational structures can also be further distin-
guished. Vertical decentralisation is described by the degree to which the “authority is 
concentrated at the top of an organization”(Huber, 2011, p. 133). If the authority is also 
located in the lower and middle management the degree of vertical centralisation is low. 
Horizontal centralisation describes, according to Huber (2011), the distribution of author-
ity on one hierarchical level. If only one function possesses all authority, the organisa-
tional structure can be described as highly horizontally centralised.  
As the previous section demonstrated, the organisational structure is closely con-
nected to organisational authority and the execution of organisational control. Hatch and 
Cunliffe (2013) describe in this regard three theories that address different mechanisms 
of control which occur on different hierarchical levels in the organisational context. 
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The most basic theory, which described organisational control mechanisms on a 
societal or upper management level, is the theory of market, bureaucracies and clans of 
Ouchi (1979). According to this theory, the control is exerted to achieve cooperation and 
minimise transaction costs. The market exerts its control by the law of supply and de-
mand, and the organisational processes are adjusted to keep pace with the offer of com-
petitors. By this means, the market controls the organisational processes and perform-
ance (Ouchi, 1979). When there is no competition, organisations are controlled by bu-
reaucracy or by clans. The bureaucracy exerts control by the prescription of rules and 
procedures (Ouchi, 1979). The adherence to the rules is controlled by close monitoring of 
the supervisor. The clan exerts its influence through social norms, expectations and cul-
tural values. Only symbolic control is exerted. According to Ouchi (1979), organisations 
are not regulated by one of these mechanisms; they are determined by a conglomerate of 
market, bureaucracy and clan influences to differing extents. Since market regulation 
works only if the individual has to face the market, almost all large organisations are 
somehow regulated by bureaucracy or clan mechanisms.  
The agency theory, as described by Hatch and Cunliffe (2013), considers the con-
trol mechanisms which are engaged on the executive level of organisations. The agency 
theory describes how it can be ensured that agents, such as managers, meet the goals 
which are prescribed by the shareholder/owner of the organisation. This is achieved by 
exerting control through (1) contracts between the shareholder and the manager, (2) the 
provision of information which allows the manager to meet the prescribed goals, and (3) 
presenting the prospect of rewards when goals are met (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). 
The last theory, the cybernetic theory (cf. Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013), focuses mainly 
on the organisational control which is exerted to ensure goal accomplishment on the indi-
vidual level. This is achieved by the following control processes: organisational goals are 
set, work targets and standards are then derived and prescribed, and finally, performance 
is monitored to detect and correct deviances (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). 
 For the scope of the present investigation of the determinants of safety-related 
rule violations, especially the control mechanisms proposed by the market, bureaucracy 
and clan theory as well as the mechanisms assumed by the cybernetic theory are rele-
vant. In our empirical investigations, we simulate organisational control mechanisms by 
prescribing performance as well as safety goals (control mechanism proposed by cyber-
netic theory and the bureaucracy). Furthermore, one of the main objectives of the investi-
gations were to explore the impact of audit timing and accuracy of information about the 
probability of audits, which are implemented to exert organisational control to ensure 
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compliance with the prescribed rules (the controlling/auditing of organisational members 
is a further control mechanism proposed by cybernetic theory and the bureaucracy). The 
impact of clan-based control mechanisms is focused on in one of the investigations, in 
which the impact of social norms on rule violations is addressed (cf. Impact of goods at 
stake section 6.1). 
Whereas Huber (2011) concentrates in his description of organisational structures 
on the distribution of authority, and Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) concentrate on theories 
about different levels of organisational control, Simon (1976) makes certain assumptions 
about the determinants of authority acceptance. Simon distinguishes in this regard be-
tween five determinants:  
(1) Social sanctions refer to societal compliance expectations in several so-
cial situations; if the expectations are not met, the person will be disap-
proved of the other members of the society; social sanctions are the most 
influential and therefore the most important sanction type (the impact of 
social norms, enforced by social sanctions, was investigated in the scope 
of the current work and will be described in the section about the impact of 
the goods at stake, cf. 6.1) 
(2) Formal sanctions depend on the correlation between the work in the or-
ganisation and the financial security or status (for the example of rule vio-
lations, formal sanctions are bonus payments which are associated with 
compliance, or fines which have to be paid in the case of a rule violation) 
(3) Inter-individual differences: There are indications person-related differ-
ences exist regarding the receptiveness to the influence of authority (per-
son-related predictors of rule violations were focused on in the investiga-
tions described in the section about the impact of personality, cf. 6.2) 
(4) Identification with the organisation and the organisational purpose is de-
termined by the belief in the organisation, the organisational processes 
and the skills and abilities of the superior 
(5) Convenience: If a person does not have to make a decision, this is much 
more convenient than if a person has to come to, and be responsible for, 
his/her own decisions 
Since safety rules are prescribed by organisational units, or members who use au-
thorities and organisational control mechanisms to enforce rule compliance, these factors 
were considered in order to reach a better understanding of rule-related decisions in the 
organisational context, as is focused on in the present investigation. 
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Besides the aforementioned dimensions of specialisation, formalisation and cen-
tralisation, Huber (2011) refers to three additional characteristics with which the structure 
of organisations can be described. He assumes that the characteristics of the employee, 
the organisational culture and the organisational routines are relevant organisational de-
sign features. He assumes further that these features determine the performance of the 
organisation.  
Regarding the employee, the required number, skill type and skill level of the em-
ployees has to be determined. Then, the respective employees have to be recruited and 
retained to generate the respective performance level which the organisation is aiming to 
achieve.  
The organisational culture consists of “values and norms that guide communica-
tion and behaviours in the organisation” (Huber, 2011, p. 140). A culture would be de-
scribed as strong when the norms and values are intense and widely held. The organisa-
tional culture can be further characterised by its seniority, integrity, openness to change, 
uniformity, the degree of competitiveness versus cooperativeness, or risk proneness. The 
congruence between the aimed for and the real attributes and the strength of the culture 
contributes to the performance of an organisation. If strong cultures are resistant to 
change, this can also be dysfunctional in fast-changing environments, but usually strong 
cultures are beneficial (Huber, 2011). 
Organisational routines are described by Huber (2011, p. 141) as “organizational 
processes not part of the technological core“ but “congruent with achievement of the or-
ganization`s focal goals.” According to Huber (2011), organisational routines refer, for 
example, to organisational processes in the following areas: employee recruitment, train-
ing or compensation, budgeting and financial control and, especially relevant for the pre-
sent investigation, organisational routines also regulate safety and security activities.  
Although the definitions of organisational routines and organisational rules (cf. 
section 3.1.3.) differ in certain aspects, they also have several aspects in common. Both 
describe a defined process/pattern which is applied in the organisational context. 
Whereas organisational routines are defined as processes, which are engaged to achieve 
organisational goals, but do not refer to the core business activities (Huber, 2011), the 
term organisational rule is not as specific. Organisational rules are simply defined as for-
mal structures that describe stable relationships and activities (Zhou, 1993). The term 
organisational rule is broader and can be further specified and distinguished according to 
certain dimensions, cf. next section. 
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Organisational rules 
The organisational rule was already defined and described in the previous section 
and initially and in more detail in the section on rule classification (cf. Organisational rules 
3.1.3). In the following, some further aspects which are especially relevant regarding the 
decision making in organisations should be addressed. First, the difference between im-
plicit and explicit rules will be described, before the factors which determine the effective-
ness of rules are outlined. Finally, different functions of rules in organisations are dis-
cussed.  
 
Explicit versus implicit organisational rules. Zhou (1997) differentiates between 
explicit and implicit rules in organisations. He defines explicit rules as ”formal procedures, 
policies and regulations“, whereas he describes implicit rules as “norms conventions and 
standards“ (Zhou, 1997, p. 285). It can be said that explicit rules are consciously commu-
nicated by the organisations, whereas implicit rules are expectations which are not explic-
itly conveyed, because it is assumed that these rules are generally known. The implicit 
rules are close to the term norm, which was described in the section on social norms (cf. 
3.1.2).  
A similar distinction was made by Huber (2011), who characterises organisational 
structures according to their degree of formality. It can be assumed that the informal or-
ganisational structures described by Huber are similar to the implicit rules of Zhou and the 
explicit rules described by Zhou, are much the same as the formal rules to which Huber 
refers.  
This distinction is relevant insofar as the explicit/formal and implicit/informal rules 
do not have to be congruent. For example, there can be an explicit safety-related rule 
which prescribes a certain safe behaviour pattern. The implicit rule or social norm in the 
respective organisational unit can be the violation of this explicit rule (for example in order 
to achieve a certain performance level). Actually, people have to violate one of the rules; 
they can only choose which one they violate. The contradiction between different rule 
types is mostly due to goal conflicts, which will also be addressed in the last section (cf. 
section Goal conflict). To prevent the violation of explicit/formal (for example safety-
related) rules, the implicit/informal rules and norms in the organisation should be consid-
ered as well. It should be analysed whether there are any conflicts between explicit and 
implicit rules. If contradictions are detected, it should be further analysed whether they 
are due to objectives which are set by the organisation. If goal conflicts are identified as a 
cause of the rule violations, this problem can be addressed through certain interventions. 
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One possibility is the representation/description (framing) of the performance goals. The 
impact of this intervention on the amount of safety-related rule violations is addressed in 
empirical investigations in sections 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4. 
 
The effectiveness of rules. The effectiveness of rules depends on the available 
measures to enforce compliant people and detect and sanction the people who violate 
rules (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009; Zhou, 1997). Zhou describes organisational decision 
making as a repeated situation in which people learn through their experiences. If the rule 
violations are sanctioned regardless of whether the people have to pay a fine or lose their 
social reputation, the probability of further violations will decrease (Zhou, 1997). Rule vio-
lations can only be sanctioned if they are detected, for example by an audit. Since audits 
are very expensive (Power, 1997) the placement of audits should be well thought out in 
order to achieve a high compliance rate with a minimum of audits. In this regard, the im-
pact of information about audit probabilities (cf. section 6.3) and the audit timing (cf. sec-
tion 6.4) were systematically investigated in the scope of the empirical evidence part. 
 
Functions of organisational rules. Organisational rules serve different functions: 
They are implemented to manage conflicts and uncertainty and to support the retention of 
the organisational learning process (Zhou, 1997).  
According to Zhou (1997), organisational rules can prevent the emergence of in-
trapersonal conflicts: If the organisation prescribes certain behaviour, the organisational 
members are forced to comply with this rule. This is especially relevant if there are norms 
from the organisational framework which are contradictory to the organisational rules; 
then, the rules can be a kind of protection for the organisational member. The person 
does not have to explain why s/he is doing something which is not congruent with the 
norm, because there is an organisational rule which prescribes it.  
Deciding which behaviour is most appropriate in the respective situation requires 
often a high level of competence: The prescription of rules facilitates this decision proc-
ess by reducing the uncertainty in the situation (Zhou, 1997). In this regard, the compli-
ance with rules is mostly not due to the insight that the rule is the most effective and ap-
propriate behaviour in the situation; rather, it is due to people`s tendency to avoid uncer-
tainty (Zhou, 1997).  
As described by Zhou (1997), organisational rules are usually developed on the 
basis of organisational routines and knowledge about certain technologies, the process 
and operation in an organisation. In this regard, the development and prescription of rules 
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is one of the most popular measures of knowledge management and learning in organi-
sations (Zhou, 1997). 
Organisational decision making- The points of view 
The discussion regarding decision making in organisations usually focuses too 
much on the role of the organisation. The role of the individual decision makers and the 
impact of the societal and legal background are mostly disregarded. The following para-
graph focuses on these aspects.  
 
The role of the decision maker – The micro point of view. The individual back-
ground of the decision maker, such as social identity, expectations and the habits, has a 
determining influence on the decisions which are made in the organisational context 
(Zhou, 1997). These factors determine the underlying preferences which in turn deter-
mine organisational decision making. Zhou (1997, p. 264) described this effect as follows: 
“Decision making starts long before individuals begin the decision-making process." The 
sense of morality or the social norms that prescribe which behaviour is appropriate de-
termine the decisions which are made in different contexts, such as in the organisational 
context. The impact of the activation of social norms is addressed in the first empirical 
study (cf. 6.1) 
People`s norms and values are not unchangeable (Zhou, 1997). On the contrary, 
it has been shown that professional training and practice not only influences the skills and 
competences of a person, but can also change the professional norms, ethics and rules 
of conduct in the respective situation (Zhou, 1997).  
The identification with a social group that is similar regarding the dimensions of 
power, status and prestige is also very influential concerning the determination of deci-
sion making. The affiliation to a social group promotes the influence of stereotypes on 
people`s attitudes, beliefs, values, affective reactions and behavioural norms (Zhou, 
1997). According to Zhou, the decision-making process can be seen as the product of a 
social categorisation process. 
 
The legal background – The macro point of view. Organisational rules are usually 
derived from legal systems, governmental regulations and cultural rules (Zhou, 1997). 
This foundation increases the appropriateness and legitimisation of organisational rules. 
Furthermore, organisations are penalised if they deviate from these institutionalised rules, 
and rewarded if they act in compliance with them (Zhou, 1997). As a consequence, most 
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organisational rules are formulated in accordance with cultural rules and legal regula-
tions.  
Summing up it can be said that governmental regulations, cultural rules and 
norms influence organisational decision making on two different levels. On the one hand, 
the norms and legal regulations influence the decision maker on the individual level, be-
cause the norms and regulations determine the formation of individual preferences (cf. 
section role of the decision maker and the micro point of view). On the other hand, the 
cultural norms and legal background influence organisational decision making on the 
macro level, because organisations use the norms and legal regulations as the basis for 
the formulation of organisational rules. Thus, the respective cultural norms and legal 
background should be taken into account in order to gain a comprehensive understand-
ing of the (rule-related) decision-making process in the respective organisational context. 
Rational choice versus rule following 
Regarding the description and explanation of decision making in organisations ac-
cording to Zhou (1997), there are two competing theoretical approaches: the rational 
choice approach and the rule-following approach. 
The rational choice approach assumes that decision making in organisations is 
based on the anticipation and evaluation of future consequences (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1972; Zhou, 1997). For a more detailed description of the rational choice 
theories, cf. Decision making under uncertainty (section 5.3.1).  
The rule-following approach assumes that organisational decision making can be 
best described by rule following theories, because most decisions made in organisations 
are made on the basis of certain rules. Zhou (1997) assumes that the decision to follow a 
rule is based on routines and requires the analysis of the context and history of a situa-
tion. According to March (1994), people who decide to follow a rule undergo the following 
process:  
(1) they analyze the situation  
(2) afterwards they analyze their own identity and ask themselves who they are,  
(3) finally they combine their previous insights by thinking about the question of 
what a person like them should do in this organisation in this situation. 
Whereas the rational choice theories assume that the decision making is deter-
mined by the optimisation effort of people, the theories which describe rule-following be-
haviour assume that people do not try to decide for the most optimal behaviour, but for 
the most appropriate behaviour (Zhou, 1997). 
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To integrate the rational choice and the rule-following approach, the following 
concepts should be considered. Simon (1965) distinguishes between programmed and 
non-programmed decisions in organisations. He describes programmed decisions as 
decisions which are made in repetitive and routine situations. Due to the high frequency 
of occurrence of these situations, there are routines and procedures which prescribe ex-
actly what and when certain steps have to be taken. Non-programmed decisions have to 
be made, according to Simon (1965), in novel and exceptional situations. Due to the fact 
that these situations occur so rarely or are even occuring for the first time, there are no 
available procedures or methods which describe how the situation can be handled. 
Simon (1965) proposes further that these concepts are not distinct. He assumes that 
there is a continuum, with each decision lying anywhere between the poles of highly pro-
grammed decision and highly non-programmed decision.  
Whereas Zhou (1997) described rule compliance and rational decision making as 
two competing approaches to explain decision making in organisations, the assumptions 
of Simon (1965) suggest that depending on the situational context, different decision-
making strategies are applied. The programmed decisions described by Simon are similar 
to the rule-following behaviour concept mentioned by Zhou (1997). The non-programmed 
decisions are assumed to be in accordance with the rational decision-making approach 
described by Zhou. It can be assumed that depending on the situation, either predomi-
nantly the propositions of rule-following theories (or programmed decisions), or the 
propositions of the rational decision-making theories (non-programmed decisions), or a 
mixture of the two determine the decision making in organisations.  
Organisational conflict 
According to Hatch and Cunliffe (2013, p. 252), organisational conflicts are "an in-
evitable aspect of organizing". They define organisational conflict as "the struggle be-
tween two or more individuals or groups in an organisation" (2013, p. 252). 
Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) describe a medium level of organisational conflicts as 
optimal, since too few and too many conflicts are assumed to decrease organisational 
performance. According to Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) too few conflicts are an indicator of 
a lack of motivation and concentration, and too many conflicts are an indicator of distrac-
tion, uncooperativeness and politicisation. They view a medium level of organisational 
conflicts as an indicator of cohesiveness, productivity and willingness for cooperation.  
The assumption that a medium level of conflicts is optimal implies that depending 
on the conflict level of the respective organisation, it can be worthwhile to reduce or even 
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stimulate the occurrence of conflicts in organisations. But before such interventions can 
be implemented, it is necessary to analyse the status of conflicts in the respective organi-
sation. 
According to Hatch and Cunliffe (2013), indicators of goal conflicts are open hostil-
ity, distrust and disrespect, as well as information distortion, avoidance of interaction and 
lack of cooperation. When these indicators have been ascertained, in a next step, the 
causes of conflicts should be determined. Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) differentiate between 
nine local conditions which may trigger organisational conflicts, such as interpersonal 
differences, status congruity, communication obstacles, goal incompatibility and reward 
and performance criteria.  
Reward and performance criteria and goal incompatibility are especially relevant 
with respect to the violation of safety-related rules which are investigated within the scope 
of the present investigation (cf. paragraph 6). The impact of reward and performance cri-
teria was investigated by varying the framing of the production outcomes/salary as gain 
or loss. Furthermore, in all investigations, a conflict between performance and safety was 
triggered by the prescription of mutually incompatible safety and performance goals. 
These goal conflicts are due to the fact that different hierarchical levels or organisational 
units communicate different, often contradictory organisational demands and goals to 
their organisational members, which is very common in most organisations. 
In safety-critical organisations, there is always a tension between the centralised 
guidance which prescribes certain (safety-related) rules and the daily practice (Dekker, 
2005). According to Dekker (2005), this tension is mostly due to the fact that compliance 
with (safety-related) rules and getting a job done in the demanded time and with the de-
manded quality are often mutually exclusive. The organisational members have to 
achieve different goals: On the one hand they should act safely, but on the other hand the 
systems were not created to be safe, but to achieve certain economic gains by maximis-
ing the capacity utilisation (Dekker, 2005). 
The purposive idea in the management of commercial organisations is the simul-
taneous optimisation of costs, schedule and reliability key figures (McCurdy, 2001), or in 
other words the maximising output and minimising input at the same time (Simon, 1976). 
This philosophy can also be briefly described as “faster, better and cheaper” (McCurdy, 
2001). The achievement of these goals should be possible through the use of innovative 
technology and the employment of new management tools. Actually, it is a misconception 
that all three goal criteria can be optimised simultaneously; at least one of these goals is 
disregarded in order to achieve the other goals (Dekker, 2005). Nevertheless, the organi-
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sations expect their members to achieve all goals. Certainly, the conflicting goals are not 
communicated per se, but the organisational members are given different directives from 
different management levels, departments and people (Dekker, 2005). Furthermore, 
some goals are not explicitly communicated but are conveyed by subtle messages and 
pressure, which is exerted subliminally, for example by the management or the customers 
(Dekker, 2005). 
Independently of the explicitness with which the goals are communicated, people 
usually feel a certain obligation to achieve the goals somehow. This leads to different 
phenomenon, which will be described in the next paragraphs.  
 
Fine-tuning. The organisational members try to overcome the goal conflict, for ex-
ample, by “fine-tuning” their performance (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). Based on previous 
experiences people try to fulfil their tasks in a faster, better or cheaper manner by doing 
particular things differently than how it was done before or how it is prescribed by the or-
ganisation (Dekker, 2005). People fine-tune their activities in order to get the job done. 
They draw on the knowledge of experienced colleagues, who know how to complete the 
task better, cheaper, or faster as it is required from the management without provoking 
safety-related consequences (Dekker, 2005). If this works, according to Decker (2005) it 
sets off a very dangerous process:  The deviation becomes routinized and the lack of 
failure is seen as validation that the fine-tuning is not dangerous at all. In fact, fine-tuning 
is often quite dangerous; with the frequency of fine-tuning, the probability of safety-critical 
incidences increases. One prominent example of the dangerousness of fine-tuning is the 
Challenger disaster in 1986. The analysis of the disaster revealed that “fine-tuning makes 
failures very likely” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 335)  
The fact that fine-tuning of prescribed procedures towards a faster and more re-
munerative operation, as was even ascertained in one of our previous investigations (von 
der Heyde, Brandhorst, & Kluge, 2013), makes it quite likely that such activities are fairly 
common behaviour patterns in organisations with multiple objectives.  
 
Blue feeling is a term which has its origins in the aircraft sector and describes “the 
willingness and ability [...] to actually deliver on all three goals simultaneously (safety, 
punctuality, and value for money)” (Dekker, 2005, p. 146). It is called blue feeling, since 
blue was the dominant colour of one of the airlines in which the blue feeling was investi-
gated. There is no association here with the term feeling blue, which describes a feeling 
of depression or sadness in everyday parlance. 
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The description of this phenomenon proves that people in organisations try to 
achieve all goals simultaneously. The achievement of goals which are actually irreconcil-
able is even a source of professional self-esteem: People with the blue feeling do not feel 
uncomfortable about the conflicting goals; they feel more confident, because they are 
able to attain the unattainable (Dekker, 2005). People, who do not have the blue feeling 
are even perceived negatively by their colleagues and superiors (Dekker, 2005). Accord-
ing to Dekker, it is assumed that they are not motivated or willing enough to achieve the 
different goal criteria. 
The fact that most rule violations are due to goal conflicts and the attempt to over-
come these conflicts leads to the insight that the violation of rules and the fine-tuning of 
behaviour is not generally negative and the compliance with rules is not generally positive 
(Brandhorst, von der Heyde, & Kluge, in prep.; Dekker, 2005). It depends on the organi-
sation and the priorities of the organisation how it evaluates rule violating behaviour. In 
fact, rule violations and fine-tuning can even be a competitive advantage for the organisa-
tion, because the employees are creative and competent regarding the fulfilment of their 
work task, which can lead to savings in terms of expenses or time. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that rule violations which are committed because of goal conflicts are not real rule 
violations, because they are committed to comply with other rules and goals which are 
prescribed by the organisation (Dekker, 2005). 
5.3.4 Decision making regarding rule violations  
The previous sections looked at the decision-making process regarding rule viola-
tions from different angles. The theories regarding the decision making under uncertainty, 
decision making regarding risk taking, as well as the organisational decision making de-
pict essential aspects and processes regarding the violation of rules. The following sec-
tions are concerned with a theory which was originally developed to describe the deter-
minants of planned behaviour in various situations (Theory of Planned Behaviour, Ajzen, 
1991). This theory was extended in different steps in order to predict behaviour (Integra-
tive Model, Fishbein, 2000; Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction, Fishbein, 
Hennessy, Yzer, & Douglas, 2003) and was finally applied by Kluge (2010) and Kluge, 
Badura and Rietz (2013) to the violation of safety-related rules.  
Theory of Planned Behaviour  
Predicting and explaining human behaviour is a challenging task, which can be 
addressed by different theoretical approaches. The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB, cf. 
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Figure 8, Ajzen, 1991) is based on the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fisbein, 
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which was developed because attitude alone is not a 
good predictor of human behaviour. The Theory of Reasoned Action and the TPB are 
almost congruent. The difference between these theories is one more determinant, the 
perceived behavioural control, which is only included in the TPB. In order to avoid unnec-
essary repetitions and overlapping, only the TPB is described in the following. 
The TPB concentrates on the explanation and prediction of volitionally controlled 
behaviour and focuses in this regard on self-regulation processes, which are considered 
as key determinants of the behavioural intention, which in turn determines whether or not 
the behaviour is performed (Ajzen, 1991).  
 
 
Figure 8. Theory of Planned Behaviour (figure based on a an illustration by Ajzen, 1991) 
 
Besides behaviour, one of the essential factors in the TPB is intention, which can 
be understood as motivation to perform a certain behaviour. The stronger the intention, or 
the motivation, respectively, the more effort is exerted to perform the behaviour, which 
makes its occurrence more likely (Ajzen, 1991). The self-control processes, which ac-
cording to Ajzen (1991), determine the intention are the attitude toward the behaviour, the 
subjective norm and the behavioural control. The attitude toward behaviour “refers to the 
degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the 
behavior in question” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). The subjective norm is a social factor which 
refers to “the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 
1991, p. 188). The last determinant, the perceived behavioural control, describes the 
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“perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). According 
to Ajzen is the perceived behavioural control influenced by past experience as well as 
anticipated difficulties or obstacles which may occur.  
According to the TPB (Ajzen, 1991), all determinants are positively related to the 
intention, meaning that the more favourable the attitude and subjective norm toward the 
behaviour and the greater the perceived behavioural control, the stronger the intention 
will be, which in turn makes it more likely that the intention will be realised. The perceived 
behavioural control has a special role in the TPB. This determinant influences the behav-
iour not only by affecting the intention: In conjunction with the intention, the perceived 
behavioural control directly determines the behaviour (illustrated by the broken line in 
Figure 8).  
Ajzen (1991) further assumes that the relative importance of the determinants is 
not always the same, but varies across different situations. There may even be situations 
in which only one of the factors is relevant regarding the determination of the intention. 
Moreover, Ajzen (1991) believes that the strength of the intention is determined by sev-
eral external, non-motivational influences, such as the availability of resources or the skill 
level. These factors are already considered in the perceived behavioural control determi-
nant and are therefore not specifically regarded as further determinants in the model. 
As the TPB should not only predict but also explain human behaviour, it makes 
certain assumptions about the antecedents of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control. Ajzen (1991) assumes that behaviour is a function of the beliefs 
which are salient in the respective situation. He differentiates between three belief types: 
behavioural beliefs, which are associated with the attitude toward the behaviour; norma-
tive beliefs (assigned to the subjective norms); and finally control beliefs, which corre-
spond to the perceived behavioural control.  
Behavioural beliefs correlate behaviour with outcomes. The behavioural beliefs 
(and the attitudes toward the behaviour) are positive if the behaviour is usually associated 
with positive consequences, whereas the behavioural beliefs (and attitudes toward the 
behaviour) are negative if the respective behaviour is usually connected with negative 
outcomes. 
According to Ajzen (1991), normative beliefs are concerned with the assessment 
of the attitude of important reference persons or reference groups. It is estimated whether 
the reference person or group supports or opposes the respective behaviour. The more 
important a person is, and the more persons are assumed to share the attitude, the 
stronger is the normative belief and the subjective norms and their impact on the inten-
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tion. Moral obligations are not covered by normative beliefs and subjective norms, but are 
assumed to influence the intention as a further determinant (Ajzen, 1991). 
A person`s control beliefs are influenced by his/her own experiences of success 
regarding the respective behaviour and/or second-hand information from other people 
who have experiences with the behaviour, or who are informed about other factors which 
increase or decrease the probability of success of the behaviour in question (Ajzen, 
1991). The resources which enhance success as well as (possible) obstacles are consid-
ered in the control beliefs, or the perceived behavioural control, respectively, which is 
determined by the control beliefs.  
The usefulness of the TPB for predicting people`s the intentions and behaviours in 
several contexts has been determined by several studies (cf. for example Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). Nevertheless, there are certain determinants of behaviour which are not 
considered and certain questions which remain unacknowledged in the TPB. The TPB 
makes no assumptions about the determinants of the beliefs, and also does not consider 
factors which may influence the correlation between the intention and the behaviour. 
These aspects are addressed by the Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction, which is 
based on the TPB but expands this theory by several further aspects (Fishbein, 2000; 
Fishbein et al., 2003). The Integrative Model (of Behavioral Prediction) will be described 
in the next paragraph. 
Integrative Model (of Behavioral Prediction) 
The Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction (IM, cf. Figure 9, Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein 
et al., 2003) is based on several previous models (such as the TPB of Ajzen, 1991; or the 
Behavioural Belief Model of Rosenstock, 1974). These models were integrated into a new 
model in order to achieve a better understanding of the determinants of behaviour, to 
enable a more precise prediction of behaviour and more effective behaviour change, for 
example in the health-care sector regarding the prevention of HIV infections (Fishbein, 
2000). 
Most elements of the IM are the same as in the TPB (cf. Figure 8, Ajzen, 1991). 
Like the TPB, the IM (cf. Figure 9) includes behavioural, normative and control or efficacy 
beliefs, which determine the attitude, norms and self-efficacy (the same as perceived be-
havioural control in the TPB). These factors influence the intention, which is central re-
garding the determination of behaviour. According to the IM, behaviour is defined by four 
elements: the action, which describes the activity of the behaviour, the target, which de-
scribes what should be achieved by the behaviour, the context in which the behaviour 
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occur, and the time period in which the behaviour takes place or is expected to take place 
(Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein et al., 2003).   
As in the TPB, the strength of the intention is quite crucial for the realisation of the 
respective behaviour pattern in the IM, but in contrast to the TPB, it is further assumed in 
the IM that the skills and abilities which are necessary to perform the behaviour, as well 
as environmental constraints concerning the behaviour, determine whether or not the 
intended behaviour actually occurs (Fishbein et al., 2003, cf. Figure 9). The probability 
that a certain behaviour will be performed is highest if the intention is strong, the person 
is qualified to perform the behaviour, and there are no or only few environmental con-
straints to prevent the respective behaviour. These two additional determinants of behav-
iour offer an explanation for why so many strong intentions are not realised. 
In addition to skills and abilities and environmental constraints, which influence 
behaviour as new factors in addition to intention, the IM also includes several so-called 
external or distal variables (cf. Figure 9). These external variables are, for example, 
demographic variables, such as sex or age, personality traits or past behaviour. These 
variables are assumed to influence the intention only indirectly by affecting the different 
underlying beliefs and values (Fishbein et al., 2003). The integration of these factors on 
the one hand explains how these factors influence people’s intentions and behaviour, and 
on the other hand highlights the emergence of beliefs more clearly. 
 
  
Figure 9. Integrative Model (figure based on the illustrations of Fishbein, 2000; 
Fishbein et al., 2003). 
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Overall, it can be stated that the IM constitutes a very valuable further develop-
ment of the theories which aim to explain, predict, and in a final step change human be-
haviour. The questions which were left unresolved by the TPB were answered by the IM. 
In the following paragraph the IM is applied to the context of rule violations. 
Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to violation 
Kluge (2010) and Kluge et al. (2013) identified the Integrated Model of Behav-
ioural Prediction (IM) of Fishbein et al. (2003) as a model which includes all levels of in-
fluence that are relevant for describing the determinants of safety-related rule violations. 
She used the elements of the IM to summarise the determinants of safety-related rule 
violations proposed by different investigators (cf. Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10. Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to Violations (Kluge, 2010; 
Kluge et al., 2013) 
 
The demographic variables which are, according to Kluge (2010), relevant in the 
context of safety-related rule violations include people`s age and sex. Young people and 
men are especially prone to rule violations (Reason, 2008). Regarding the personality, 
Kluge (2010) considers conscientiousness (based on the findings of Berry, Ones, & 
Sackett, 2007), integrity (based on the findings of Marcus, Schuler, Quell, & Hümpfner, 
2002) and anxiety (based on the findings of Zeitlin, 1994) as relevant determinants. The 
past behaviour determinant is described by Kluge (2010) as history of previous accidents 
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and incidents: Here, Kluge refers to the results of Reason (2008), who found a positive 
association between the amount of safety-critical events like accidents and the amount of 
committed rule violations.  
Besides the person-related variables, Kluge (2010) describes several beliefs 
which influence the decision to violate a safety-related rule. The behavioural beliefs are, 
according to Kluge, the assumptions regarding the instrumentality of the rule violation, the 
beliefs regarding the risk of negative consequences associated with a violation, and as-
sumptions about the necessity of the respective violation (beliefs deduced on the basis of 
the findings of Verschuur et al., 1996). Regarding the normative beliefs, Kluge (2010) 
refers to Reason (2008), who assumes that the willingness to violate rules is influenced 
by people’s concerns about what others may think of them. According to Reason, people 
for whom it is important what others think should tend to comply with rules to avoid nega-
tive evaluations of others. On the basis of Reason (2008) and Verschuur et al. (1996), 
Kluge (2010) proposes, moreover, an impact of control beliefs on rule-related behaviour. 
Control beliefs are described by Kluge (2010) as beliefs regarding the manageability of 
the current situation. This assessment is influenced by the beliefs regarding one’s own 
skills and abilities and the perception of external influences which also determine the con-
trollability of a situation. 
On the basis of the assumptions of the IM (of Fishbein et al., 2003), Kluge (2010) 
proposes that the impact of behavioural beliefs on intention is mediated by attitudes; the 
impact of normative beliefs is mediated by norms; and the control beliefs influence the 
intention through their impact on self-efficacy. Whether the resulting intention to comply 
with or to violate a rule will be realised is influenced, according to the IM, by the environ-
mental constraints and the skills and abilities of a person. Based on the findings of Ver-
schuur et al. (1996), Kluge (2010) describes safety audits, time availability, production 
goals, supervisor surveillance and inadequate work planning as environmental con-
straints which are relevant with regard to the determination of rule-related behaviour.  
Additionally, the impact of the skills and abilities on behaviour, proposed by the IM, are 
considered by Kluge as relevant determinants of rule-violating behaviour. The skills and 
abilities are, according to Kluge (2010), a factor which can be influenced by the extent of 
training which is supplied by the respective organisation.  
The environmental constraints production goal and safety audits and their impact 
on rule-related behaviour are focused on in the empirical part of the present investigation. 
The impact of the framing of production goals will be described in sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 
the impact of safety audits will be outlined in sections 6.3, 6.4. In the section about the 
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impact of the goods at stake (cf. 6.1), the impact of norms and norm activation on safety-
related rule violations is additionally addressed. In all empirical investigations, several 
person-related determinants, as well as knowledge and performance indicators and their 
correlation with rule violations, were considered. Hence, the empirical part of the present 
investigation offers substantial evidence regarding the validity of the IMV. In the General 
discussion (cf. section 7), all findings regarding the IMV will be integrated in the model.  
5.3.5 The Decision-Making Perspective - Conclusions 
The decision-making perspective revealed valuable insights into the processes 
which determine rule-related decisions. The decision to violate a rule is on the one hand 
determined through simple cost-benefit considerations and the appraisal of expected 
probabilities, but on the other hand is also influenced by irrational biases, which are due 
to the characteristics of people`s cognitive processing capacities. Furthermore, people`s 
demographic characteristics, personality traits, experience, beliefs, attitudes, norms, self-
efficacy and skills and abilities as well as certain environmental constraints determine 
their behavioural intentions and behaviour.   
Each determinant comprises information for the effective intervention against fu-
ture rule violations. An intervention which is based on the insight that rule violations are 
determined through cost-benefit considerations can be the implementation of control 
mechanisms like safety audits and the use of subsequent enforcement and punitive 
mechanisms, respectively, which ensure that the violation of rules is associated with high 
costs and that compliance is rewarded through certain benefits. This is only one example 
of rule violation reduction interventions, which are assumed to be highly effective be-
cause they are based on a profound and holistic understanding of the decision-making 
process of safety-related rule violations.  
Although the Human Factors perspective already comprises the definition of dif-
ferent influencing levels and factors, the decision-making perspective makes a further 
proposition about the coherence between the influencing factors, and about moderations 
and mediations, and is therefore a very valuable supplement to the determinants which 
were already described in the previous perspectives.  
In particular, the IMV was used for the derivation of the hypotheses which were in-
vestigated in the Empirical evidence part (cf. section 6).  The framing of the production 
outcome, which was investigated in the studies described in sections 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4, 
addresses the effects proposed by the Prospect Theory and the environmental con-
straints which were described by the IMV. The goods at stake study (described in section 
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6.1) refers to the impact of norms, which is a component of the TPB, IM and IMV. The 
personality variables which are considered in the IMV are especially focused on in the 
second paper (cf. section 6.2). The impact of the accuracy of information about audit 
probabilities (cf. section 6.3) is considered in the IMV and can be assigned to the envi-
ronmental constraints, which presumably influence a person`s outcome and control be-
liefs, but additionally affect furthermore also the cost-benefit considerations which are 
proposed by the rational decision-making theories. The bomb crater effect (cf. section 
6.3), which describes the tendency to violate a rule just after an audit has occurred, as 
well as the impact of audit timing (cf. section 6.4) can be explained by the aspect of ex-
perience or past behaviour which is proposed by the IMV.   
5.4 Integrating the perspectives  
 To come closer to a holistic understanding of safety-related rule violations, the 
previous sections looked at this concept from different angles. 
The Human Factors perspective focused on rule violations as one type of unsafe 
behaviour in organisations. Safety-related rule violations were defined and distinguished 
from similar concepts; furthermore, different rule violation types were identified and de-
scribed. The different theories and models about rule violations were summarised and 
represented according to their contribution to a better understanding of the process and 
the different determinants of safety-related rule violations.  
The Industrial and Organisational Psychology perspective includes the definition 
of different types of deviant behaviour in the organisational context. Here, different gen-
eral as well as specific, concrete terms were described and their correlations with the 
concept of safety-related rule violations were outlined. Furthermore, due to the research 
focus of the community of industrial and organisational psychology, this perspective fo-
cused especially on personality traits and their correlation with deviant behaviour in or-
ganisations. 
The Decision-Making perspective concentrated on the process which determines 
the decision to violate a safety-related rule. Here, different decision-making theories were 
identified as relevant: theories in the area of decision making under uncertainty, theories 
about decision making in risk-taking situations and theories and assumptions about deci-
sion making in organisations. 
The different perspectives reflect the different research communities and their re-
spective research focuses regarding the topic of safety-related rule violations. Interest-
ingly, each community places an emphasis on different aspects. Whereas in the area of 
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Human Factors, process-oriented aspects as well as person-related and situational de-
terminants are considered, the industrial and organisational psychology perspective fo-
cuses especially on person-related determinants, and the decision-making perspective 
concentrates mainly on the process-related aspects in their research. The consideration 
of the findings and theories gained in the different research communities and the integra-
tion of the different perspectives enables a more holistic understanding of safety-related 
rule violations (cf. Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Integration of the perspectives on safety-related rule violations 
 
Moreover, the transfer of insights between the different perspectives provides a 
valuable source for developing new research questions. The studies described in the 
present investigation are good examples of this (cf. Empirical Evidence 6). The Industrial 
and Organisational Psychology perspective and the Decision-Making perspective were 
used to derive research questions and hypotheses for the investigation of safety-related 
rule violations in the Human Factors context.  
The investigations described in the section about the impact of personality (cf. 6.2) 
are based on the consideration of personality traits, which correlate with deviant behav-
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iour in the area of organisational and industrial psychology. It was investigated whether 
these traits a context typical for Human Factors research. Some of the hypotheses which 
were investigated in the studies on the impact of goods at stake (6.1), audit probability 
(6.3) and audit timing (6.4) were derived from different decision-making theories (Pros-
pect theory, cf. section 5.3.1 and Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction, cf. section 
5.3.4). 
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6 Empirical Evidence 
6.1 The impact of goods at stake –  
Social norms and their impact on safety-related rule viola-
tions: It doesn’t matter if people are harmed 
6.1.1 Abstract 
It is assumed that violations of safety-related rules contribute to unsafe acts and 
trigger safety-critical events in organisations. In contrast to a "human error", rule 
violations are assumed to be intentional, based on explicit decision-making proc-
esses. In a production context, and based on the assumptions of the Integrated 
Model of Behaviour Prediction, the impact of different goods at stake (injured resi-
dents versus damaged plant) and the effect of framing the production outcome 
(gain versus loss) on safety-related rule violations were investigated in two studies. 
In the pre-study, the scenarios which were developed to induce different goods at 
stake were evaluated. In the main study, the effect of the framing and the goods at 
stake were investigated experimentally. In contrast to previous studies, no framing 
effect was found in the present investigation. Moreover, the goods at stake had no 
significant impact on rule violations. Post-hoc analyses showed that person-related 
variables, such as skills and knowledge, were significantly related to the decision 
for a violation. The correlations between violations and performance and knowledge 
parameters suggest that more emphasis should be placed on the education and 
training of staff in order to prevent rule violations in organisations.  
6.1.2 Introduction - Explaining safety-related rule violations 
To achieve safety in organisations, it is important to consider both the technical 
and the human side. The emergence both of technical malfunctions and of human errors 
should be prevented. Since erroneous acts are not the only human contribution to safety-
critical events, violations should also be addressed (cf. for example Reason, 1990). Viola-
tions are assumed to be a serious problem in many organisations (Fogarty & McKeon, 
2006; Helmreich, 2000; Hobbs & Williamson, 2002; Lawton, 1998; Reason, 2008). They 
are defined as deliberate, but non-malevolent deviations from safety rules and regulations 
(Reason, 2008) and are likely to lead to erroneous actions and “unsafe acts” (Reason & 
Hobbs, 2003).   
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Although violations do not necessarily lead to undesired outcomes (Alper & Karsh, 
2009; Besnard & Hollnagel, 2014), it has been assumed that up to 70% of all accidents in 
safety-critical organisations are due to violations of regulations (Mason, 1997, p. 289). In 
order to enhance safety, an understanding of the processes which constitute the deci-
sion-making process of rule-violating behaviour is required. Safety issues need to be 
considered from both a system-oriented and an individual-oriented perspective (cf. for 
example Wiig & Lindøe, 2009). The Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction (Fishbein 
et al., 2003), applied to Violations (IMV, Kluge, 2010: Kluge et al., 2013, cf. Figure 12), 
integrates both perspectives and is therefore used as a theoretical framework for the cur-
rent investigation (Figure 12). The IMV considers person-related (like age, personality or 
past behaviour) as well as organisational variables (environmental conditions) with regard 
to the emergence of rule violations. These variables affect a person’s behavioural, nor-
mative and control beliefs, which influence the person’s attitudes, norms and self-efficacy, 
which in turn influence intentions and rule-related behaviour. In the present studies, the 
impact of the normative beliefs and (social) norms, their responsiveness to environmental 
conditions, and the coherence with the framing of the production outcome as loss or gain 
are investigated. 
 
 
Figure 12. Adapted Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction (Reason, 2008; Verschuur 
et al., 1996) applied to violations (IMV, Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013). 
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6.1.3 Theoretical background    
The decision-making process is based on a comparison of the benefits and costs 
of the compliant behaviour with the benefits and costs that will accompany the violation 
behaviour (Battmann & Klumb, 1993; Zeitlin, 1994). It is assumed that people calculate 
some kind of implicit trade-off in order to determine the most purposive alternative. The 
amount of resources which can be gained in relation to the resources which must be in-
vested and/or risks which are associated with the respective alternative are balanced 
against one another.  
Referring to the IMV (Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013), it can be assumed that 
people’s beliefs have a determining influence on the appraisal of the potential benefits 
and costs. The probability that people will violate is especially high in situations in which 
the violation is associated with high benefit, low costs and low perceived negative conse-
quences (Polet, Vanderhaegen & Wieringa, 2002).   
The impact of outcome beliefs – Framing of the salary earned 
In addition to the evaluation of the benefit ratio, Lehman and Ramajunam (2009) 
found evidence of an increased tendency to violate a rule if one will not meet one’s own 
target value and expect a potential loss without rule violation. In this case, risks are ac-
cepted as a “necessary evil” to achieve the production goals after all (cf. Sanne, 2008). In 
this regard, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) showed that presenting an identical situation 
while altering points of reference (for example a production goal) leads to a differing per-
ception of the results. For example, the payment of 20 € can be seen as “gain” if the ref-
erence point is to get nothing (0 €), but if the reference point is to get 25 €, a salary of 20 
€ would be seen as a “loss” of 5 €. Although the ultimate salary is the same, it is assumed 
that the potential loss is perceived as more aversive. Therefore, people try to avoid the 
“loss” by maximising their production outcome, for example by violating a rule. 
Kluge, Badura, Urbas and Burkolter (2010), as well as Kluge et al. (2013) have al-
ready shown that the framing of the salary as “gain” or “loss” influences the decision-
making process concerning rule violations. If the production outcomes and the salary are 
framed as “loss”, more people tend to violate the safety-relevant rule. If the production 
outcome is framed as “gain”, people complied significantly more with rules. The first hy-
pothesis concerns the replication of this previously shown framing effect: 
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Hypothesis 1: The framing of the salary influences whether people violate a 
safety-related rule. If the salary is framed as “loss”, people will violate the rule more often 
than if the salary is framed as “gain”. 
In addition to the investigation of the "pure" framing effect, the present studies 
aimed at investigating variables which moderate the framing effect on rule violations. For 
example, Schmook, Bendrien, Frey and Wänke (2002), as well as Kühberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck and Perner (1999), found evidence that the goods at stake acted as a pos-
sible moderator of the effect of framing.  
Goods at stake 
The costs and benefits of a risk-related decision are considered not only with re-
spect to personal consequences but also with respect to other stakeholders such as the 
organisation, local inhabitants and the environment which are affected by the individual 
decision. The goods at stake concern the possible consequences for others that may 
accompany a decision. According to Polet et al. (2002) the perception of risk is deter-
mined by the probability of the undesired situation and the consequences of the unde-
sired situation. In the case of deciding to commit a rule violation, it is argued that people 
trade off the goods at stake in relation to the severity of the consequences that might be 
associated with rule violation. The violation of safety-related rules, for example in an in-
dustrial plant, might result in the destruction of property, the injury of people or even the 
endangerment of human life. The risk value of a decision can be reduced by either a re-
duced risk probability or by decrease the severity of the consequences (Polet et al., 
2002). Since human life is perceived as more valuable than material property (Fagley & 
Miller, 1997), it is assumed that safety-related rule violations are less likely if the goods at 
stake concern the well-being of people. 
The perception of the value of certain things is assumed to be determined through 
the normative beliefs and (social) norms, which represent some of the major determinants 
of rule violations (cf. IMV, Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013). Social norms are defined as 
norms that guide social behaviour without the force of laws such as rules or standards 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The activation of social norms is triggered by certain stimuli. As a 
function of these stimuli, different types of norms are activated. In this respect, Kerr 
(1995) differentiates between general interaction norms and benevolence norms. General 
interaction norms refer to a person’s beliefs regarding appropriate behaviour in certain 
situations. Such norms affect the welfare of a group member only indirectly, in contrast to 
benevolence norms, which directly affect the welfare of others. Benevolence norms are 
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activated when important values are threatened, for example the sanctity of human life. 
By contrast, the endangerment of material property only activates general interaction 
norms. The activation of benevolence norms leads to a stronger inhibition of norm-
diverging behaviour than the activation of general interaction norms. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that people are less likely to violate benevolence norms than general interaction 
norms.  
Fagley and Miller (1997) found evidence of an aversion to the violation of benevo-
lence norms. Individuals appear to try to prevent the endangerment of human well-being 
by all available means. Based on the study by Fagley and Miller (1997), it can be as-
sumed that if a violation would risk endangering human life, people have a higher ten-
dency to comply with the rule (and the benevolence norms). By contrast, if only material 
property might be affected through the violation, the tendency towards compliance should 
be lower. In summary, the goods at stake influence whether people comply with or violate 
a safety rule. 
Hypothesis 2: If a safety-related rule violation might result in the endangerment of 
human life, people comply with the safety rule more often than if the violation might result 
in the destruction of property. 
The interaction of framing and goods at stake 
If the goods at stake address human well-being, there should be no difference de-
pending on whether the production outcome is framed as gain or loss; individuals should 
show compliant behaviour because they want to avoid the endangerment of people by all 
available means (Fagley & Miller, 1997). 
Regardless of whether the production outcome is framed as gain or loss, people 
should tend to comply with the safety-related rule. It can be assumed that the impact of 
social norms (which imply compliance to ensure safety) exceed the desire to achieve cer-
tain production outcomes to maximise one’s own salary. If only material property might be 
affected through the rule violation, the framing effect should occur. In this case, it is ex-
pected that if the outcome is framed as loss, people tend to violate the rule, whereas if 
the outcome is framed as gain, they tend to comply with the rules. 
Hypothesis 3: There is an interaction between framing and the goods at stake 
concerning the decision to comply with or violate a safety-related rule. 
Hypothesis 3.1: If the goods at stake trigger benevolence norms, individuals 
comply with the safety-related rule regardless of the framing. 
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Hypothesis 3.2: If the goods at stake concern material property, the effect of the 
framing of the production outcome should occur (cf. hypothesis 1). 
In order to test the hypotheses, a pre-study and a main study were conducted, 
which are described below. 
6.1.4 Pre-study 
Prior to the main study, a web-based pre-study was conducted in order to test the 
scenarios regarding their potential to activate social norms addressing different goods at 
stake. In this regard, the participants were asked to rate the outlined scenarios on various 
dimensions. 
Method 
Sample. 99 participants (52 females) aged between 16 and 75 years (M = 30.17, 
SD = 10.94) completed the online study. Participants were recruited via email. About one 
half of the sample consisted of employees from different organisations, while the other 
half comprised engineering students from the University of Duisburg-Essen.  
 
Procedure. The participants had to fill in an online questionnaire, which consisted 
of 28 pages with different content and input options. First of all, subjects were informed 
about the purposes of the study and told that they could discontinue participation at any 
time (in terms of informed consent). Subsequently, they were introduced to the scenario 
and were required to answer several questions about the respective scenario. Finally, 
they were asked to provide information regarding demographic characteristics.  
 
Introduction of the organisational scenario. Participants were asked to imagine 
that they are in the role of a production supervisor running a waste-water treatment plant. 
As a production supervisor, they should start up the plant to separate a water-solvent 
mixture into their components. They should further imagine that their salary depends on 
their production performance. In their position as a production supervisor, they have the 
choice between two procedures to start up the plant.  
Subsequently, in the next part of the investigation, two start-up procedures were 
introduced: an 11-step and an 8-step procedure. The 11-step procedure was described 
as safe; if this procedure was applied, no deflagration would occur. This procedure was 
additionally labelled as time-consuming due to the number of steps that have to be im-
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plemented. The time required for the start-up process leads to a late separation of waste 
water, and therefore the production target and the maximum salary cannot be achieved.  
The 8-step procedure bears a 20% risk of a deflagration and consists of fewer 
steps; this takes less time and leads to an increased salary compared to the 11-step pro-
cedure.  
The Independent Variable: Introduction of the "goods at stake". After the introduc-
tion of the scenario, participants were instructed to read one of the newspaper articles 
(see Figure 13), continuing to imagine themselves in the role of supervisor. Based on the 
design and content of a scenario already used in previous studies (cf. Kluge et al., 2010), 
three different scenarios were developed. The scenarios were designed to trigger differ-
ent social norms (see Table 3). 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 13. Layout of scenarios damaged plant (left), slightly injured residents (middle) 
and seriously injured residents (right) in German language 
 
The scenarios differed in terms of the consequences of the deflagration which 
were described (goods at stake). In scenario 1, the consequence of the deflagration was 
a damaged plant, whereas in scenarios 2 and 3, residents were injured. Scenarios 2 and 
3 differed in the severity of injury: In the second scenario, the residents were slightly in-
jured, while in the third scenario, they were seriously injured (cf. Table 3). The different 
consequences of each scenario were illustrated through photographs (cf. Figure 13). The 
photographs were intended to make the impact of the respective scenario more "visible".  
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Table 3. Comparison of the newspaper article content. 
Note: The columns marked in grey were chosen to induce the goods at stake in the main study.  
  * The only photograph which differed between the scenarios 
 
Dependent Variables: realism, credibility, dramaturgy, emotionality, and reprehen-
sibility. The participants were asked to evaluate the newspaper articles on a seven-point 
Likert scale according to cases of realism (“I think the event described is realistic”), credi-
bility (“… is credible”), dramaturgy (“… is dramatic”) and emotionality (“… is emotionally 
touching”). Additionally, the participants had to rate the moral reprehensibility of running 
Manipula-
tion 
Scenario I:                               
Damaged plant 
Scenario II:                                       
Slightly injured resi-
dents 
Scenario III:                           
Seriously injured resi-
dents 
Part 1 Today, the ACME in 
Duisburg had an inci-
dent in its wastewater 
treatment plant. 
Today, the ACME in Du-
isburg had an accident in 
its wastewater treatment 
plant. 
Today, the ACME in Duis-
burg had a chemical acci-
dent in its wastewater 
treatment plant. 
Part II Due to a deflagration, 
parts of the water treat-
ment plant were de-
stroyed. Destruction 
concerns the homogeni-
sation plant. Damages 
to valves and tanks 
occurred.  
Due to a deflagration in 
one of the mixing tanks, 
toxic solvent escape 
occurred. In the immedi-
ate vicinity of the waste-
water treatment are some 
houses. Despite the 
evacuation of residents, 
20 residents were 
slightly injured, e.g. 
irritation of the mucous 
membranes and respira-
tory problems. 
Due to a deflagration in 
one of the mixing tanks, 
highly toxic solvent es-
cape occurred. In the im-
mediate vicinity of the 
wastewater treatment are 
some houses. Despite the 
evacuation of residents, 20 
residents were seriously 
injured, e.g. irreversible 
liver damage. 
Part III Costs for repairing the 
plant and resulting loss 
of production are ex-
pected to amount to 
100,000 €. 
Costs for indemnity and 
resulting loss of produc-
tion are expected to 
amount to 100,000 €. 
Costs for indemnity and 
resulting loss of production 
are expected to amount to 
100,000 €. 
Photo at 
the bot-
tom * 
of a damaged plant of many ambulances en-
tering the location of the 
accident 
of  injured residents lying 
on stretchers  
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the risk of a deflagration.  Finally, participants were asked to choose a procedure (either 
the 11-step procedure, which is safe but comes with less benefit, or the 8-step procedure, 
which is unsafe but comes with a higher personal benefit).     
Results 
For data analysis, descriptive statistics, one-way ANOVAs and a Chi2 test were 
calculated. The results show significant main effects for the rating of the scenario regard-
ing the dimensions of being emotionally touched, dramaturgy, realism, credibility, and 
moral reprehensibility (cf. Table 4 for means and test statistics). Post-hoc analysis (using 
Tukey HSD) revealed that the damaged plant scenario was perceived as less emotionally 
touching than the scenario with slightly injured residents (p<.05) and the scenario with 
seriously injured residents (p<.01). The scenario with seriously injured residents were 
also perceived as more dramatic than the damaged plant scenario (p<.05). Additionally, 
the participants judged taking the risk that residents will be slightly (p<.05) and seriously 
(p<.01) injured as more morally reprehensible than taking the risk of plant damage.  
 
Table 4. M and SD of scenario evaluation scales. 
Scales Damaged 
plant 
Slightly injured 
residents 
Seriously  
injured resi-
dents 
Sig. 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  
Being emotionally 
touched* 
3.18 
(1.29) 
4.24 (1.71) 4.85 (1,54) F(2,96) = 10.10,  p = .00, 
ηp
2= .17 
Drama* 4.48 
(1.46) 
4.85 (1.70) 5.45 (1,39) F(2,96) = 3.41,  p = .04, 
ηp
2= .07 
Realism* 5.03 
(1.38) 
5.67 (1.22) 4.73 (1.72) F(2,96) = 3.59,  p = .03, 
ηp
2= .07 
Credibility * 5.06 
(1.22) 
5.64 (1.29) 4.67 (1.61) F(2,96) = 3.08,  p = .02, , 
ηp
2= .06 
Reprehensibility* 4.33 
(1.95) 
5.42 (1.3) 5.48  (1.4) F(2,96) = 5.60,  p = .01, 
ηp
2= .10 
Percentage of in-
tended violations 
18.2% 6.1%, 6.1%; χ 2(2,99) = 3.56, p=.17, 
ηp= .19 
Note: *Scale from 1 to 7.  
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The scenario with the seriously injured residents were perceived as significantly 
less realistic than the scenario with the damaged plant (p<.05); the scenario with the 
slightly injured residents was also rated as more realistic than the scenario with seriously 
injured residents, although the difference does not reach significance (p=.08). Regarding 
the credibility rating, the scenario with the seriously injured residents was perceived as 
significantly less credible than the scenario with the slightly injured residents. 
On a descriptive level, the participants in the damaged plant condition seemed to 
be more often willing to violate a rule (18.2% vs. 6.1% in the scenarios with injured resi-
dents). According to the calculated Chi2 test, this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant (see Table 4).  
Conclusions for the selection of scenarios 
The two scenarios in which people were injured were evaluated as equally dra-
matic and emotionally touching and were therefore assumed to trigger benevolence 
norms equally well. As the scenario with the slightly injured residents was rated as more 
realistic and credible than the scenario with seriously injured residents, this scenario and 
the damaged plant scenario were chosen for use in the main study to operationalize the 
goods at stake. 
The results of the pre-study also lead to the assumption that if there is a possibility 
that people might be injured, subjects are less likely to intend to violate a safety-related 
rule. The following main study should answer the question of whether subjects actually 
act on this intention.  
6.1.5 Main Study  
For the main study, a simulation of the scenario described in the pre-study was 
used. The simulation (WaTrSim, Burkolter, Kluge, German, & Grauel, 2009) offers the 
advantages of an experimental setting such as the possibility to vary certain conditions 
like the framing of the production outcomes and the goods at stake conditions. Neverthe-
less, the experimental situation is close to a real working context because the simulation 
of an industrial plant is used.  
Method 
A 2 x 2-factorial experimental design with the factors framing (loss vs. gain) and 
goods at stake (destruction of material property vs. slightly injured residents) was imple-
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mented. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Department of 
Psychology of the University of Duisburg-Essen.  
136 students (52 female) aged between 19 and 37 years (M = 22.99, SD = 2.99) 
from the Engineering Department of the University of Duisburg-Essen participated in the 
experiment, which was conducted between July 2011 and May 2012. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the framing conditions and the goods at stake conditions. Partici-
pants were recruited by flyers and advertising in lectures of the university. The cover story 
of the investigation was that training for operating the simulation should be evaluated. It 
was announced that in about three hours, up to 25 EUR could be earned in the experi-
ment.  
Participants were invited in groups of up to eight people per experimental session. 
First of all, participants were informed about the purposes of the study and told that they 
could discontinue participation at any time (in terms of informed consent). One session 
included the measurement of person-related variables, the introduction and training 
phase, the criterion measurement and finally the debriefing (see Figure 14).  
 
 
 
Figure 14. The experimental procedure, CV= Control Variables, DV= Dependent Vari-
ables.  
 
A seven-item test of prior technical knowledge, general mental abilitiy (Wonderlic, 
2002), a test on risky decision making (Game of Dice Task GDT, Brand et al., 2006), and 
a short test for assessing conscientiousness (Saucier, 1994) were applied to assess per-
son-related variables identified as relevant in the IMV (see Figure 12). It was assumed 
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that people might differ concerning their responsiveness to the goods at stake conditions 
depending on their empathy. Therefore, empathy was measured using the empathy scale 
of Paulus (2007). A sample item is: “Often, I am very emotional about things which I actu-
ally only observed.”). 
 
The participants’ task. The participants were introduced to the Waste Water 
Treatment Simulation (WaTrSim, Burkolter et al., 2009). WaTrSim is a computer-based 
simulation of a plant for purifying industrial waste water.  
 
The training. The training began with basic information about the simulation, then, 
participants were introduced to the user interface, the sub-processes, and the objectives 
of minimisation of the off-spec (waste product) and maximisation of the production output. 
Participants were also informed that their individual performance would be assessed in 
relation to a given production goal which has to be achieved. Both groups were trained in 
the application of the mandatory 11-step and 8-step procedure (see procedure character-
istics of the pre-study).  
 
Posttest. After the training, all participants took a posttest which measured the de-
clarative knowledge about the simulation and the performance in applying the two proce-
dures.  
 
The production goal framing. Participants in both framing conditions received 
feedback on their production outcomes and salary while they were working with WaTr-
Sim. In the gain framing condition, the participants trained and worked with a WaTrSim 
version in which the salary is displayed as a gain: Participants could see the amount of 
money they had earned (for example 20 EUR). The participants in the loss framing condi-
tion trained and worked with a WaTrSim version in which the salary to be earned is dis-
played as a loss: Participants see the amount of money they have earned in relation to 
the maximum salary of 25 EUR (for example, if they earned 20 EUR, the display reads -5 
EUR). 
It is important to note that frames are manipulated by changing the salience of ref-
erence points, meaning that participants perceive formally identical outcomes either as 
gains or as losses. In the loss framing, the reference point (production target) is the pro-
duction which is achievable using the 8-step procedure, whereas in the gain framing, the 
reference point is the production which is achievable by using the mandatory 11-step 
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procedure. Therefore, the expected outcomes are identical in the two conditions: The 11-
step-procedure leads in both framing conditions to about 20 EUR, while the 8-step-
procedure leads in both framing conditions to up to 25 EUR. If a deflagration occurs, par-
ticipants in both groups receive 10 EUR.  
 
The goods at stake conditions. After the training phase, the posttest and a short 
break, participants returned to their computers and were told that they are now the re-
sponsible shift supervisor. Subsequently, they received a personal note which included a 
message from the company's safety department that there is a strict order to adhere to 
the 11-step procedure due to deflagration in one of the company’s plants.  
To provide some background information on this message from the safety de-
partment, the experimenter presented one of the newspaper articles (cf. Figure 13), in 
which it was described that the deflagration caused damage to the plant (scenario I) or 
led to slightly injured residents (scenario II, cf. pre-study).  
 
The criterion measurement and debriefing. After receiving the personal message, 
participants were reminded of the objectives to be achieved as the shift supervisor and 
that their financial compensation for the participation would depend on their performance 
in this final trial. Subsequently, it was accentuated that each participant is responsible, in 
the role of shift supervisor, for the production and that it is his/her decision which proce-
dure to choose. To ensure that the participants felt unobserved, the experimenter was 
called away by a colleague and left the room for one minute. It was measured how many 
participants complied with (started up the plant by using the 11-step procedure) or vio-
lated the safety-related rule (by using the 8-step procedure). After this final trial, partici-
pants were debriefed and all of them received 25 EUR.  
Results 
Three participants who were unable to perform the 11-step procedure after the 
training were excluded from the ANCOVA analysis to examine the hypothesis. Further-
more, the data from seven participants were excluded because these participants started 
WaTrSim without permission several times and were therefore more experienced in start-
ing up the plant than the other participants. In total, 126 data sets were used for the AN-
COVA. 
For the statistical analysis, the variable violation (violation = 1, compliance = 0) 
was used as a continuous variable, because in this case it represents a quantitative at-
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tribute (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001). 
ANOVAs and Chi2 tests were calculated to determine whether the groups differed 
significantly regarding different person-related variables, which might influence the deci-
sion-making process concerning rule violations (cf. Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the control variables, M (SD). 
 Gain Loss Sig 
 
Damaged 
plant  
n = 31 
Injured resi-
dents 
n = 32 
Damaged 
plant  
n = 31 
Injured resi-
dents 
n = 32 
. 
Sex 9 female 
22 male 
15 female 
17 male 
13 female 
18 male 
14 female 
18 male 
Χ2(3,126)= 2.40, p = .49, 
ηp=.01 
Age 
22.97 (2.55) 22.94 (2.98) 23.81 (3.32) 21.94 (2.09) 
F(3,122) = 2.40 
p = .07, ηp2= .06 
General Mental Abili-
ties 
(max. 50 pts) 
28.94 (7.43) 26.50 (5.10) 26.94(5.47) 26.59 (4.25) F(3,122) = 1.27 p = .29, ηp2= .03 
Conscientiousness 
scale  (1-9) 6.59 (1.00) 6.47 (1.14) 6.56 (1.03) 6.56 (1.09) 
F(3,122) = 0.85 
p = .97, ηp2< .01 
Empathy scale (1-5)  3.45 (.53) 3.49 (.51) 3.39 (.56) 3.47 (.41) F(3,122) = 0.21 p = .89, ηp2= .01 
Risky decision making 
(-18 – 18) + 9.10 (10.68) 10.07 (8.94) 
13.71 
(5.84) 9.56 (11.02) 
F(3,120) = 1.57 
p = .20, ηp2= .04 
Prior knowledge (max. 
7 pts) 5.81 (1.01) 5.91 (1.12) 5.65 (.98) 5.59 (1.13) 
F(3,122) =.58 
p = .63, ηp2= .01 
Performance practical 
test (11-step proce-
dure, hourly wage in 
€) 
20.35 (1.09) 19.89 (1.17) 20.97 (2.67) 20.82 (1.94) 
F(3,122) = 2.26 
p = .09, ηp2= .05 
Performance practical 
test (8-step procedure, 
hourly wage in €) 
22.45 (.90) 22.24 (1.08) 23.27 (1.93) 23.32 (.77) 
F(3,122) = 6.26 
p = .001, ηp2= .13 
Posttest knowledge 
(max. 28 pts) 21.55 (3.51) 22.41 (4.10) 
21.29 
(3.91) 21.22 (3.61) 
F(3,122) = .66 
p = .58, ηp2= .02 
Violations 
12 violations 
19 compli-
ance 
8 violations  
24 compli-
ance 
11 viola-
tions 
20 compli-
ance 
6 violations 
26 compli-
ance 
F(3,122) = .130 
p = .28, ηp2= .03 
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Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference only with regard to the per-
formance of the 8-step procedure (cf. Table 5, line 10). Therefore, an ANCOVA with the 
performance of the 8-step procedure as covariate was calculated to test the hypotheses. 
Preliminary checks revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was vio-
lated. Therefore, in the following analysis, an alpha level of α < .01 is assumed to deter-
mine the significance of the results (cf. for example Pallant, 2001). 
A two-way between groups ANCOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses re-
garding the impact of the framing and the goods at stake on rule violations.  
Hypothesis 1, which proposes an impact of the framing on rule violations, was not 
supported by the data. The main effect for the framing (F(1, 121)=0.60, p=.44, ηp2= .01) 
does not reach significance (cf. Table 6 for means). Thus, previous effects of the framing 
found, for example, by Kluge et al. (2013) could not be replicated. Hypothesis 2, which 
suggests that the goods at stake have an impact on people’s tendency to violate safety- 
related rules, also could not be verified. The main effect regarding the goods at stake did 
not reach significance (F(1,121)=3.39, p=.07, ηp²= .03, cf. Table 6 for means). 
Finally, hypothesis 3, which suggests an interaction between the framing and the 
goods stake, has to be rejected. There was no significant interaction effect between the 
framing and the goods at stake (F(1, 121)=0.05, p=.83, ηp2< .01). 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics concerning safety-related rule violations M (SD) 
Goods at stake Framing M SD N 
 
Damaged plant  
Gain .35 .49 31  
Loss .23 .43 31  
Total .29 .46 62  
Injured residents 
Gain .22 .42 32  
Loss .16 .37 32  
 Total .19 .39 64  
Damaged plant & injured 
residents 
Gain .29 .46 63  
Loss .19 .40 63  
 Total .24 .43 126  
Note: Coding of behaviour: 0=compliance, 1=rule violation.  
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Post-hoc analysis of person-related variables and their impact on safety-related 
rule violations. To investigate the relationships between the various person-related varia-
bles with rule-related behaviour, point-biserial correlations were calculated (cf. Table 7). 
The participants who were excluded because they were unable to perform the 11-step 
procedure were included in the correlation calculation in order to describe the whole 
spectrum of the ability and performance levels present in the data set.   
This analysis showed medium-sized positive and highly significant (p < .01) corre-
lations between general mental ability and the prior knowledge, the performance during 
operating with the more complex 11-step procedure, and the posttest knowledge (cf. Ta-
ble 7).  
 
Table 7. Correlations between control variables and violations (N=126) 
Note: Coding of behaviour: 0=compliance, 1=rule violation. The value of the practical test for both 
strategies 1 and 2 is a mean of the two-time execution of both strategies. + A high score means 
that the participant is risk-averse. pt = practical test; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
M     D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Age (1) 23.05 3.05          
General mental 
abilities (2) 
27.12 5.72 
-.16 
        
Conscientiousness  
(3) 
6.57 1.09 
-.08 -.02 
       
Empathy (4) 3.45 0.50 
.04 -.02 -.07 
      
Risky decision mak-
ing (5) + 
10.54 9.41 
-.01 .15 -.06 .14 
     
Prior knowledge  (6) 5.70 1.09 
-.08 .34** -.09 -.01 .02 
    
Performance 11-
step procedure (7) 
20.33 2.20 
-.20* .31** -.01 -.12 -.04 .28** 
   
Performance 8-step 
procedure  (8) 
22.71 1.68 
-.27** .21* .04 .04 .07 .15 .57** 
  
Posttest knowledge 
(9) 
21.40 4.08 
-.14 .42** -.04  -.12 .08 .43** .45**  .38** 
 
Violation (10) 37 violations 
89 compli-
ance 
.08 -.08 .16 -.09 -.02 -.06 -.20* -.07 -.22* 
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Significant small-sized negative correlations (p < .05) were found between the 
rule-related behaviour and the performance in the complex 11-step procedure and the 
posttest knowledge. This means that the better the performance of the 11-step proce-
dure, and the better the results of the posttest, the less likely participants were to commit 
a rule violation.  
The general mental ability correlates with theoretical (posttest) knowledge during 
training and procedural knowledge (performance of the procedures) of the required task 
indicating that general mental ability is the best premise to acquire theoretical and proce-
dural knowledge. The amount of knowledge and acquired skill in performing the 11-step 
procedure led, in turn, to a higher tendency to comply with rules. 
6.1.6 Discussion 
Results indicate that the goods at stake as well as the framing of the production 
outcome do not affect the decision-making process concerning rule-related behaviour. 
This means that violations occur to an equal degree under all experimental conditions.  
The absence of the framing effect was unexpected because this effect was dem-
onstrated in the same experimental context in several previous studies (Kluge et al., 
2013; Kluge et al., 2010). A plausible explanation for the absence of the framing effect is 
that the effect might be sensitive to situational factors, like the implementation of the 
goods at stake manipulation in the experimental environment, or other situational influ-
ences which differed between the investigations. It can be assumed that additional fac-
tors moderate the occurrence of the framing effect in the decision-making situations in-
vestigated here. Further studies should investigate the stability of the framing effect. If it 
turns out that the framing effect is susceptible to situational influences, as appears to 
have been the case in the present investigation, these influences should be identified, 
characterised and further investigated with regard to their moderating role. 
Concerning the goods at stake, the statistical analysis suggested that the goods at 
stake had no significant influence on the decision-making process regarding rule viola-
tions. However, it should be taken into account that the difference was marginally signifi-
cant (p=.07), suggesting that the effect of the goods at stake might be detected with a 
larger sample. Therefore, further investigations should be conducted to determine wheth-
er or not the goods at stake are a relevant influencing factor regarding rule violations.  
If the assumption that the goods at stake exert no effect on the occurrence of rule 
violations is maintained, this might be explained by different considerations. The partici-
pants were in a realistic goal conflict between the safety of the plant and the achievement 
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of their production goals. Participants wanted to achieve both the performance and the 
safety goals, but they were probably aware that the scenario, and the described possible 
consequences of the rule violation with which the goods at stake were induced, were fic-
tional. The lower production outcome, by contrast, was not fictional, and a failure to reach 
performance goals directly affected their compensation for the investigation. The fictional 
nature of the goods at stake scenarios might therefore be one explanation why the partic-
ipants decided to try to achieve their performance goals at the expense of the considera-
tion of the goods at stake. 
A further explanation for the findings is that in contrast to the investigation by 
Fagley and Miller (1997), who found an effect of the goods at stake, the main study was 
an experimental investigation in which the participants had to implement whatever deci-
sion they made. In Fagley and Miller`s investigation and in our pre-study, only the inten-
tion to violate a rule was investigated, whereas the main study captured the frequency of 
rule violations (behaviour). As predicted, for example, by the Integrated Model of Behav-
iour Prediction applied to violation (Kluge, 2010; Kluge et al., 2013, cf. Figure 12), there is 
a relation between the intention and the behaviour, but environmental factors and the 
factor of skill and training also influence this relationship. Thus, it can be assumed that 
most participants presumably intended to comply with the rule in the condition in which 
residents could be injured, but this intention was not realised because several other fac-
tors interfered with it. These findings are consistent with those of McKeon, Fogarty and 
Hegney (2006), who found that the level of knowledge is negatively associated with the 
level or rule violations. In this regard, the data analysis revealed several person-related 
factors which significantly correlated with rule violations. The participants who performed 
the 11-step procedure well or who had substantial knowledge regarding the simulation 
violated the mandatory procedure significantly less. According to these findings, it can be 
assumed that a high level of skill and knowledge prevents rule violations. By contrast, 
deficits regarding the fulfillment of the work task lead to a higher tendency to violate a 
rule. The rule violations might be used by the participants to compensate for certain defi-
cits in operating the plant.  
The impact of knowledge on rule violations is corroborated by the findings of 
Grote, Weichbrodt, Gunter, Zala Mezoe and Kunzle (2009) who showed that rule-related 
decisions with negative consequences are often due to lacking knowledge about the task 
and the situation. Besnard and Greadthead (2003) even discovered that the accuracy of 
the representation of the reality, or task knowledge, is correlated with the positive conse-
quence of the violation. The more accurate the representation the more likely the viola-
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tions lead to positive consequences. In sum, a comprehensive knowledge and proficient 
skill level are likely to prevent rule violations and if they are committed they are less likely 
to lead to negative consequences.  
In addition to the person-related factors, according to the IMV, there are also envi-
ronmental factors, such as the achievement of the performance goals (Kluge, 2010; 
Kluge et al., 2013, cf. Figure 12), which influence whether people`s intention to comply 
with a rule is realised. Like in the experimental setting of the main investigation, the 
achievement of performance goals is also associated with certain bonus payments in 
many organisations. The current findings indicate that it is very important for participants 
to meet performance goals to achieve a good remuneration. The prevention of the en-
dangerment of human life seems to only take second place. This finding is consistent with 
the results of a study by Falk and Szech (2013), in which participants had to decide either 
to save the life of a mouse but receive no money, or to get 10 € but have to accept that a 
mouse will be killed. They found that 40 % of the participants decided to accept that a 
mouse will be killed in order to get the remuneration; if they had to decide about the life of 
the mouse in a market situation, the rate of those who agreed to kill the mouse for finan-
cial remuneration even increased up to 80%. These results impressively demonstrate that 
the majority of the people are willing to diverge from social norms and act in a morally 
reprehensible way in order to achieve even a relatively small amount of money. 
The non-occurrence of the effect of the goods at stake might also be attributable 
to the different characteristics of the performance and the safety goals. As mentioned 
above, the participants were in a conflict between the achievement of the performance 
and the safety goals. It seems possible that the goods at stake were not relevant for the 
decision due to the different levels of abstraction of the performance and the safety goals. 
While the achievement of the production goals directly affected the salary of the partici-
pants in every case, the consequences of disregarding the safety goals (goods at stake) 
were more elusive and abstract. It can be assumed that the high level of abstraction of 
the goods at stake led the participants feel less emotionally affected by the described 
consequences. Furthermore, Perse (1990) showed in her investigation that the emotional 
involvement with (television) news depends on the motivational setting of the viewer. 
While being confronted with the newspaper articles in the current study, the motivation of 
the participants was to achieve a high production outcome. Although the participants may 
have perceived the information that residents were injured to be quite dramatic, due to 
their motivational background and the distal consequences of the goods at stake condi-
   
Empirical Evidence    
 
109 
 
tions, they did not really become emotionally involved. Therefore, the goods at stake did 
not affect the decision concerning the rule violation. 
The issue regarding the emotional involvement in the experimental setting may 
raise the question why an experimental setting was used for the present investigation. At 
first the investigation, how it is designed here, is inconvertible in an organisational setting, 
because all details of the investigations have to be permitted and corroborated by the 
industrial council and by the managers of the respective organisation. The random as-
signment to different experimental conditions as well as the collection of personal data 
are some of the very problematic requirements which can only be met be experimental, 
“laboratory settings”, but not by real organisational or “field” investigations (Stone-
Romero, 2011). The laboratory setting, or as Stone-Romero says “special purpose set-
ting” is in that respect associated with a high level of internal validity which enable the 
reliable conception of causal relations. Stone-Romero (2011) argues in this regard that a 
high internal validity justify the generalisation of the findings to other non-laboratory like 
for example organisational settings.   
Considering the practical implications of the investigation, the assumption that rule 
violations can be prevented if it is described that the consequences may affect human 
well being, is not supported by the present findings. The evidence suggests that rather 
than appealing to social norms, it is more effective to offer regular training measures for 
the operators to reduce the amount of rule violations. A high proficiency level and sub-
stantial knowledge about the work task seem to provide the best prevention against rule 
violations. It should be further investigated whether the effect of performance and knowl-
edge on rule violations can be found in other contexts as well. If it transpires that this ef-
fect is stable across different contexts and investigations, this will provide the very valu-
able insight that personnel development which improves the performance of a certain 
task or the knowledge about it is one tool that can be used to achieve more compliance, 
and thus more safety in organisations. 
The present investigations led to several very valuable insights into the determina-
tion of safety-related rule violations. The factors knowledge and task performance are 
identified as significant predictors of safety-related rule violations. The framing effect does 
not seem to be as stable as appeared to be the case in previous investigations, and the 
goods at stake do not seem to influence safety-rule related behaviour at all.  Neverthe-
less, several research questions remain. Besides the investigated factors, there are fur-
ther environmental conditions which are assumed to determine safety-rule related behav-
iour as well. To investigate these factors, the WaTrSim basic version has been extended 
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into a new version called WaTrSim-Annual. WaTrSim-Annual simulates a whole produc-
tion year in which the participants have to decide not only once, but a total of 48 times 
whether they want to comply with the rule. This extension of the simulation allows the 
investigation of the decision-making process concerning safety-related rule violations 
over the course of time. This is even closer to the decision-making situation in the real 
working environment in an organisation, because operators usually have to decide regu-
larly whether to violate a certain rule. Considering the IMV (cf. Figure 12), safety audits 
are assumed to be influential in this repeated, more long-term-oriented decision-making 
process. Therefore, the impact of safety audits and the impact of different accuracy levels 
of the information about the possibility of safety audits will be investigated in subsequent 
studies. 
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6.2 The impact of personality –  
Counterproductive Work Behaviour in a simulated production 
context: An exploratory study with personality traits as predic-
tors of safety-related rule violations  
6.2.1 Abstract 
Counterproductive workplace behaviour (CWB) is investigated in Organisational Psychol-
ogy as well as in the area of Human Factors. So far, each of these disciplines has mostly 
disregarded findings by the other. The present studies integrate findings gained from the 
two disciplines to investigate the qualities of personality traits that predict safety-related 
rule violations in a production context. A pilot study was conducted to test a set of per-
sonality traits in terms of their predictive qualities regarding the intention to violate a rule. 
Three traits (integrity subscale: cautiousness, self-interest, injustice sensitivity) emerged 
as predictors and were applied in a business simulation of a production environment 
(main study). Cautiousness turned out to be significantly correlated with safety-related 
rule violations in the production context. Hence, cautiousness should be measured in 
personnel selection in order to enhance safety and reduce the costs of CWB in organisa-
tions.  
6.2.2 Introduction - The relationship between Counterproductive Work-
place Behaviour (CWB) and Human Factors research on safety-
related rule violations 
Enhancing the productivity and wellbeing of people in organisations is the major 
goal of work and organisational psychologists. Traditionally, organisational psychologists 
have focused on the investigation of beneficial behaviour, such as motivation or job satis-
faction, while less attention has been paid to negative, counterproductive behaviour pat-
terns (Griffin et al., 1998). According to Sacket (2002), CWB is defined as intentional be-
haviour on the part of an organisational member, which is contrary to the interests of the 
organisation. Examples of CWB include theft, misuse of information or unsafe behaviour 
(enumeration of Gruys & Sackett, 2003). There are many terms which describe behaviour 
that is similar to or the same as CWB (cf. employee deviance, see below). In line with 
some authors who suggest using CWB as generic term (cf. for example Gruys & Sackett, 
2003), in the following, CWB is used as generic term for all concepts which describe de-
viant behaviour in the work context.  
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6.2.3 Theoretical background 
The fact that CWB is assumed to cost organisations billions of dollars every year 
(Murphy, 1993; Ones, 2002) demonstrates that CWB is not an unlikely practice in many 
organisations. In the past years, CWB has become an important topic in the area of Or-
ganisational Psychology as well as in Human Factors research. 
The Human Factors Perspective 
 Human Factors research is concerned with the investigation of the human-system 
interaction and its effects on performance, user satisfaction and safety (Wickens et al., 
2004). In the area of Human Factors, CWB is mainly considered under the heading of 
safety-related rule violations and their impact on safety. The violation of safety-related 
rules is defined as “[…] deliberate departures from rules that describe the safe or ap-
proved methods of performing a particular task or job” (Lawton, 1998, p. 78).  
Reason (2008) further differentiates between malevolent violations, which are un-
dertaken to damage the system, and non-malevolent violations, which are not committed 
to harm an organisation. Malevolent violations occur due to different motivations: Some 
are committed to compensate for deficiencies in the workplace (Reason, 2008), while 
others are due to the general human tendency to choose the most comfortable, less ef-
fortful behaviour (Reason, 1990). According to Reason (2008), some violations are com-
mitted to demonstrate skills in handling difficult risky situations or arouse a thrilling ex-
perience.  
The Organisational Psychology Perspective 
Like rule violations, CWB is affected by different factors. Possible variables that 
might influence CWB include the safety climate in an organisation (Ehrhart & Raver, 
2014), and a lack of vocational fit (Iliescu, Ispas, Sulea, & Ilie, 2015). CWB in general has 
been measured by several instruments (see below) which use peer rating (co-workers or 
supervisors) as well as self-rating. Since self-reports were shown to be more valid than 
external assessments, the self-rating method of measurement is recommended (Berry, 
Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012). 
In the area of Organisational Psychology, CWB is investigated under different 
headings and terms. CWB includes a variety of different behaviour patterns, which are 
described with different terms and at different levels of abstraction. The following list is 
not exhaustive; on the contrary, only the terms which are relevant in the context of the 
investigation at hand are described and defined.  
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There are terms that are used more or less synonymously with CWB, like em-
ployee deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000), and terms that describe behaviour which 
can be categorized as CWB if it occurs in the organisational context but which are not 
restricted to this area, like antisocial behaviour (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997), lying be-
haviour (Williams, 2002), or imprudent and criminal behaviour (Arneklev, Grasmick, Tittle, 
& Bursik Jr, 1993; Arneklev, Elis, & Medlicott, 2006).  
Employee deviance refers to “[...] voluntary behaviour that violates significant or-
ganizational norms and in doing so threatens the well-being of an organization, its mem-
bers, or both” (Bennett & Robinson, 2000, p. 556). Examples of such behaviour include 
theft, disciplinary problems, substance abuse, property damage or organizational rule-
breaking (Salgado, 2002). All of these examples refer to rule-violating behaviour; how-
ever, the latter example plays an important role in the context of safety-related rule viola-
tions in organisations.  
Antisocial behaviour can be defined as any behaviour that impairs or aims to im-
pair an organization or its members (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997). According to the 
authors, examples of antisocial behaviour in organizations are fraud, interpersonal vio-
lence, lying or violations of confidentiality.  
Lying behaviour can be understood as “[...] an assertion, the content of which the 
speaker believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with 
regard to that content” (Williams, 2002, p. 96). As such, lying behaviour involves the act 
of knowingly giving out wrong information with the intention of misleading another person; 
behaviour that can harm an organisation or even endanger work safety.  
Imprudent behaviours can be conceived of as irresponsible acts such as smoking, 
alcohol consumption and gambling (Arneklev et al., 1993). Similar to criminal behaviours, 
imprudent behaviours also “[...] require little planning, provide immediate gratification, and 
offer a great deal of excitement” (Baron, 2003, p. 404). According to Arneklev et al. 
(2006), the difference between the two types of behaviour is that imprudent behaviour is 
not illegal while criminal behaviour always is.  
Integrating the Organisational Psychology and Human Factors Perspective 
The wide range of terms makes it hard to integrate and compare empirical find-
ings. Most researchers have a specialised understanding and have developed their own 
theories regarding their conception of CWB; hence, the research results pertaining to 
similar constructs are often not considered (Ones, 2002). In particular, the research in the 
different areas of Organisational Psychology and Human Factors have mostly disre-
garded findings and developments in the respective other area.  
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When considering these terms and definitions, the link between CWB and safety-
related rule violations becomes apparent. CWB involves the violation of certain rules or 
norms, but rule violations are often, but not necessarily, CWB. Rule violations are associ-
ated with the risk of undesired outcomes, but most violations do not result in harm for the 
organisation (Alper & Karsh, 2009; Besnard & Hollnagel, 2014). If the rule violation is 
committed in order to handle a new situation, or to achieve other, more important, organ-
isational goals, the violation can even be advantageous for the organisation (Besnard & 
Hollnagel, 2014; Hale & Swuste, 1998). Taken together, the constructs of CWB and rule 
violations seem to be closely connected. The connection between these constructs sug-
gests that there are similar processes which determine these behaviours.  
Preliminary findings regarding safety-related rule violations  
The present investigation assumes a Human Factors-oriented perspective and 
therefore focuses on the violation of safety-related rules. As such, the Macroergonomic 
Framework of Rule-Violations by Alper and Karsh (2009) was used as a starting point for 
the investigations. Alper and Karsh (2009) described different levels of factors which in-
fluence the decision to violate a safety-related rule. They differentiate between individual 
factors, such as experience, knowledge, or age; factors which are associated with the 
work system, such as the task complexity, time demands or department goals; organisa-
tional factors, such as organisational policy or social norms; and finally, external, envi-
ronmental factors, such as the legislation, or influences of the industry.   
Our research concentrated on the investigation of factors which refer to the work 
system level or the organisational level (cf. for example Kluge et al., 2013; von der Heyde 
et al., 2013; von der Heyde, Presting, Kluge, & Badura, 2012). Nevertheless, some indi-
vidual factors, like sex, age, conscientiousness or risky decision making were measured 
as control variables, because there are already some findings showing that these factors 
are valid predictors of rule violations (cf. for example Berry et al., 2007; Hale & Swuste, 
1998). Surprisingly, none of the measured predictors, like conscientiousness or risky de-
cision making, proved to be significant predictors of the violation of safety-related rules in 
our investigations (cf. von der Heyde et al., 2012). Therefore, the present study aims to 
identify personality traits that potentially predict rule-violating behaviour which have not 
yet been investigated in this context.  
While the investigation of these correlations is comparatively less common in the 
area of Human Factors research, in the area of Organisational Psychology and personnel 
selection, the prediction of CWB on the basis of certain variables, like integrity or certain 
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other personality traits, is quite common (Ones et al., 1993; Peng, 2012; Salgado, 2002; 
Woolley & Hakstian, 1993).   
The empirical findings concerning the correlation between CWB and personality 
traits should be used to gain new ideas for personality traits that might predict safety-
related rule violations in organisations. 
Personality traits for predicting safety-related rule violations in the production context 
The review of the literature regarding the association between personality traits 
and various CWB behaviour patterns revealed eight concepts to be promising for the 
prediction of rule-violating behaviour. 
Self-control describes the tendency to avoid acts whose negative long-term 
consequences outweigh current advantages (Marcus, 2004). The general theory 
of crime proposes that engagement in criminal behaviour is caused by low self-
control (Gottfredson, 1990). These findings are supported by research demon-
strating that various criminal and imprudent behaviours can be attributed to low 
self-control (e.g. Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). A more recent inves-
tigation in a student sample even found that self-control is associated with the vio-
lation of rules (Muraven, Pogarsky, & Shmueli, 2006). Therefore, self-control was 
included as one possible predictor. 
Integrity is understood as an individual’s conformity regarding values, 
norms and actions (Marcus, 2006). Marcus (2006) developed a practice-oriented 
method of integrity measurement to predict counterproductive behaviour in or-
ganisations. Integrity was included in this study because it is a well-established 
construct for predicting counterproductive work behaviour (Marcus et al., 2013). 
Five sub-constructs of integrity (Marcus, 2006) were assessed in the current 
study: 
a. Low distribution assesses the strength with which the violation of norms and 
rules is distributed in daily work settings.  
b. Non-rationalization describes the tendency to search for causes that justify un-
reasonable behaviour.  
c. People with high levels of reliability are supposed to work in a structured man-
ner, to keep their word and to control their impulses.  
d. Cautiousness describes a person’s preference for safe and predictable actions 
as opposed to risky and exciting situations.  
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e. Conflict avoidance refers to a person’s tendency to avoid conflicts and to pur-
sue a peaceful way of problem solving.  
The belief in a just world is a concept that was originally introduced by 
Lerner (1980), who defined it as the belief that we are living in a world where indi-
viduals always get what they deserve. Hafer (2000) found that a strong belief in a 
just world was associated with a decreased use of unjust means to achieve long-
term goals. The violation of rules can, to some extent, be regarded as use of un-
just means; hence, it is assumed that rule-violating behaviour can be associated 
with a low belief in a just world.  
The sensitivity towards injustice is, according to Schmitt, Maes and Schmal 
(1997), a construct which needs to be assessed from three perspectives: the vic-
tim perspective (others are advantaged while oneself is disadvantaged), the ob-
server perspective (observing someone else being treated unfairly from a neutral 
position), and the perpetrator perspective (Schmitt et al., 1997). The latter per-
spective is mostly interesting in terms of an individual’s tendency to feel guilty 
about unjustified benefits (Schmitt et al., 1997). Violations may be conducted to 
acquire (unjustified) benefits; hence, the perpetrator`s perspective is also included 
in the present investigation. Research investigating the effects of this trait sug-
gests that sensitivity towards injustice from the perpetrator’s perspective is posi-
tively related to prosocial behaviour and negatively related to antisocial behaviour 
(Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005). 
Self-interest can be described as an action that is “undertaken for the sole 
purpose of achieving a personal benefit or benefits”, such as tangible (e.g. mone-
tary) or intangible (e.g. group status) benefits (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 
2005, p. 285). Self-interest was included in the current investigation because it 
was found to be associated with lying behaviour (Grover & Hui, 1994). 
Self-responsibility is focused on decision-making processes concerning 
planning and action regarding an individual’s behaviour. An individual acts self-
responsibly if important objectives and the achievement of objectives are thor-
oughly thought through before action is taken (Bierhoff et al., 2005). This person-
ality trait was chosen because prior research found that the amount of performed 
safety observations can be associated with feelings of personal or self-
responsibility (DePasquale, 1999). 
Regulatory focus at work refers to the regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 
1998), which differentiates between promotion-oriented individuals, who aim to 
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achieve desirable outcomes, and prevention-oriented individuals, who aim to 
avoid undesirable outcomes. Depending on the type of regulatory focus (promo-
tion vs. prevention), individuals tend to apply different approaches which lead to 
the desired outcomes. The regulatory focus also leads to the occurrence of differ-
ent error types. Higgins et al. (2001) found that Individuals who are promotion-
oriented were less likely to make an “error of omission” (refers to an action in 
which something has been left out). Furthermore, an “error of commission” (refers 
to an action which should not have been taken) was less likely for individuals with 
a prevention orientation. Wallace, Johnson and Frazier (2009) applied the regula-
tory focus theory to work settings and found this theory to be a valid and reliable 
measure for predicting work outcomes such as productivity or safety performance. 
More specifically, Wallace et al. (2009) found that a promotion focus was posi-
tively related to productivity performance but negatively related to safety perform-
ance, suggesting that individuals with a promotion focus tend to work quickly 
rather than accurately and safely. Conversely, individuals with a prevention focus 
showed a positive relationship with safety performance (Wallace et al., 2009). It 
can be assumed that the regulatory focus is also associated with rule violations 
because the compliance with rules is an integral part of safety performance.  
 
To investigate whether these personality traits are suitable for the prediction of 
safety-related rule violations in the production context (as a subtype of CWB), two studies 
were conducted. In the pilot study, merely the intention to violate a rule was investigated, 
whereas in the main study, concrete behaviour was looked at. 
6.2.4 Pilot study 
A web-based pilot study was conducted in order to preselect the personality traits 
which show the most promise regarding the prediction of safety-related rule violations in 
the production context (main study). The underlying assumption is that the personality 
traits which significantly predict rule-violating behaviour in daily life scenarios are also 
applicable for the prediction of safety-related rule violations in the production context. The 
pilot study included eight personality traits and their relations to the intention to violate a 
rule in daily life settings. Personality traits were measured using existing scales. The in-
tention to violate rules in daily life settings was measured applying a self-constructed ten-
item instrument, the purpose of which was to mirror the underlying principles of the busi-
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ness simulation production scenario of goal conflicts (used in the main study and which 
takes 5 hours to complete) in ten small-scaled  scenarios.  
Method  
Overall, 91 participants were recruited (65 female), most of whom (86.8%) were 
students while the rest were employees or freelancers. The participants were aged be-
tween 18 and 50 years (M = 24.43; SD = 6.92). The study was a questionnaire-based 
online study which took about 45 minutes to complete. Students were compensated with 
course credits; the remaining participants did not receive any compensation. 
The online study was conducted between September and November 2012. It was 
approved by the local Ethics Committee. Subjects were informed about the purposes of 
the study and told that they could discontinue at any time (in terms of informed consent). 
The participants were recruited on the campus of the University Duisburg-Essen through 
flyers and posters, and posts in online forums as well as in online social communities 
(German student forums such as uni-protokolle.de and forums and social communities of 
students from different universities).  
 
Predictor variables. As outlined in the theoretical background, seven personality 
traits were selected to be tested as predictors of rule-violating behaviour: self-control, 
integrity, belief in a just world, sensitivity towards injustice, self-interest, self-responsibility 
and regulatory focus at work.  Apart from the constructs self-control and regulatory focus 
at work, all scales used in the study were designed in German. Exemplary items were 
translated for the purpose of this paper only. 
The operationalisation of the predictor variables including the scale description, 
authors and exemplary items are displayed in Table 8. Most of the applied scales were 
shortened; items that fit well into the study’s context were selected (an overview of items 
used can be found in the Appendix 11.2). All α-values provided in Table 8 refer to the 
reliability measures of the present pilot study.  
Criterion: Rule-violating behaviour in daily life situations. Ten items measuring the 
tendency for rule violations in daily life situations (see Table 9) were developed by the 
authors (for the German Items, see Appendix 11.2.8). The rule violation instrument was 
developed as a short and efficient way to measure rule violations in the pilot study. Since 
the business simulation used in the main study is very time-consuming (taking 5 hours 
per person), the rule violation instrument was developed to enable a comparatively quick 
pretest of a large number of personality traits. The purpose was not to develop and vali-
date the rule violation instrument as a new measurement method but rather to use it as a 
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substitute for the comprehensive simulation. This enabled the pilot study to be conducted 
online with the aim of selecting the best predictors of rule-violating behaviour from a 
number of already validated instruments.  
 
 
Table 8. Operationalisation of the predictor variables 
Personality 
trait 
Authors Scale description Exemplary items All items 
Self-control Seipel (1999) 
(derived from 
Grasmick et 
al., 1993) 
15 out of 21 items (α = 
.67); 5-point Likert 
scale (disagree/agree) 
“I never allow myself to lose 
control.” 
Appendix 
11.2.1 
Integrity Marcus 
(2006) – 
Inventory of 
Work-
Related Atti-
tudes and 
Self-
Assessment  
5 (35 items) out of 9 
(115 items) subscales 
• Low distribution 
(α = .67) 
• Non-
Rationalization (α = 
.54) 
• Reliability (α = 
.64) 
• Cautiousness (α 
= .76) 
• Conflict avoid-
ance (α = .77) 
5-point Likert scale 
(disagree/agree) 
• Low distribution (“Every-
one cheats on their tax re-
turns”) 
• Non-Rationalization (“To 
be successful in one’s pro-
fessional life, one mustn’t 
be too particular about 
rules and guidelines”) 
• Reliability (“I work on 
tasks quickly rather than 
thoroughly”) 
• Cautiousness (“I am sen-
sible rather than adventur-
ous) 
• Conflict avoidance (“I try 
to avoid conflict if possi-
ble”) 
Appendix 
11.2.2 
Belief in a 
just world 
Schmitt et al. 
(1997) 
Subscale “ultimate 
justice”; 6 items (α = 
.89); 5-point Likert 
scale (disagree/agree) 
 “Anyone who does wrong 
will be called to account for it 
one day.”  
Appendix 
11.2.3 
Sensitivity 
towards in-
justice 
Schmitt et al. 
(1997) 
Subscale “perpetrator 
perspective”; 9 items 
(α = .90); 5-point Likert 
scale (disagree/agree) 
“It bothers me if I get some-
thing that someone else de-
serves” 
Appendix 
11.2.4 
Self-interest Mohiyeddini 
& Montada 
(2004) 
8 items (α = .80); 6-
point Likert scale (dis-
agree/agree) 
“I think it is more important to 
follow my own interests than 
the interests of others” 
Appendix 
11.2.5 
Self-
responsibil-
ity* 
Bierhoff et al. 
(2005) 
6 out of 20 items (α = 
.39); 6-point Likert 
scale (disagree/agree) 
“I think everyone can con-
tribute to improving their daily 
life.” 
Appendix 
11.2.6 
Regulatory 
focus at work 
Solga (in 
prep.) (de-
rived from 
Wallace et 
al., 2009) 
6 items (1,3,5,7,9,11) 
subscale prev. focus 
(α = .87); 5 items 
(2,4,6,8,10) subscale 
prom. focus (α =.70); 
5-point Likert scale 
(never/always) 
“I concentrate on completing 
work tasks correctly” (prev. 
Focus) 
Appendix 
11.2.7 
* Scale was excluded from analysis due to poor reliability levels 
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The items of the rule violation instrument explore an individual’s intention to vio-
late a rule, guideline or social norm in daily life settings. The instrument consists of ten 
items in which dilemma situations are described. The dilemma situations address differ-
ent areas of daily life concerns that are assumed to be commonly experienced by indi-
viduals across Europe. As such, the dilemma situations include heterogeneous behaviour 
concerning sports activities, public and road transport, (illegal) internet activities and gen-
eral social behaviour. Each situation comprises self-interested goals which are in conflict 
with different types of rules (e.g. social norm or law) in order to correspond to the behav-
iour investigated in the main study, as explained below. The rule violation instrument was 
developed to measure a person’s tendency to violate or comply with rules when s/he is 
exposed to conflicting goals which either suggest complying with or violating a rule or 
social norm. Since these goal conflicts appear in different contexts, the items represent 
the various goal conflicts in various situations. Nevertheless, in order to mirror the simula-
tion context which is used in the main study, the items of the rule violation instrument are 
congruent regarding the underlying conflict between the individual goal and the rule or 
norm.  
The content validity of the rule violation instrument was designed to be high, since 
the propensity to commit rule violations in situations with conflicting goals is measured 
across different situational contexts and with reference to different rules and norms. Fur-
thermore, the items were rated by a group of ten experts with respect to their closeness 
to reality and the extent of the dilemma which is experienced regarding each item. Only 
the items with a high interrater agreement in the expert rating were included in the rule 
violation instrument. Since the rule violation instrument was designed as a method to 
measure the criterion of rule violations more efficiently in a pretest, and was not con-
ceived as a new instrument, neither the convergent nor the divergent validity was deter-
mined in the present investigation. 
For each situation, the individual has to rate the degree to which s/he would vio-
late the rule on a four-point Likert scale (disagree/agree). Through the use of a four-point 
scale, the participants are forced to indicate at least a tendency for one decision option 
(compliance/violation). The full list of items including means, standard deviations, item 
difficulties and discriminatory powers is presented below (Table 9).  
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Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, item difficulties and discriminatory powers for items 
of the rule violation instrument, N=90 
 
Item M SD pm rit 
1 I would rather risk being caught speeding than be late 
for an important appointment. 
2.23 .97 .56 -.17 
2 Although I have a blood alcohol level of 0.8 per cent 
(blatantly above the legal limit), I give my injured friend 
a lift to the hospital. 
2.14 1.03 .54 .12 
3 Although an opposing player lies injured on the ground 
due to my foul, I continue the match to make the final 
score for my team. 
2.12 .97 .53 .33 
4 I would cross the street when the lights are red in order 
to catch the bus, even though a family with small chil-
dren is standing next to me. 
3.13 .11 .78 .23 
5 I would rather risk missing the last train than get on it 
without a valid ticket. 
2.79 .11 .70 .23 
6 I would rather risk failing an important exam than cheat 
using illegal means. 
2.26 1.1 .56 .25 
7 Although I notice that I’ve damaged another car while 
backing out of a parking space, I drive on (hit and run) 
so that my insurance doesn’t go up. 
1.98 1.01 .49 .37 
8 Although I suspect the Smart phone (list price 600€) 
being offered to me by an acquaintance for 200€ is 
stolen, I buy it 
2.23 1.13 .56 .37 
9 Since my favourite film is out of stock in the shops, I 
download it illegally off the internet 
2.74 1.22 .69 .37 
10 Although I do not feel well, I offer my bus/train seat to a 
frail person. 
1.72 .82 .43 .12 
Notes. pm = item difficulty; rit = discriminatory power; items written in a lighter font are not included 
in the score calculation 
 
 
The item difficulties are satisfactory; they are in the middle range and vary be-
tween .43 (Item 1) and .78 (Item 4). The discriminatory power of the items is not satisfac-
tory; most items vary between .23 and .37. The items with a lower discriminatory power 
than .23 (items 1, 2 and 10) were excluded from the score calculation (excluded items are 
marked in a lighter font in Table 2).  
As the rule violation instrument covers a heterogeneous construct, the calculation 
of Cronbach’s Alpha as an indicator of reliability was not assumed to be applicable. The 
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calculation of retest reliability seems to be more appropriate, but requires two measure-
ment times. Due to the fact that the rule violation instrument was designed not as a new 
measurement method but merely as a time- and cost-efficient alternative method to 
measure the criterion in the pretest, we suggest considering the discriminatory power 
values of the items as indicator for the reliability of the rule violation instrument (cf. Table 
9). 
Results  
Pearson correlations were calculated to analyse the relationships between the 
items of the rule violation instrument and the personality traits (cf. Table 10). 
  
Table 10. Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson Correlations for the Criterion and the 
Predictor Variables, N=91 
Item  
Self-
control 
(Rang
e 1-5) 
Injustice  
sensi-
tivity 
(Range 
1-5) 
Self-
interest  
(Range 
1-6) 
Regu-
latory 
focus 
at work  
prom. 
Focus 
(Range 
1-5) 
Regu-
latory 
focus 
at work  
prev. 
Focus 
(Range 
1-5) 
Self-
respon
sibility 
(Range 
1-6) 
Belief 
in a 
just 
world 
(Range 
1-6) 
+Low 
distri-
bution   
(Range
1-5)   
+Non-
ration-
aliza-
tion 
(Range 
1-5) 
 
+Relia
bility 
(Range 
1-5) 
+Cauti
ous-
ness 
(Range 
1-5) 
+Con-
flict 
avoid-
ance 
(Rang
e 1-5)  
1 -.01 -.10 .19 .21 .17 .04 .13 .24 .16 .11 .33 .09 
2 -.09 .11 .04 .00 -.13 -.27** -.01 .09 .03 -.17 -.09 -.11 
3 -.05 -.36** .39** .21* .11 -.12 -.07 -.04 -.31** -.13 -.27* -.16 
4 .14 -.26* .11 .32** .14 .03 -.17 .07 -.04 -.04 -.44** -.15 
5 -.02 -.12 .12 -.04 .01 .03 -.16 .11 -.09 -.13 -.32** -.13 
6 -.06 -.11 .05 -.17 -.02 .03 -.07 -.26* -.19 -.11 -.16 -.12 
7 -.04 -.39** .48** -.10 -.09 -.13 .10 -.02 -.17 -.31* -.22 .05 
8 -.17 -.28** .18 -.02 -.22* -.13 -.11 -.02 -.16 -.17 -.21 -.06 
9 -.19 -.15 .16 -.14 -.18 -.15 -.14 .03 -.09 -.19 -.16 -.12 
10 .14 -.07 .26* .21 .31** .04 -.07 .21* -.01 -.06 .08 .05 
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Rule
-
violat
ion 
in-
stru
ment 
(13) 
(R
 
 
-.11 -.42** .37** .10 -.07 -.12 -.16 -.03 -.27* -.28** -.45** -.18 
Note. + indicates a subscale of the Integrity Inventory, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 
The means, standard deviations and correlations are displayed in Table 10. Sig-
nificant medium-sized negative correlations were found between the rule violation instru-
ment and the scales assessing sensitivity towards injustice, non-rationalization, reliability 
and cautiousness (see Table 10). These correlations suggest that higher scores on the 
respective scales assessing the personality traits are accompanied by a lower intention to 
violate a rule in a daily life setting. A significant medium-sized positive correlation was 
found between several items and the total score of the rule violation instrument and self-
interest. 
Regression  
A backward regression was conducted to assess which combination of predictor 
variables (personality constructs) is best able to predict the dependent variable (intention 
to violate a rule in daily life settings). All predictors which significantly correlated with the 
rule violation instrument were entered into the model. The weak predictors were removed 
until only useful predictor variables remained in the model (see Table 11). Therefore, not 
all of the tested predictors ended up in the model.  
 
Table 11. Regression Analysis with Rule-Violating Behaviour (Rule Violation instrument) 
as Criterion 
Predictor B SE ß T p 
Cautiousness  
(Range 1-5) 
-.33 .07 -.41 -4.93 .00 
Injustice sensitivity   
(Range 1-5) 
-.14 .06 -.24 -2.50 .02 
Self-interest (Range 1-6) .15 .06 .22 2.25 .03 
Non-rationalization 
(Range 1-5) 
-.17 .09 -.17 -1.99 .05 
R²  .42    
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The results of the backward regression indicated that four predictors explained 
42% of the variance (F(4,85) = 15.17, p < .01). Significant predictors of rule violations are 
cautiousness (ß= -.41, p < .01), sensitivity towards injustice (ß = -.24, p < .05) and self-
interest (ß = .22, p <.05). The Beta coefficient of non-rationalization was not significant (ß 
= -.17, p =.05). The results indicate that low levels of cautiousness as well as sensitivity 
towards injustice (perpetrators perspective) are indicators of a high intention to violate a 
rule in daily life settings, whereas low levels of self-interest are associated with a low in-
tention to violate a rule in daily life settings. 
Discussion  
The pilot study suggests that cautiousness, sensitivity towards injustice, as well as 
self-interest are personality predictors of the violation of rules in daily life settings. These 
results must be interpreted with caution because the criterion validity of the rule violation 
instrument could not be determined, as no external criterion for the violation of safety-
related rules was measured. Due to the fact that this was a pilot study aiming to reveal 
which personality traits show the most promise regarding the prediction of rule-violating 
behaviour, the effort was minimized, but further studies should be conducted to determine 
the validity of the rule violation instrument.  
The pilot study revealed cautiousness, injustice sensitivity and self-interest as 
valid predictors of the intention to violate a rule in daily life situations. The main study 
aims to investigate whether these personality traits are also suitable for the prediction of 
actual behaviour in a production work setting. 
6.2.5 Main study 
The investigation of rule violations in a real work setting is challenging because 
violations are associated with serious risks and endangerments. Therefore, a business 
simulation was used to investigate this research question. The business simulation 
WaTrSim-Annual (von der Heyde et al., 2013) represents the work situation of an opera-
tor in a chemical plant.   
The participants assumed the role of an operator who has the task of starting up 
the WaTrSim plant each week (48 weeks in total) for one simulated production year. The 
participants were told that they would be paid for their participation and that their salary 
would be dependent on their performance level when operating the plant. As operators, 
they had to decide for every simulated week whether to comply with the rule and start up 
the plant according to the compulsory and safe 11-step procedure (productive behaviour), 
which is, however, not as profitable, or to violate the rule, applying a more profitable but 
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unsafe 8-step start-up (work-around) procedure (CWB). Overall, the participants were 
confronted 48 times with the goal conflict (or dilemma), with a good remuneration on the 
one hand and safety on the other hand. 
The behaviour in this dilemma situation is assumed to be determined by several 
factors. On the basis of the pilot study results, it can be assumed that cautiousness, injus-
tice sensitivity and self-interest are valid personality predictor variables not only for the 
intention to violate a rule in a daily life dilemma situation, but also for the actual behaviour 
concerning safety-related rule violations in a production environment.  
Hypotheses:  
1) Low rates of safety-related rule violations can be associated with high scores on 
the cautiousness scale.  
2) Low rates of safety-related rule violations can be associated with high scores on 
the sensitivity towards injustice scale.  
3) Low rates of safety-related rule violations can be associated with low scores on 
the self-interest scale.  
Method 
Overall, 152 students (38 female) of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of 
Duisburg-Essen were recruited to participate in the study. The sample was aged between 
18 and 33 years (M = 21.32; SD = 2.39). The study took about five hours to complete, 
including the training of operators. To generate a goal conflict between safety and good 
remuneration, the participants were told that they will be paid based on their performance 
in operating the plant. Due to ethical considerations, every participant was compensated 
with 50 Euros each. The study was conducted between November 2012 and July 2013. It 
was approved by the local Ethics Committee. The participants were recruited on the 
campus through flyers, posters, face-to-face contact in lectures and by posts in online 
forums and in social networks (forums and social communities of students of the city in 
which the study takes place and of cities in the immediately surrounding areas).  
 
Procedure. First, participants were informed about the purposes of the study and 
told that they could discontinue at any time (in terms of informed consent). Then, they 
were introduced to the business simulation WaTrSim. They learned and were trained on 
how to operate the chemical plant by applying the two start-up procedures. After the train-
ing, the participants had to start up the plant and make their own decisions regarding 
which procedure to use. After they had completed the year in the business simulation, the 
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predictors cautiousness, injustice sensitivity and self-interest were measured. At the end 
of the study, the participants were debriefed and paid. 
 
The Criterion Variable. After the first quarter of the simulated year, the 8-step pro-
cedure was declared as forbidden, because this procedure bears the risk of a deflagra-
tion (for further details see Kluge et al., 2013). To underline the severity of the conse-
quence, participants were informed that the compliance with the mandatory procedure 
would be audited (cf. von der Heyde et al., 2013). If a participant violated the mandatory 
procedure and this was uncovered by an audit, s/he would have to pay a fine, which was 
to receive no weekly salary for the respective production week. From this point, the par-
ticipants were in a goal conflict: They had to decide whether they would comply with the 
rule by using the safe but less profitable 11-step procedure or whether they would violate 
the rule by using the profitable but unsafe 8-step procedure (CWB). This decision had to 
be made a total of 36 times (criterion: 0-36 rule violations). 
Results 
Due to missing values in the data set or the inability to perform the two start-up 
procedures (measured by the performance in applying the procedures during the train-
ing), eight participants were excluded from further analysis. Thus, 144 participants were 
included in the analysis. Regarding the means and standard deviations, it becomes clear 
that the participants decided to violate the safety-related rule on average 13 out of 36 
trials when starting up the plant (see Table 5).  
 
Testing the hypotheses. It was hypothesized that low rates of safety-related rule 
violations (CWB) can be associated with high scores on the cautiousness scale (H1), high 
scores on the sensitivity towards injustice scale (H2) and low scores on the self-interest 
scale (H3).  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 have to be rejected, as there were no significant correlations 
of sensitivity towards injustice and self-interest with the amount of rule violations (see 
Table 12). A significant negative correlation was found between cautiousness and viola-
tions (rs = -.21, p. < .05), supporting hypothesis 1, which predicts that high levels of cau-
tiousness are associated with low rates of safety-related rule violations.  
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Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson Correlations, N = 144 
 M SD 1 2 3 
Cautiousness (1) 
 
2.43 .72 - - - 
Injustice sensitivity (2) 
 
3.53 1.01 -.09 - - 
Self-interest (3) 
 
2.60 .96 .05 -.41** - 
Number of violations (4) 
 
13.33 10.54 -.21* -.04 .13 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
6.2.6 Discussion 
The present investigation aimed at forging bridges between the research into 
CWB in the areas of Organisational Psychology and Human Factors research. Predictors 
of CWB which are particularly suitable for the identification of applicants who are prone to 
safety-related rule violations were identified. The integrity subscale cautiousness is seen 
as a promising personality trait for predicting rule violating behaviour in daily life situa-
tions, as well as the violation of safety-related rules in the production context.   
Although it is very effective and time-saving to measure only one predictor, the 
prediction of behaviour is more reliable if different predictor variables are used. Unfortu-
nately, of the three investigated traits, only one trait (cautiousness) was found to be asso-
ciated with rule violations in the production context. Further investigations should identify 
more predictors to ensure a reliable identification of applicants who are not prone to 
safety-related rule violations. Besides variables investigated in the main study, the pilot 
study showed further personality traits which correlated significantly with rule violations in 
daily life settings. Reliability and non-rationalization, which are subscales of integrity, cor-
related significantly with the criterion, but were not chosen for the main investigation be-
cause they explained the same variance as the chosen variables. Nevertheless, these 
traits may be more suitable for the prediction of safety-related rule violations in the pro-
duction context. Furthermore, only five out of nine subscales of the integrity questionnaire 
(Marcus, 2006) were applied in the pilot study. However, the remaining four subscales 
(behavioural intentions, calmness/self-esteem, reliability/forethought and restraint) may 
also have the power to predict safety-related rule violations in the production context. 
This should be investigated in subsequent studies. 
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The initial assumption that there are similar processes and influencing factors 
which determine rule violations in the different contexts has to be reconsidered. The fact 
that only one of three investigated personality traits seems to be suitable for the predic-
tion of rule violations both in daily life settings and in the production context suggests that 
rule-related decisions are influenced by the context in which the decision has to be made. 
It appears to make a difference whether the decision making concerning the violation of 
rules has to be made in the private or in the professional sector.  
Limitations 
Although a business simulation was used, the investigation was experimental in 
nature, meaning that it may be subject to a comparatively lower power in terms of gener-
alising the findings to an organisational context on a 1:1 basis. In this regard, it may be 
asked whether the behaviour in organisational settings is comparable with the behaviour 
of the participants in the study at hand. Violating a rule in a simulation environment might 
differ from violating a rule in a true organisational setting because participants are aware 
that the consequence associated with their rule-violating behaviour (deflagration) is only a 
fictitious one.  
The deficit regarding the external validity is one limitation of the main study. Nev-
ertheless, the lacking external validity can be assumed to be compensated by the high 
internal validity associated with this type of experimental investigation (Stone-Romero, 
2011). Besides the fact that relations can best be identified in experimental settings 
(Stone-Romero, 2011), it is very difficult to investigate rule violations in organisational 
settings. The issue of rule violations is a sensitive one, and the management and indus-
trial council have to allow the collection of person-related data, including the measure-
ment of certain personality traits as well as the person-related recording of rule violations. 
As a result, the investigation of rule violations in organisations, as it is proposed in the 
study at hand, is virtually impossible from both an ethical and an internal validity perspec-
tive.   
However, the experimental setting is not necessarily disadvantageous: Stone-
Romero (2011) pointed out that the findings gained in experimental settings are highly 
valuable because the internal validity is high and the relations found in the experimental 
setting can be generalised to field settings (such as the organisational setting).  
A further limitation concerns the sample, which consisted only of students with the 
respective educational background and age range. Although the participants were engi-
neering students (the same education as the people who work in such plants), the exter-
nal validity of the results has to be verified. In this regard, an (ideally longitudinal) field 
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study is needed to prove whether the identified personality trait is, in fact, a good predic-
tor of safety-related rule violations in the organisational context.  
The participants in both studies were recruited not only personally (main study), 
but also via online forums and social communities (pilot study, main study) in which the 
study was announced. It might be argued that due to the investigation method of the pilot 
study and the recruitment procedures of both studies, the samples are not representative 
and that certain traits and experiences might be overrepresented. As there is evidence 
that online and paper-and-pencil data collection can generally be seen as equivalent 
(Weigold, Weigold, & Russell, 2013), and as predominantly student forums and communi-
ties were used for recruitment, it can be assumed that there are no fundamental differ-
ences between the participants recruited online and those recruited face-to-face. Hence, 
the authors assume that the samples are representative for the considered student popu-
lation.  
Conclusions 
The present study considered deviant behaviour from various angles. The Organ-
isational Psychology perspective and the Human Factors perspective were combined in 
order to gain new insights. The associations between CWB and personality traits were 
used to generate ideas for personality predictors of the violation of rules and norms in 
daily life settings as well as in the organisational context. In summary, it can be stated 
that the assumption that both CWB and rule violations are determined by the same fac-
tors was partially confirmed. Injustice sensitivity, self-interest and cautiousness are asso-
ciated with CWB as well as the intention to violate a rule in daily life settings. With regard 
to rule-violating behaviour in the production context, cautiousness remained as a com-
mon predictor.   
The outcomes show that interconnecting the findings from the different areas of 
Organisational Psychology and Human Factors offers a valuable resource to generate 
new ideas for the investigation of deviant behaviour in the respective other area. Future 
investigations should use this option more intensively in order to gain a better interdisci-
plinary understanding of the research topic of CWB and rule violations, respectively. 
If further investigations replicate the findings of an association between cautious-
ness and safety-related rule violations, cautiousness should be used in the selection and 
development process of employees in general to prevent CWB. However, it should be 
used in particular for employees who work in high-risk settings, such as the production 
context, to prevent safety-related rule violations. Previous safety management regarding 
the “Human Factor” has been concerned with the prevention of unsafe acts mostly in 
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terms of industrial engineering and ergonomics. The measures of personnel selection are 
not yet used consistently. In the future, the measures of personnel selection should not 
only be used to improve performance, but should also be applied to enhance safety. As 
Kamp and Krause (1997) suggested, the identification of employees who are especially 
prone to rule violations should be an integral part of safety management measures in 
every organisation.  
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6.3 The impact of audit probability –  
The impact of the accuracy of information about audit prob-
abilities on safety-related rule violations and the bomb crater 
effect   
6.3.1 Abstract 
The present investigation was conducted in order to gain insights into the determinants of 
safety-related rule violations. Thus, the aims were to replicate the framing of the produc-
tion outcome investigated in previous studies; to ascertain the impact of the accuracy of 
information about audit probabilities; and to determine whether the amount of violations 
increases just after an audit has been experienced. The research questions were experi-
mentally investigated using a 2x3 design with the factors framing (gain, loss) and accu-
racy of information about audit probabilities (no, vague or precise information). The par-
ticipants (n = 148) were required to put themselves in the role of a control room operator 
of a waste water treatment plant. They had to choose whether to start up the plant using 
the prescribed safe but non-profitable procedure or to apply the profitable but unsafe and 
therefore forbidden start-up procedure. Participants violated the rule significantly more 
frequently when the production outcome was loss-framed. Furthermore, it was shown that 
precise information about audit probabilities led to significantly more rule violations than 
vague or no information. The data analysis additionally revealed that participants tend to 
violate a safety-related rule significantly more often if they have just experienced a safety 
audit (bomb crater effect). To prevent rule violations, it should be avoided that people (1) 
think that they are not reaching their objectives (as suggested by a loss-framed depiction 
of the production outcomes), and (2) receive precise information about audit probabilities. 
Furthermore, it is recommendable to occasionally conduct two consecutive audits.  
6.3.2 Introduction 
Organisational accidents are rare but disastrous events occurring in environments 
which involve complex modern technologies such as in the chemical industry, the aviation 
sector or the railway sector (Reason, 1997). Such accidents can have fatal consequenc-
es not only for the staff and the assets of the organisation, but also for the surrounding 
population who are not actually involved (Reason, 1997). The nuclear power plant disas-
ter in Tschernobyl in 1986 and the explosion of the BP Refinery in Texas City in 2005 are 
two of the most notable catastrophes among the vast number of organisational accidents 
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which have occurred since the beginning of industrialisation. Most accidents are not 
monocausal, the accident analysis often revealing that technical malfunctions as well as 
unsafe behaviour led to their occurrence (Reason, 1997).  
One of the most popular countermeasures to reduce unsafe behaviour in organi-
sations is the establishment of safety-related rules (Dekker, 2005). Hale and Swuste 
(1998, p. 164) define safety rules as a prescribed behaviour response or system state 
which is required to occur in a certain situation. Safety rules are established and commu-
nicated to the system operator in order to improve safety. In many organisations, the ad-
herence to rules is controlled by safety audits and inspections. In the present study, we 
address the communication of information about audits and the impact of experiencing a 
safety audit on behaviour. How are audits perceived and reacted to, and do they support 
rule compliance in the assumed direction?  
Variables affecting rule violations 
Since there is always a tension between rules and local practice (Dekker, 2005), 
the existence of safety-related rules is no guarantee that an employee will comply with 
them. Mason (1997) assumed that up to 70% of industrial accidents are attributable to the 
violation of rules. The violation of safety-related rules is defined as “[…] deliberate depar-
tures from rules that describe a safe or approved method to performing a particular task 
or job” (Lawton, 1998, p. 78). The motivational backgrounds from which a rule violation is 
committed can be rather diverse. Some rule violations are due to the motivation to dam-
age the system (malevolent rule violations, Reason, 2008; allied to the concept of coun-
terproductive behaviour in organisations, cf. for example Sackett, 2002), while others are 
not committed to harm the organisation (non-malevolent rule violations, Reason, 2008). 
Safety-related rule violations, as they are investigated in the present study, are assumed 
to be non-malevolent rule violations which arise due to conflicts between performance 
and safety goals.  
Recent examples of severe accidents which have been officially declared to be 
due at least in part to the violation of safety-related rules are the Deep Water Horizon 
disaster in 2010 and the explosion of the Indian submarine Sindhurakshak in 2013 
(Shaukat, 2013; Smith, 2011). In addition to the immense financial and environmental 
consequences of these disasters, both accidents claimed several lives. How can such 
accidents be prevented?   
A theoretical model that comprehensively integrates several variables which affect 
safety-related rule violations is the Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to 
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Violations (IMV, Kluge,2010; Kluge et al., 2013), which is based on the work of Fishbein, 
Hennessy, Yzer and Douglas (2003).  
The IMV describes the decision-making process of rule violations as influenced by 
individual as well as organisational factors. On the individual level, age, sex, as well as 
personality traits and past behaviour are considered as relevant for the determination of 
rule-related behaviour (Kluge et al., 2013). These variables exert their influence by affect-
ing the behavioural, normative and control beliefs, which in turn influence a person’s atti-
tude, norms and self-efficacy. 
Previous investigations by our research group focused on the environmental con-
ditions, such as the framing of the production outcomes (cf. 6.1; cf. Kluge et al., 2013), 
the impact of different goods at stake on the activation of norms (cf. 6.1; von der Heyde et 
al., 2012), and the identification of personality traits which predict rule violations (von der 
Heyde, Miebach, & Kluge, accepted). Regarding the framing of the production outcomes, 
the results were mixed. Kluge et al. (2013) found a medium to strong effect of the framing 
of production outcomes on safety-related rule violations, whereas von der Heyde and 
Kluge (cf. 6.1) were unable to replicate these findings; in the latter investigation, the fram-
ing did not influence the rule-related decision. Surprisingly, the activation of social norms 
in terms of the goods at stake had no effect on the decision to violate safety-related rules. 
Whether the rule violation could damage the plant or was associated with the risk of injur-
ing residents had no effect on the amount of rule violations which were committed (cf. 
6.1).  
The present investigation was designed to investigate the stability of the framing 
effect, the impact of the accuracy of information about audit probabilities, as well as the 
effect of a recent audit on the occurrence of safety-related rule violations.   
The impact of the framing of the production outcome 
The decision making concerning the violation of safety-related rules can be cate-
gorized as decision making under uncertainty. One very popular theory in this area is the 
Prospect Theory by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), which proposes that people do not 
evaluate a situation on the basis of the consideration of total outcome values. On the con-
trary, their evaluation is based on a certain reference point, which is determined by ex-
pectations and situational influences. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) assume that de-
pending on the reference point, the same outcome can be perceived as a gain or loss. 
They assume further that the value function, which is the foundation of the outcome eval-
uation, differs for loss and gain perceptions. Loss looms larger than gain, meaning that 
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losing a certain amount (for example of money) is perceived to be more negative than 
gaining the same amount is perceived to be positive. This leads to different risk-related 
decisions: According to the Prospect Theory, the loss is perceived to be so negative that 
people will try to avoid the unpleasant situation by running relatively high risks. If the out-
come is perceived as a gain, people will be more risk-averse. These assumptions of the 
Prospect Theory can be applied to the decision-making process regarding safety-related 
rules: If people are put into a loss situation, they should run the risk of rule violation signif-
icantly more often than if they find themselves in a gain situation. The loss and gain per-
ception is manipulated by altering reference points regarding the financial remuneration 
(salary) for participation, which depends on the participants’ performance. According to 
the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it can be assumed that the people 
violate safety-related rules significantly more often in the loss-framing condition than in 
the gain-framing condition. Our research group has already investigated this effect on 
safety-related rule violations, and so far, the results have not been entirely consistent. 
Whereas Kluge, Badura and Rietz (2013) found the proposed framing effect in three stud-
ies, von der Heyde and Kluge (cf. section 6.1) were unable to replicate the framing effect 
in a slightly modified experimental setting. Nevertheless, based on the assumptions of the 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and on the evidence of Kluge et al. 
(2013), it can be assumed that there is a general effect of framing on rule violations, lead-
ing to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: If the salary is framed as a loss, people will violate significantly 
more often than if the salary is framed as a gain. 
The impact of safety audits  
One of the most obvious methods to reduce the frequency of safety-related rule 
violations is the implementation of safety audits (Dekker, 2005; Mol, 2003). According to 
Mol (2003), safety audits include, for example, the regular inspection of documents, the 
analysis of workplace design characteristics and emergency and hazard inspection plans. 
The compliance with rules is checked in so-called process audits, which involve the anal-
ysis of work practices: The employee’s behaviour is compared to the standards or rules 
which regulate the behaviour in the respective situation (Mol, 2003).   
During the decision-making process regarding rule violations, people weigh up the 
benefits and risks of the decision options (Battmann & Klumb, 1993; Zeitlin, 1994). In or-
der to predict the rule-related decision, Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) developed a 
framework regarding the selectivity of rule violations in organisations. One of the contex-
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tual conditions which they describe as influential regarding the determination of violations 
is the extent to which organisations monitor and detect rule violations and enforce rules, 
and the communication of this information to the organisational members. The extent of 
monitoring and detection of rule violations varies according to the frequency with which 
audits are conducted, and is also influenced by the amount of information which is re-
vealed about the audit frequency (accuracy of information about audit probability).  The 
enforceability of a rule is determined by the amount of audits and the magnitude of sanc-
tions or fines which are prescribed if a rule violation is detected (Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009; Zhou, 1997).  
Considering the framework of Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), it can be conclud-
ed that organisations should conduct audits to achieve a reduction in rule violations. Alt-
hough most organisations use this measure, the analysis of several disasters revealed 
that many of these accidents are at least partly due to defective audit mechanisms of 
safety management (Hopkins, 2000). Since safety audits are associated with high costs 
(Power, 1997), it is important to carefully plan the implementation and timing of audits, as 
well as the type and extent of information provided about audit probabilities.  
The impact of several audit characteristics and information about audits on peo-
ple’s rule compliance has been already investigated in the area of personal financial de-
cision making (Kirchler, Muehlbacher, Kastlunger, & Wahl, 2007; Mittone, 2006; Spicer & 
Thomas, 1982). The authors found that participants try to maximize their outcome by 
weighing the possible gain which is associated with rule violations against the possible 
loss if the evasion is detected and punished. The evaluation of the risks is determined by 
the audit probability and the fine (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Kirchler et al., 
2007). The more likely an audit and the higher the fine which would be incurred in the 
case of a detected rule violation, the less likely it is that people will decide to violate the 
rule (von der Heyde et al., 2013)  
The impact of the accuracy of information about audit probabilities 
Spicer and Thomas (1982) also considered the impact of the accuracy of infor-
mation about the audit probability on rule violation or compliance. They varied the accu-
racy of information about audit probability: Depending on the experimental condition, the 
participants were provided with precise information about audit the probability (e.g. “an 
audit will occur on 1 in 20 occasions”), with moderately accurate information (e.g. “the 
audit probability is low”), or with no information about the audit probability. Only the pre-
cise information had an impact on the amount of rule violations insofar as participants 
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who received information with this level of accuracy committed significantly fewer rule 
violations than participants in the other two conditions. Mittone (2006) corroborated these 
findings: Comparing vague with precise information about audit probability, he found that 
people who received only vague information about the audit probability violated a rule 
significantly more frequently than people who were given precise information. It is as-
sumed that this finding, which seems to represent a stable effect in the context of viola-
tions in the area of financial decision making, can be transferred to the decision-making 
process regarding the violation of safety-related rules in the production context.  
Hypothesis 2: People who receive precise information about audit probabilities 
violate a safety-related rule significantly less often than people who receive vague or no 
information about audit probabilities. 
The impact of an experienced audit - The bomb crater effect 
The officially conveyed information about the audit probability is not the only in-
formational source which people are assumed to consider when assessing the likelihood 
of further audits. The occurrence and the direct experience of previous audits are also 
assumed to be used as a reference. Several studies (Guala & Mittone, 2005; Kastlunger, 
Kirchler, Mittone, & Pitters, 2009; Kirchler et al., 2007; Mittone, 2006) found the "bomb 
crater effect", which is said to arise when assessing the future audit possibility during the 
time interval when an audit has just occurred: Participants assume that the probability 
that another audit will follow directly after the previous experience is very small, and they 
therefore decide more often to violate a rule or law during this time than during other time 
intervals. The term bomb crater effect is derived from an effect which was observed dur-
ing the First World War. During bombardments, the soldiers tried to take shelter in bomb 
craters because they assumed that a bomb would be very unlikely to hit the same place 
twice in a short time period (Mittone, 2006).  
According to Kastlunger et al. (2009), there are two approaches to explain the 
bomb crater effect: The effect can be due to a misperception of probability, which is also 
known as gambler’s fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), or may result from the motiva-
tion to compensate for fines for violations which were detected in the audit which has just 
taken place. According to the gambler’s fallacy, people erroneously assume that every 
random sequence has to reflect the true proportion in the population. If, for example, a 
coin is flipped and heads has occurred five times in a row, people assume that the prob-
ability that tails will occur next time is higher than if the proportion was balanced. In actual 
fact, the probability is the same each time the coin is flipped, independent of what hap-
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pened before. If this bias is transferred to the assessment of an audit probability, then 
people will erroneously assume that an audit is less likely if an audit has just occurred, 
leading to the occurrence of the bomb crater effect. In turn, it is assumed that the bomb 
crater effect can be transferred to the violation of safety-related rules. Based on this as-
sumption, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 3: The amount of safety-related rule violations is significantly higher di-
rectly after an audit than in the other considered time periods.  
6.3.3 Method 
In the present study, a 2x3-factorial design was implemented with the factors 
framing (gain and loss) and accuracy of information about audit probability (none, vague 
and precise). 152 engineering students (114 male) from the University of Duisburg-Essen 
participated in the investigation in winter semester 2012/2013 and were tested in groups 
of 4 to 14 persons. The participants’ mean age was 21.32 years (SD=2.39). They were 
recruited by announcements in student panels, on notice boards and in lectures as well 
as by flyers distributed across the university campus. All participants were told the cover 
story that the study is about skill acquisition and retention in process control industries 
and human behaviour in system operations. The experiment was approved by the local 
Ethics Committee at the Department of Psychology of the University of Duisburg-Essen. 
Applied simulation 
The violation of safety-related rules is a sensitive topic, which is associated, 
moreover, with certain safety hazards. The assignment to the experimental conditions as 
well as the collection of person-related data has to be permitted by the industrial council 
and the managers of the respective organisation. This makes an investigation in an or-
ganisational context virtually impossible. In order to create an investigation context with 
the best possible internal and external validity, the experimenter decided to use a simula-
tion.  
A simulation combines the advantages of an experimental or special-purpose set-
ting, which is associated with a high internal validity (Stone-Romero, 2011), with the best 
possible external validity, which is achieved through the simulation of a working situation 
with high face validity. Furthermore, well-established research on rule-related behaviour 
has already been conducted using simulated environments (Thibaut, Friedland, & Walker, 
1974). 
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The computer-based simulation (WaTrSim, Burkolter et al., 2009) used in the pre-
sent study is based on the simulation of waste water treatment plant. In the WaTrSim 
simulation, the participants assume the role of a control room operator, who is responsi-
ble for starting up and controlling one of the 20 plants of the company (WaterTec-Rhein-
Ruhr). As operators, participants segregate industrial waste water, composed of solvent 
and water. The operator’s highest-priority task is to maximize their production outcome.  
For the present investigation, the WaTrSim was extended to a new advanced ver-
sion called WaTrSim-Annual (von der Heyde et al., 2013, cf. Figure 15). WaTrSim-Annual 
simulates a production year with a total of 48 production stages, divided into four quarters 
with 12 stages, each of which represents one week within the production year. Every 
week (duration 180 seconds), the participant has to conduct a start-up procedure for run-
ning the plant. Depending on their performance, the participants can earn a maximum 
salary of 1€ in each week. Together with a general payment of 2€ for the training period, 
they were therefore able to earn up to 50€ for 5 hours of participation.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. User interface of WaTrSim-Annual, the control room operator’s view of the 
adjustable components of the plant, the performance display, and a news-ticker panel 
 
Since starting up the plant 48 times in a row and repeating the same steps again 
and again was assumed to be a monotonous activity, an additional task, which changed 
weekly, was implemented in the simulation environment. This additional task was optional 
and not related to performance indicators. Furthermore, the additional tasks were only 
available after the plant had been started up in order to prevent distraction from the main 
   
Empirical Evidence    
 
139 
 
task. The additional tasks included, for example, voting to choose the next team event or 
entering the current amount of liquid into the different storage tanks. 
Operationalisation of safety-related violation (dependent variable, DV) 
There are two procedures which can be used to start up the plant. The procedures 
differ regarding safety and duration, and regarding the output and salary, which can be 
achieved by the procedure, respectively. The longer it takes to start up the plant, the less 
production outcome and salary can be achieved. 
First, the participants were familiarized with the 8-step procedure (8 SP), which is 
a comparatively short and simple start-up procedure with which the plant can be started 
up very fast (within 56 seconds). Using this procedure, a weekly salary of up to 1.00 € 
can be achieved. The disadvantage of the 8 SP is that it can cause a critical system 
state, which involves the risk of a deflagration.  
During the experiment, which encompassed a total of 48 simulated weeks, a def-
lagration occurs in one of the plants of the company after the 12th week. Subsequently, 
the 8 SP was declared as forbidden and the participants were made aware of the 11-step 
procedure (11 SP), which was henceforth the mandatory procedure. Within the 11 SP, 
the former 8 SP is extended by 3 additional steps at the beginning of the procedure to 
prevent a critical system state. These additional steps take more time to start up the plant 
(approximately 73 seconds); therefore, the 11 SP is less remunerative, as only up to 0.80 
€ can be earned. 
The dependent variable, the safety-related rule violations, was measured by the 
procedures which were applied by the participants in the last three quarters. The 
WaTrSim-Annual software detects the occurrence of critical system states which are 
caused by the 8 SP. If the participants conducted the forbidden 8 SP in the last three 
quarters, this was registered as a rule violation; if the participants conducted the manda-
tory 11 SP, this was registered as compliance (range of rule violations: 0-36).  
The independent variables 
The following paragraphs address the implementation of the independent varia-
bles framing of salary and production outcome and accuracy of communicated audit 
probability. Additionally, the procedure for calculating the effect of a currently experienced 
audit on the participants’ estimation of the audit probability for the next week will be de-
scribed (bomb crater effect, cf. Hypothesis 3).  
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Framing. The framing was manipulated by varying the reference point of the dis-
play of the production target and salary in the most recent production week (see Figure 
16). The salary depended on the production outcome which was achieved by the partici-
pants. In the gain-framing condition, the salary was displayed in relation to the reference 
point of earning nothing (0 €), meaning that if participants reached a weekly salary of 0.80 
€, this was displayed as 0.80 € in green digits (see Figure 16, left). In the loss-framing 
condition, the reference point was the maximum possible weekly salary of 1€. In line with 
the previous example, the salary of 0.80 € was displayed as - 0.20 € in red digits (see 
Figure 16, right).  
 
 
Figure 16. Framing of weekly salary and production target by conducting the 11 SP; left: 
gain-framed presentation; right: loss-framed presentation (this Figure is a summarized 
representation of framed parts of the user interface which were originally located differ-
ently) 
 
The communication of the current and target production outcome was also 
framed. The required production outcome was communicated by a numerical reference 
point (see Figure 16, “target”), as well as by a diagram (see Figure 16, thin line). 
In the gain framing, the reference point (i.e. amount) which should be achieved 
was 1100 litres. This production outcome can be achieved by applying the 11 SP. In the 
loss-framed display of the production outcome, the participants had to achieve 1300 li-
tres. This production outcome could only be achieved by conducting the forbidden 8 SP. 
The reference point (i.e. production target) and the current production outcome which 
was achieved by the participants were communicated in real time by digits (see Figure 2, 
“actual performance”) as well as by a diagram (see Figure 16, bold line) to enable a per-
manent target-performance comparison.  
The salary in the current quarter (see Figure 17, “quarterly total [in €]”) and the ex-
trapolated salary for the entire production year (Figure 17, “annual forecast [in €]”) were, 
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depending on the experimental condition, also displayed on the user interface as gain-
framed, Figure 17, left) and loss-framed, Figure 17, right). The salary in the current quar-
ter represents the actual salary within the quarter just gone, meaning that the salary in 
the previous quarter was added and displayed. As already mentioned, in the gain-framing 
condition, the reference point was 0 € (i.e. if 4.80 € was earned, 0 + 4.80= 4.80 € was 
displayed, cf. Figure 17, left). In the loss-framing condition, the reference point was the 
maximum possible salary of 12 € (i.e. if 4.80 € was earned, - 12 + 4.80 = - 7.20 € was 
displayed, cf. Figure 17, right). The framed extrapolated salary for the entire production 
year was calculated by adding the salary earned so far to the expected salary in the com-
ing weeks by determining an average performance (which had previously been calculated 
as 0.80 € per week). In the gain-framing condition, the reference value was 0 € (i.e. an 
extrapolated annual salary of 34 € was displayed as 0 + 34 € =34 €) and in the loss-
framing condition, the reference point was 48 € (i.e. an extrapolated annual salary of 34 € 
was displayed as – 48 + 34= - 14 €). 
 
 
Figure 17. Framing of the salary in the current quarter (see “quarterly total [in €]”, and 
framing of the extrapolated salary for the entire production year (see “annual forecast [in 
€]”); gain-framing (left) and loss-framing (right) 
 
At the end of each quarter, a temporary display appears with a quarterly report (cf. 
Figure 18, “quarterly figures”). This contains four values: the salary of the previous quar-
ter (cf. Figure 18, “earnings in most recent quarter”); the accumulated salary which has 
been earned so far (cf. Figure 18, “salary to date”), the mean weekly salary (cf. Figure 18, 
“mean per week”); and the extrapolated salary for the entire production year (cf. Figure 
18, “annual extrapolation”), which was also shown within the user interface Figure 17, 
“annual forecast [in €]”) . 
To ensure that the framing exerted its full effect, the participants were additionally 
requested to transfer the values of the quarterly report to a paper-and-pencil-based pro-
duction protocol. 
 
Accuracy of communicated audit probability. After the 11 SP was declared as 
mandatory, the participants were informed that they would be regularly audited for the  
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Figure 18. Framing of the quarterly report displayed at the end of each quarter; gain fram-
ing (left) and loss framing (right) 
 
remaining three quarters. They were also informed that if a violation was detected, they 
would lose their salary for the respective week. 
The audit frequency varied in the three remaining quarters. In the second quarter, 
there would be an audit in 1 of the 20 plants of the company each week (1 in 20 probabil-
ity for the participants); in the third quarter, 5 of the 20 plants would be audited each week 
(5 in 20 probability for the participants); and in the final quarter, 3 of the 20 plants would 
be audited each week (3 in 20 probability for the participants). To ensure comparability 
between the experimental groups, the audits were not conducted at random in accord-
ance with the respective probability; rather, the actual frequency of audits was predefined 
and therefore semi-random. To determine in which week the audits should be conducted, 
the plants to be audited were previously determined by a random selection of the plant 
numbers (for example: for the 1 in 20 probability, one of the plants were randomly select-
ed, for the 3 in 20 probability, three plants were randomly selected and for the 5 in 20 
probability, five plants were selected). Every time the plant number one was selected, the 
participants would be audited in the respective week. This random selection procedure 
resulted in audits for week 20 (second quarter, audit probability 1 in 20), 25, 29, 34 (third 
quarter, audit probability 5 in 20) 37, 43 and 46 (fourth quarter, audit probability 3 in 20). 
The number and temporal position of the audits in the production year were the same for 
all participants. 
At the beginning of each quarter, the participants received information about the 
audit probability. The extent of information was varied according to the experimental fac-
tor accuracy of information about audit probability. The participants were randomly as-
   
Empirical Evidence    
 
143 
 
signed to one of the three experimental conditions: no information about the audit proba-
bility (n=50), vague information about the audit probability (n=49) or precise information 
about the audit probability (n=49). The information provided to the respective experi-
mental group in the given quarter is listed in Table 13. To ensure that participants were 
aware of this experimental manipulation, the respective announcement regarding the au-
dit probability was made twice; first by the experimenter prior to the beginning of each 
quarter, and second via information in a pop-up window within the simulation. Further-
more, they were also informed about the audit probability by the news ticker which was 
implemented in the user interface (cf. Figure 15, large text box in the lower half of the 
interface). In the news ticker, the participants were given information about the current 
audit activities in the company according to the accuracy level of their experimental group 
(cf. Table 13). Therefore, in the no information condition it was merely displayed that au-
dits were being conducted. In the vague information condition, participants were informed 
that a small (or large or medium) number of plants were being audited. The precise in-
formation condition included the specific plant numbers which were being audited (for 
example “currently, plant 5 is being audited”).  
  
Table 13. Announced audit probabilities for the respective experimental group and quar-
ter in each week. 
 
 
No information Vague information Precise information 
2nd quarter 
Various plants are 
being audited 
A small number of 
plants are being au-
dited. 
1 in 20 plants are 
being audited 
3rd quarter 
Various plants are 
being audited 
A large number of 
plants are being au-
dited. 
5 in 20 plants are 
being audited. 
4th quarter 
Various plants are 
being audited 
 A medium number 
of plants are being 
audited. 
3 in 20 plants are 
being audited. 
 
 
Audit Feedback. Each time the participants were audited, they received feedback 
concerning the outcome of the audit. This feedback occurred after 90 seconds within the 
particular week in which an audit was being conducted (as a reminder: the 11 SP takes 
approx. 73 seconds and the 8 SP approx. 56 seconds). This delay ensured that the par-
ticipants were not alerted by others who had been faster in conducting the chosen start-
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up procedure and could therefore be audited earlier. The feedback was implemented by a 
pop-up window notification (Table 14) containing positive (rule compliance detected) or 
negative (rule violation detected, no salary for the respective week) feedback. 
  
Table 14. Displayed notification of positive and negative audit feedback 
positive negative 
Your plant has just been inspected by the 
audit team. They found that you complied 
with the company directives and used the 
prescribed procedure to start up the plant. 
You have therefore avoided the risk of opera-
tions being interrupted by an undesired reac-
tion. You therefore do not have to expect a 
fine.  
We would ask you to continue comply with the 
company directives in the future; otherwise, 
you will face a sanction of 1.00 €.   
Your plant has just been inspected by the 
audit team. They found that you did not com-
ply with the company directives and used the 
forbidden procedure to start up the plant. 
You have therefore run the risk of operations 
being interrupted by an undesired reaction. 
According to the company directives, this 
will be sanctioned with a fine of 1.00 €.  
We therefore ask you to comply with the com-
pany directives in the future; otherwise, you 
will face a sanction of 1.00 €. 
 
The effect of an experienced audit (bomb crater effect) 
 To investigate the bomb crater effect, two specific values were calculated; first, 
the mean amount of violations committed in the subsequent week (and subsequent trial) 
after an audit had been executed (mean violation amount after audit); and second, the 
mean violation amount in the remaining weeks of the quarters 2-4 (base mean violation 
amount) excluding only the first quarter (because the 8 SP was allowed in this quarter) 
and the weeks after an audit had been executed. This exclusion is important for calculat-
ing a value that describes a mean tendency to commit a rule violation during the weeks 
that are not related to an audit. Based on the coding of compliance (0) and violation (1), 
the mean violation amount is the sum of all rule violations committed in the respective 
weeks, divided by the number of considered cases (here:  N=148 for each considered 
week).  As a consequence, the mean violation amount after an audit, as well as the base 
mean violation amount, ranges between 0 and 1 and can also be interpreted as the prob-
ability of a rule violation in the respective week.  
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Control Variables 
The ascertained control variables comprised a set of demographic information 
such as sex and age, the level of experience in handling simulated environments as they 
are used in gaming environments (gaming frequency; Item: "Do you play computer 
games?", 6-point Likert scale), the general mental ability (Wonderlic, 2002), prior 
knowledge regarding simulation-related contents, performance, and the theoretical 
knowledge regarding the different start-up procedures (8 SP and 11 SP). Furthermore, 
the salary earned and several personality variables were controlled for. The presence in 
terms of the simulation environment was ascertained by the 11-item presence scale of 
Frank and Kluge (2014); cautiousness was measured by a 7-item subscale of Marcus´ 
integrity scale (2006), self-interest was measured by an 8-item scale by Mohiyeddini and 
Montanda (2004); and sensitivity towards injustice was measured by a 9-item subscale of 
the questionnaire of Schmitt, et al (1997).  
General procedure 
First of all, participants were welcomed, informed about the purposes of the study 
and, in terms of informed consent, told that they can discontinue participation at any time 
(see Table 15). Demographic information was then obtained.  Afterwards, they were in-
troduced to the simulation and learned how to start up the plant using the 8 SP. After the 
training, they had to demonstrate their practical skills (performance practical test 8 SP, 
see Table 15) by starting up the plant without any job aids. The knowledge about the 
simulation was tested by a posttest (posttest 8 SP, see Table 15). Subsequently, the first 
quarter began.  
After the first quarter, the participants received a note written by the company’s 
safety department. It had come to the department’s knowledge that a deflagration had 
occurred in another plant of the company and that this deflagration was due to the 8 SP. 
To prevent future accidents, it was announced that a new start-up procedure would be 
introduced. This new 11-step start-up procedure was declared as mandatory.  
To enable the participants to start up the plant using the new, mandatory proce-
dure, the participants completed an additional training session. Afterwards, they had to 
demonstrate their practical skills regarding the 11-step procedure (performance practical 
test 11 SP), and their knowledge about this start-up procedure were tested by a short 
posttest (posttest 11 SP, see Table 15). Before the participants continued the production 
year, they were informed that it would be randomly audited whether they complied with 
the safety-related rule.  
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Table 15. General procedure (CV=control variable; DV=dependent variable) 
 
 
After the participants had completed the production year, further person-related 
variables were measured in an online questionnaire. Subsequently, the participants were 
debriefed and paid. On average, they earned a salary of 39.52 € (SD=1.77). Due to ethi-
cal considerations, all participants received 50 €, independently of their performance. 
 
6.3.4 Results 
To ensure that the violation or compliance was a deliberate choice between the 
procedures, it needed to be checked whether the participants were able to conduct both 
procedures equally well. Therefore, an exclusion criterion was defined, according to 
which both procedures had to be executed correctly at least twice, either during the per-
formance test after the training or during the production year. Based on this criterion, four 
of the original sample of 152 participants had to be excluded; thus, 148 participants re-
mained for further analysis.  
Reception Time   
Measurement of  prior knowledge and general men-
tal ability 
30 
 
CV 
Introduction and training WaTrSim & 8 SP 55   
Performance and knowledge test regarding the 8 SP 15  CV 
System operation quarter 1 (weeks 1-12) 25  DV 
Break 5   
Deflagration 5   
Introduction & training of 11 SP 25   
Performance and knowledge test regarding the 11 
SP 
15 
 
CV 
Announced audits with no, vague or precise informa-
tion  
5 
 
 
System operation quarters 2 – 4 (weeks 13-48) 75  DV 
Measurement of person-related variables 20  CV 
Debriefing & farewell 5 = ∑ ca. 285 min. 
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Manipulation check - The impact of the manipulated audit probabilities 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the amount of 
rule violations depending on the various audit frequencies in quarter 2 (1 in 20 audit 
probability, M=5.74, SD=4.47), quarter 3 (5 in 20 audit probability, M=3.95, SD=3.77) and 
quarter 4 (3 in 20 audit probability, M=5.17; SD=4.16). There was a significant effect of 
the changing audit probability (F(2,96)=15.63, p<.01, ηp2=.25), with a medium effect size. 
The control group, which received no information about the audit probabilities, 
was tested separately. In this group, the amount of committed rule violations did not differ 
significantly (F(2,48)<0.01, p=.99, ηp2<.01) between the  second (M=3.46, SD=4.27), third 
(M=3.46; SD=4.10) and fourth quarter (M=3.40; SD=3.85). 
Control of confounding variables 
To ensure that differences in the amount of rule violations were due to the exper-
imental variation, the experimental groups were checked regarding significant differences 
in the control variables. The pairwise comparisons of the ascertained variables revealed 
that there were no significant differences between the experimental groups (cf. Table 16). 
Testing the hypotheses 
Due to the fact that there were no covariates identified in the previous analysis, an 
ANOVA was conducted to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. For Hypothesis 1, which refers to the 
effect of the framing on the amount of  safety-related rule violations, the results show that 
an average of about 11 rule violations (of 36 possible violations) were committed in the 
gain condition (M=11.28, SD=10.39). In contrast, in the loss condition, an average of 
about 16 rule violations were committed (M=15.44, SD=10.34, cf. Figure 19). The main 
effect of the framing is statistically significant (F(1,147)=6.67, p=.01, ηp2=.05), albeit with a 
small effect size. These results support Hypothesis 1, which assumes that people violate 
safety-related rules significantly more often if the salary is loss-framed than if the salary is 
gain-framed.  
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Table 16. Descriptive statistics of the control variables, (M (SD)). 
 
 
control  
variable 
 (range) 
Gain framing Loss framing  
None 
n = 25 
Vague 
n = 26 
Precise 
n = 25 
None 
n = 25 
Vague 
n = 23 
Precise 
n = 24 Sig.* 
Gender 10 female 15 male 
8 female 
18 male 
2 female 
23 male 
4 female 
21 male 
8 female 
15 male 
6 female 
18 male 
χ2 = 9.37, p = .10 
(for N = 148) 
Age 21.88 (2.92) 21.77 (3.27) 20.76 (1.76) 21.84 (2.36) 21.00 (1.60) 20.79 (1.86) F(5,142) = 1.28 p = .28, ηp= .04 
Gaming frequency 
(1-6) 2.76 (1.33) 2.92 (1.49) 2.64 (1.44) 2.80 (1.80) 2.35 (1.50) 2.50 (1.53) 
F(5,142)= 0.47 
p = .80; ηp= .02 
Semester 3.48 (3.40) 2.92 (3.13) 2.38 (1.79) 3.91 (4.06) 3.45 (2.39) 2.17 (1.52) F(5,141)= 1.34 p = .25; ηp= .05 
General Mental 
Ability 
(0-50) 
29.16 (7.34) 28.54 (6.60) 27.08 (5.41) 30.48 (6.14) 27.78 (7.03) 29.21 (6.01) F(5,142) = 0.85 p = .52, ηp= .03 
Pretest knowl-
edge (max. 7 pts) 5.32 (1.22) 5.54 (1.14) 5.60 (1.00) 5.44 (0.92) 5.65 (1.03) 5.46 (1.14 
F(5,142)=.30 
p = .91, ηp= .01 
Performance  (8-
SP, average 
output) 
1111,74 
(93,43) 
1173,81 
(90,26) 
1121,83 
(208,18) 
1120,73 
(79,01) 
1120, 20 
(155,38) 
1160,14 
(172,54) 
F(5,146) = .80 
p = .55 ηp = .028 
Performance (11-
SP, average 
output) 
1197,68 
(154,66) 
1210,35 
(117,39) 
1162,20 
(176,66) 
1192,62 
(129,33) 
1161,11 
(218,93) 
1212,35 
(130,73) 
F(5,150)= .40 
p = .85, ηp= .01 
Posttest knowl-
edge 8 SP (0-27)  19.88 (4.02) 19.96 (3.24) 19.68 (3.34) 19.64 (3.55) 20.61 (4.58) 20.33 (3.81) 
F(5,142)= 0.25 
p = .94; ηp= .01 
Posttest knowl-
edge 11 SP (0-3)  2.85 (0.46) 2.80 (0.41) 2.87 (0.34) 2.92 (0.27) 2.72 (0.61) 2.64 (0.75) 
F(5,142)= 1.07 
p = .38; ηp= .04 
Salary  € 39.54 (1.04) 40.10 (1.04) 39.15 (1.77) 40.07 (1.24) 39.00 (1.90) 39.20 (2.69) F(5,142)= 1.84 p = .10; ηp= .06 
Presence (1-6) 3.57 (0.92) 3.29 (0.92) 3.13 (3.13) 3.34 (0.93) 3.67 (0.98) 3.08 (0.76) F(5,140)= 1.70 p = .14; ηp= .06 
Integrity: Cau-
tiousness (1-5) 2.51 (0.82) 2.56 (0.76) 2.29 (0.61) 2.31 (0.70) 2.31 (0.70) 2.46 (0.73) 
F(5,135) = 0.53 
p = .75, ηp= .02 
Sensitivity to-
wards injustice (1-
6)  
3.48 (1.23) 3.38 (1.06) 3.38 (0.93) 3.42 (0.90) 3.88 (1.04) 3.66 (0.86) F(5,135) = 0.86 p = .51, ηp= .03 
Self-interest (1-6) 2.75 (1.13) 2.62 (0.98) 2.91 (0.90) 2.50 (0.70) 2.44 (0.94) 2.41 (1.08) F(5,135) = 0.90 p = .49, ηp= .03 
*The degrees of freedom differ in the various analyses due to missing values. 
 
Hypothesis 2 refers to the influence of the accuracy of information about audit 
probabilities on the tendency to violate safety-related rules. It predicts that people who 
receive precise information violate rules significantly less often than people who receive 
no or only vague information about audit probabilities.  
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Figure 19. Means of safety-related rule violations (quarter 2-4; range 1-36) in the gain 
(n=76) and loss (n=72) condition 
 
The comparison between the means in the different experimental conditions 
shows that there are differences between the conditions, but not in the hypothesized di-
rection. In the no information condition, about 10 rule violations occurred on average 
(M=10.32, SD=10.12; n=50); in the condition in which the participants received vague 
information about audit probabilities, about 12 rule violations were committed (M=11.89, 
SD=9.72; n=49). The highest number of rule violations occurred in the precise information 
condition, in which an average of about 18 violations occurred (M=17.87, SD=10.41; 
n=49, cf. Figure 20).  
. 
 
Figure 20. Means of rule violations in each condition (quarters 2-4; range 0-36) 
 
The main effect regarding the effect of the accuracy of information about audit 
probability on the violation of safety-related rules is statistically significant (F(2,147)=8.18, 
p<.01, ηp2=.10). To test Hypothesis 2, the simple contrast type is chosen. The difference 
between the no information and precise information group is significant (t(147)=-7.55, 
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p<.01), as is the difference between vague information and precise information (t(147)=-
5.97, p<.01). The hypothesis predicted a lower rather than a higher amount of rule viola-
tions in the case of precise information; therefore, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected 
According to the bomb crater effect, (Hypothesis 3), it is assumed that in the week 
after an audit has occurred the amount of rule violations will increase. In Figure 21, the 
amount of rule violations in each week is shown. The weeks in which an audit took place 
are circled. While during the second quarter (weeks 13 to 24) the first implemented audit 
led to a decrease in safety-related rule violations, in quarters three and four the amount of 
rule violations increased after the audits (except the violation amount after the final audit). 
To test Hypothesis 3, a one-tailed t-test was conducted. The t-test compares the mean 
violation amount with the amount of rule violations in the week after an audit. The mean 
violation amount (including all weeks except the weeks after the audits) is 0.36 (SD=0.30; 
53 in total). In the week after an audit, the mean violation amount raised to 0.40 
(SD=0.34, 61 in total). The difference between the mean violation amount and the mean 
violation amount in the week after an audit is statistically significant, with t(147)=-1.71, 
p<.05. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
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 Figure 21. Progression of committed violations per week expressed with marked times of 
audits. 
 
 
The differences between the mean violation amounts in the weeks in which an 
audit was being conducted and the mean in the weeks after the audit had been conduct-
ed were investigated in more detail. Table 17 shows the repeated measures ANOVA for 
these comparisons. For the first audit, there is a significant decline in committed viola-
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tions. After the second audit as well as after the final audit, no significant change can be 
observed. The audits in weeks 29, 34, 37 and 43 are followed by a significant raise in the 
tendency to violate the rule (cf. Table 17). 
 
Table 17. Probability of rule violations before and after an audit (N=148) compared by a 
repeated measures ANOVA. 
Audited weeks  M SD F(1,147) p 
20 
Week of audit .51 .50 
6.02 .02* 
Week after audit .40 .49 
25 
Week of audit .30 .42 
0.22 .64 
Week after audit .32 .47 
29 
Week of audit .26 .44 
5.96 .02* 
Week after audit .36 .48 
34 
Week of audit .31 .46 
6.02 .02* 
Week after audit .42 .50 
37 
Week of audit .30 .56 
9.62 <.01** 
Week after audit .43 .50 
43 
Week of audit .31 .46 
18.43 <.01** 
Week after audit .51 .50 
46 
Week of audit .43 .50 
0.86 .36 
Week after audit .39 .49 
Note. M=mean, SD=standard deviation, p=significance, *p<.05, **p<.01 
 
Post-hoc analysis 
A set of person-related variables were correlated post-hoc with the amount of 
safety-related rule violations. It was found that the sex (coded: 1=female, 2=male) is posi-
tively associated with the amount of committed rule violations (r=.20, p=.01), insofar as 
male participants violated the rule significantly more often than female participants. A 
significant negative correlation was also found between rule violations and cautiousness 
(r=-.21, p=.01). Moreover, the mean production outcome by applying the 11 SP is nega-
tively associated with the amount of committed rule violations (r=-.30, p<.01). In other 
words, the higher the cautiousness and the better the performance regarding the 11 SP, 
the fewer rule violations were committed.  
Other person-related variables such as age, general mental ability, sensitivity to-
wards injustice, or self-interest, were not associated with the amount of rule violation.  
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6.3.5 Discussion 
The present study was conducted to develop a deeper understanding of the pro-
cesses and conditions of safety-related rule violations. Besides the framing effect, which 
was already focused upon in previous studies by our research group, in particular the 
impact of audits and the accuracy of information about audit probabilities on the occur-
rence of safety-related rule violations over the course of time were investigated.  
The preliminary findings regarding the framing of the production outcome are in-
consistent: Whereas Kluge et al. (2013) found that people more frequently violated safe-
ty-related rules in the loss-framed condition (von der Heyde and Kluge, cf. 6.1) were una-
ble to replicate these findings, and did not find an effect of framing on safety-related rule 
violations. On the contrary, the present investigation found a significant framing effect and 
corroborates the results of Kluge et al. (2013). Although the framing effect seemed to be 
prone to certain situational influences which may account for the findings of von der 
Heyde and Kluge (cf. 6.1), on the basis of the current findings it can be assumed that the 
effect of framing is nevertheless a quite robust effect. This effect has been found both in 
an investigation of single-case decisions regarding rule violations (Kluge et al., 2013), 
and in an investigation of recurring rule-related decisions which have to be made repeat-
edly over a long time period as in the present study. 
Regarding the audit placement and the communication of audit probabilities, the 
manipulation check regarding the accuracy of information about audit probability already 
revealed interesting results. Of relevance regarding the determination of safety-related 
rule violations is not the real frequency of audits, but rather the information about audit 
probability. The participants who received no information about the audit probability did 
not change their-rule related behaviour pattern during the different quarters. Although the 
audit frequency changed in the quarters (one audit in the second quarter and three audits 
each in the third and fourth quarters), it can be assumed that the audit frequency was too 
low to be discovered by pure observation, meaning that it was not considered in the rule-
related decision.  
In the experimental conditions in which the participants received precise or vague 
information about the audit probability, the mean audit amount differed significantly be-
tween the second (1 in 20) and third (5 in 20) quarters, and between the third and fourth 
quarters (3 in 20), even though in the latter case only the information about the audit fre-
quency differed, and not the actual frequency. This shows that it is not the real frequen-
cies that are decisive, but rather the information about the audit probabilities.  
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However, the fact that the occurrence of safety-related rule violations did not differ 
significantly between the second and fourth quarters indicates that people only adapt 
their behaviour due to major changes in the audit probability. They only became more 
cautious and committed significantly fewer rule violations if it was announced that the 
probability was high (i.e. 5 in 20 plants would be audited). If the announced audit prob-
ability was medium (3 in 20) or low (1 in 20), this did not seem to be decisive regarding 
the determination of the rule-related behaviour.  
The current investigation revealed further that the accuracy of information about 
audit probability is decisive regarding the determination of rule-related behaviour, but not 
in the hypothesised direction. In contrast to the studies in the area of fiscal evasion, in 
which the level of accuracy of information about audit probability was negatively associ-
ated with rule violations (in terms of evasion, see Mittone, 2006; Spicer & Thomas, 1982), 
the current study suggests a positive correlation between the accuracy of information 
about audit probability and the amount of rule violations. The precise information about 
audit probabilities led to a higher amount of rule violations than if no or vague information 
about audit probabilities was supplied. These results can be explained by considerations 
of Heiner (1983), who assumed that a high level of uncertainty will lead to more compli-
ance with rules, because the rules are the only available information regarding the appro-
priateness of behaviour. A recently published study, in which the impact of information 
about audits was investigated in the area of fiscal evasion, also proposed this uncertainty 
affect e.g. regarding tax evasion (Tan & Yim, 2014). Tan and Yim (2014) assume that 
most people will choose a worse but sure outcome over a better but risky outcome in or-
der to avoid uncertainty.  
Therefore, in the present case it can be assumed that the participants in the no in-
formation condition chose to comply and accept a lower salary in order to avoid the un-
certainty which was associated with the rule violation. However, if the participants re-
ceived precise information about the audit probability, they presumably believed that they 
could control the risk and therefore decided more often to violate the rule. Furthermore, it 
can be assumed that the information about the audit probability was perceived as a hid-
den request to adapt the behaviour according to the varying audit probabilities. The par-
ticipants may have asked themselves why the organisation was communicating the audit 
probabilities, and as they were also constrained to achieve the production goals, as-
sumed that they were also expected to adapt their rule-related behaviour to the varying 
audit probabilities.  
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The bomb crater effect, which had already been found in previous studies to be 
very robust (cf. Guala & Mittone, 2005; Kastlunger et al., 2009; Kirchler et al., 2007; 
Mittone, 2006), was also found in the present investigation. The mean amount of rule 
violations in the week after an audit was significantly higher than the mean amount of rule 
violations in the other weeks. The analysis of the bomb crater effect on a more detailed 
level, taking into account each week after an audit had occurred, revealed, moreover, that 
the post-audit increase in rule violations was significant in all weeks, with three excep-
tions: The bomb crater effect did not occur after the first two weeks after an audit and 
after the final audit. In the first week after an audit, the mean amount of rule violations 
even decreased significantly. This is congruent with the findings of other authors 
(Kastlunger et al., 2009; Mittone, 2006), which also revealed that the compliance in-
creased after the first audit. This can be explained by a kind of deterrence effect, which 
already declines after the second audit and even becomes a reversed effect after the 
third audit. The absence of the bomb crater effect after the final audit may be due to the 
motivation to maintain the outcome level that has already been achieved. A loss of remu-
neration in the final trials can hardly be compensated, meaning that people may be more 
risk-averse, or only continue with their previously practiced rule violation strategy instead 
of reacting to current events like audits.  
Limitations 
Although the experimental design offers certain advantages, such as a high inter-
nal validity and the enablement of the systematic investigation of sensitive topics like the 
violation of safety-related rules, this research method is also associated with certain dis-
advantages. The external validity of experimental investigations is not as high as in field 
studies. The samples used in experimental investigations as well as the artificial nature of 
experimental settings raises questions regarding the transferability of assessed results. 
These problems were addressed by using only engineering students for the investigation; 
although the participants are not currently working in organisations, they represent the 
new generation of employees who will work in the positions of interest in the future. Fur-
thermore, a simulation was used to generate an experimental situation which is as realis-
tic and close to the working situation in organisations as possible. Nevertheless, it has to 
be admitted that the simulation is an artificial environment which may have led to the 
over- or underestimation of the specific extent of safety-related rule violations. The effects 
ascertained in the current investigation are assumed to be valid, but the total frequencies 
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of committed rule violations need to be interpreted with caution and should be verified by 
field investigations in the respective contexts. 
The simulation of a whole production year, in which the plant has to be started 48 
times in total, enables the investigation of routinized rule-related decisions, which is a big 
step towards a more realistic representation of the working situation. On the other hand, 
however, the same start-up procedure has to be fulfilled again and again, which is quite a 
tiring and boring activity. To make the simulation richer in variety, an additional (not per-
formance-related) task was implemented in the simulation. This task changed every week 
and could be accomplished voluntarily after the plant had been started up. Although this 
additional task was not mandatory, it was completed quite frequently, with the participants 
deciding to accomplish it in about 19 out of the 48 weeks (M=19.37, SD=12.93 Min=7; 
Max =48). Thus, it can be assumed that the goal to diversify the activity by this additional 
task is presumably accomplished in the majority of the cases.   
The pretest of the present investigation (von der Heyde et al., 2013) showed that 
there are quite diverse effects when not only the common rule violation is considered, but 
also the fine tuning of the mandatory procedure. In the pretest by von der Heyde et al. 
(2013), the increase in the fine led to a decrease in common rule violations, but an in-
crease in fine-tuning activities. The effect of the framing and the accuracy of information 
about the audit probabilities on the fine-tuning of the mandatory 11 SP were not consid-
ered in the present investigation. Future investigations should consider the effect of these 
aspects on this more subtle type of rule violation. 
Outlook and practical implications 
The present investigation provides very valuable insights into the underlying 
mechanisms of repeated rule-related decisions. It was shown that people feel a strong 
need to avoid falling short of expectations. If it is made salient that they cannot meet their 
goals if they comply with the safety-related rule, they violate these rules more frequently 
than if this shortcoming is not made salient. If the same amount is earned, but it is not 
emphasised that they will fall short of expectations, the participants complied with the rule 
more frequently. If an organisation wishes to promote rule compliance, it is recommend-
able to display the performance output and the salary as a gain in any case, and not to 
emphasise the information that employees have not met the desired value. 
If audits are not conducted very frequently and on the basis of an easily under-
stood principle, the present investigation suggests that the real frequency of audits is not 
decisive regarding the decision to violate the respective rule. More important is the infor-
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mation about the audit probability. If no or vague information about the audit probability is 
supplied, people consistently tend to comply with the rules more, because they have no 
points of reference to determine an advantageous or less risky moment to violate the 
safety-related rule. Although they have their own experience as an informational re-
source, the total frequency of rule violations is too minor to detect variations which can be 
used as an indication of the audit probability and thus be of use for adapting the rule-
related behaviour.  
If people receive precise information about audit probabilities they adapt their rule-
related behaviour and are generally more willing to violate rules. However, people do not 
react to small changes in the communicated audit probability. Whether the audit probabil-
ity is 1 in 20/ low or 3 in 20/medium is irrelevant; they only adapt their rule-related behav-
iour if there are big changes in the probabilities (for example if the audit probability 
changes from 1 in 20/low to 5 in 20/high). The recommendation which can be deduced 
from these results is that to enhance compliance with safety rules, no or only vague in-
formation about audit probabilities should be supplied. If people have no points of refer-
ence on which they can base their decisions, they are generally more risk-avoidant and 
are more likely to comply with rules. Furthermore, the bomb crater effect which was 
shown in the present investigation suggests that it may be effective to conduct two audits 
in a row in order to make clear that the fact that an audit has just occurred does not make 
it more unlikely that another one will immediately follow.  
Although the rule-related decisions in the areas of fiscal evasion and industrial 
production have certain common features, such as the bomb crater effect, the present 
investigation shows that there are quite large differences between the different contexts 
regarding rule-related decision making. Thus, although the outcomes of investigations of 
rule violations in other research areas can provide inspiring starting points for the further 
development of knowledge about the regulation of rule-related decision-making proc-
esses, the results and insights gained in one context need to be replicated in other areas 
of interest. For example, it should be investigated whether the results of the present in-
vestigation are valid with respect to decision making regarding the violation of safety-
related rules in areas such as the medical or aviation sector. Therefore, the present in-
vestigation highlights the immense need for research investigating the determinants of 
rule violations in different contexts.  
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6.4 The impact of audit timing –  
The impact of safety audit timing and framing of the produc-
tion outcomes on safety-related rule violations in a simulated 
production environment 
6.4.1 Abstract  
In an experimental study, participants (n=79) assumed the role of control room operator 
of a simulated plant. For a total of 36 times, they had to decide whether to violate a 
safety-related rule to maximize their own salary, or to comply with it at the cost of a lower 
income. The experimental variation was the timing of audits in the simulated production 
year ("early" = audits accomplished within weeks 13-30 versus "late" = audits accom-
plished within weeks 31-48) and framing of production outcomes and salary (gain versus 
loss). Results show that early-audited participants committed significantly fewer rule viola-
tions in the early period than those who had not yet been audited. Later on, the early-
audited participants began to violate the rule, whereas the late-audited participants con-
tinued violating even though they had now been audited. Participants who experienced a 
loss-framed production outcome committed significantly more violations than participants 
in the gain-framed condition. When safety rules are prescribed, audits should be accom-
plished immediately. The late implementation of audits leads to persisting rule-violating 
behaviour. Furthermore, audits should be accomplished at regular time periods. To re-
duce the amount of safety-related rule violations, the production outcomes should be dis-
played as gain.  
6.4.2 Introduction - The need for safety audits 
A causal analysis of the BP refinery explosion in Texas city in 2005, the Deepwa-
ter Horizon accident in 2011 and the sinking of the Indian submarine INS Sindhurakshak 
in 2013 revealed that these disasters were at least partially due to the violation of safety-
related rules (Khan & Amyotte, 2007; Shaukat, 2013; Smith, 2011). The association be-
tween rule violations and safety is additionally corroborated by several investigations (cf. 
for example Hobbs & Williamson, 2002; or Phipps et al., 2008) which identified the viola-
tion of safety rules as one of the main causes of industrial accidents in several industrial 
sectors. Thus, the implementation of safety audits to reduce rule violations is a very 
common measure of safety management (cf. for example Griffiths, 1985; or Hale & Borys, 
2013b). Since safety audits are time-consuming and expensive (Power, 1997), the im-
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plementation of audits should be planned in an evidence-based manner to achieve a 
maximum impact with a minimum amount of audits. The aim of the present study is to 
address issues of optimal timing of safety audits; furthermore, the effect of framing the 
production outcome and salary as gain or loss on the amount of safety-related rule viola-
tions will be outlined.   
6.4.3 Theoretical Background - Individual and organisational factors af-
fecting the adherence to safety-related rules 
Accidents are not monocausal; they are mostly due to an unfortunate series of 
events. As described in Reason`s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model, organisational accidents 
are due to an interplay between situational characteristics (latent failures) and unsafe 
acts like errors or rule violations (active failures). Since there is already a great deal of 
research about human error, the current study addresses the topic of rule violations. 
Lawton defines safety-related rule violations as “[…] deliberate departures from rules that 
describe the safe or approved methods of performing a particular task or job” (Lawton, 
1998, p. 78). 
The factors which determine the decision-making process regarding rule violations 
are described by the Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied to Violations 
(IMV) which was proposed by Kluge (2010) and Kluge, Badura and Rietz (2013) based 
on findings by Verschuur, Hudson and Parker (1996). According to the IMV, person-
related determinants like age, sex, personality traits and past experience are assumed to 
influence the decision-making process regarding rule violations by determining the be-
havioural, normative and control beliefs of the decision-maker. In turn, these beliefs are 
assumed to influence the attitude, norms and self-efficacy, which determine the decision-
maker’s intention. Whether the intention is realised in behaviour is assumed to be influ-
enced by the environmental conditions, like the occurrence of safety audits or the framing 
of certain production goals, and by the skills and abilities of the decision-maker (cf. Figure 
22).  
Previous investigations by our research group have already demonstrated the im-
pact of the framing of the production goals as gain or loss (Kluge et al., 2013; von der 
Heyde, Brandhorst, & Kluge, submitted). Furthermore, the impact of personality traits 
(von der Heyde et al., accepted), the impact of the accuracy of information about audit 
probability and the impact of previously experienced safety audits (von der Heyde et al., 
submitted), and of skills and abilities (von der Heyde et al., 2012) on rule violations were 
investigated. The new aspect in the present study concerns the investigation of the envi-
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ronmental constraints, especially the audit timing, which can be easily influenced by the 
organisation. The timing of audits is varied and the impact of early or late audit implemen-
tation on the total amount of safety-related rule violations is addressed. Following one 
previous investigation (von der Heyde & Kluge, cf. 6.1) in which no framing effect was 
found, the current study aims to attain more empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
framing on the amount of rule violations. Moreover, from a methodological perspective, 
the rule-related behaviour is not operationalised as a single decision, but is embedded in 
a total 36 decisions in a (simulated) production year. 
 
 
Figure 22. Adapted Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction (Reason 2008; Verschuur, 
Hudson, and Parker 1996) applied to violations (IMV, Kluge, 2010; Kluge, et al., 2013). 
 
Audit timing 
Organisations are not only concerned with improving safety; they also have to op-
timise their effectiveness. Since compliance with safety rules is often more effortful and 
time-consuming and less lucrative than violation, employees are often in a conflict be-
tween performance- and safety-oriented goals. Battmann and Klumb (1993) and Reason, 
Parker and Lawton (1998) also assume that safety-related rule violations are often com-
mitted due to goal conflicts. Since the achievement of performance goals by committing a 
rule violation is often associated with short-acting benefits, the reinforcement of safety-
related rules by safety audits and fines is a necessary and often used measure to in-
crease the costs and decrease the benefits of rule violations (cf. for example Hale & 
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Borys, 2013b; or Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). As safety audits are quite costly and 
burdensome (Power, 1997), an attempt should be made to achieve the maximum rule 
compliance with the minimum level of safety audits. One starting point for optimization is 
the timing of audits.  
A concept which provides information regarding the perfect timing of audits is the 
availability heuristic, which is proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). This describes 
people’s tendency to overestimate the probability of incidences which they easily remem-
ber or for which examples easily come to mind. With respect to the impact of audit timing, 
it can be assumed that safety audits that are implemented comparatively early on lead to 
significantly fewer rule violations, as people will easily remember their last audit experi-
ence and will overestimate the probability of future audits. 
The impact of audit experience on the amount of rule violations committed after-
wards has already been investigated in the context of tax evasion (Mittone, 2006; Spicer 
& Hero, 1985). In the investigation by Spicer and Hero (1985), participants had the possi-
bility to violate a rule in a total of 10 rounds. The amount of rule violations in the final 
round was negatively associated with the amount of audits experienced in the rounds 
before. Mittone (2006) did not vary the total amount of audits, but rather the timing. Par-
ticipants had to pass through 60 periods in which they had to decide whether to violate or 
comply with a rule. All participants were audited six times: One group was audited pre-
dominantly in the first 30 periods, and the other predominantly in the last 30 periods. The 
group that was audited late violated the rule significantly more frequently in both periods 
than the group that was audited early. On the basis of the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) and the findings of Spicer and Hero (1985) and Mittone (2006), the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants who are audited early in a production year violate a 
safety-related rule significantly less often than people who are audited late in a production 
year.  
Framing of the production outcomes 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assume in the Prospect Theory that decision mak-
ing is not determined by the absolute value of outcomes, but is influenced by people’s 
subjective evaluations. If a person becomes convinced that he/she will not reach the ex-
pectations or the goal which was proposed (loss framing), this is perceived as so aversive 
that the person will run high risks (for example committing a rule violation) in order to ul-
timately meet the goal. If the same performance level is achieved but the performance is 
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displayed as gain (compared to the reference point of achieving/earning nothing), the 
person will experience it as less negative. He/she will then be comparatively satisfied with 
the performance and salary level already achieved and will therefore tend to be less will-
ing to undergo the risk associated with a rule violation.  
The framing effect has already been investigated quite frequently by our research 
group, but with inconsistent results. In two studies, the framing of the production outcome 
and salary led to significant differences in the amount of rule violations, with small effect 
sizes (Kluge et al., 2013; von der Heyde et al., submitted). However, in another investiga-
tion (von der Heyde & Kluge, 6.1), the framing effect was not significant. The present in-
vestigation should provide further empirical evidence regarding the stability of the framing 
effect. Hence, in accordance with the Prospect Theory and most of our previous findings, 
the following hypothesis is derived:  
Hypothesis 2: If the salary is framed as loss, people will violate the safety-related 
rule significantly more often than if the salary is framed as gain. 
6.4.4 Method 
A 2x2-factorial experimental design was conducted with the factors audit timing 
(early and late auditing) and framing (gain and loss). Between November and December 
2013, 81 engineering students (43 male) from the University of Duisburg-Essen with a 
mean age of 20.80 years (SD=2.51) participated in the study. As a large sample size was 
estimated to be necessary for the analysis, engineering students rather than real working 
operators were recruited. From the perspective of experimental control, it would have 
been extremely challenging to find 80 real working operators who were almost identical 
regarding their occupation and industrial sector, age, educational background and voca-
tional training, experience and job tenure in the area of Duisburg-Essen.  
Participants were recruited through flyers at the university campus, announce-
ments in lectures, and online forums of engineering courses. Participants were tested in 
groups of 4 to 8 persons. As a cover story, they were told that the study was about skill 
acquisition and retention in process control industries. The experiment was approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Computer Science and Cognitive Science of 
the University Duisburg-Essen.  
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Applied simulation of the production environment 
To investigate the topic of safety-related rule violations, a computer-based simula-
tion of a waste water treatment plant WaTrSim-Annual (von der Heyde et al., 2013, cf. 
Figure 23) was used. Since it is practically impossible to investigate safety-related rule 
violations in a real organisational setting due to ethical and legal considerations, the 
simulation was used to establish an experimental setting which is as close as possible to 
the conditions in an organisation. The investigation in a laboratory setting is furthermore 
associated with high internal validity, which according to Stone and Romero (2011) justi-
fies the generalization of the outcomes even in non-laboratory settings. There is a long 
tradition of using simulations to investigate rule-related behaviour. The main advantage is 
that the experimenter does not need to wait for the event (e.g. a rule application) to begin, 
and nor does he/she have to rely on reports obtained long after the event took place 
(Weick, 1965). The freedom regarding when to begin experimental events stands in stark 
contrast to the situation commonly faced in field research (Weick, 1965). Moreover, simu-
lations entail the advantage of being able to control sources of variation, because uncon-
trolled variables remain potential alternative explanations (Marx & Hillix, 1963). Weick 
(1965) states that in this sense, laboratory observation is superior to naturalistic observa-
tion (p. 198). 
In WaTrSim-Annual, participants assume the role of a control room operator, who 
is responsible for starting up and controlling one of a total of 20 plants of the company 
(WaterTec-Rhein-Ruhr). The task of the operator is to maximise the production of segre-
gate industrial waste water, which is composed of solvent and water. The adjustable 
components of the interface with which the participants interact are highlighted in Figure 
23a. 
In WatrSim-Annual, the plant has to be started 48 times over one simulated pro-
duction year (48 weeks), divided into 12-week quarters (a week lasts for 120 seconds). 
Depending on their performance (produced purified water), the participants could earn up 
to 1 € per week (48 € in 48 weeks). For the training period, all participants received 2 €, 
meaning that they could earn up to 50 € for 4.5 hours of participation.  
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Figure 23. For the purpose of visualization: partly highlighted user interface of WaTrSim-
Annual, the control room operator’s view of the adjustable components of the plant (a) 
and the performance display (b). 
 
Operationalisation of the violation (dependent variable, DV) 
To start up the plant, two procedures were available and trained. The 8-step pro-
cedure (8-SP) enables a fast start-up of the plant and therefore a high production out-
come and salary of up to 1 € per week. However, it is associated with certain safety risks: 
It can cause a critical system state which can in turn cause a deflagration.  
The 11-step procedure (11-SP) consists of three additional steps added at the be-
ginning of the procedure. These additional steps prevent the critical system state and 
deflagration, which can be caused by the 8-SP. As the 11-SP takes more time to start up 
the plant, less production outcome can be achieved, and consequently a lower salary of 
up to 0.80 € per week can be earned by this procedure. 
Due to safety issues, the 8-SP is forbidden after the first quarter and the 11-SP is 
declared as mandatory (cf. General procedure for more details). This intervention pro-
vokes a conflict between safety-oriented goals (which can be achieved by the 11-SP) and 
performance and profit-related goals (which can be achieved by the 8-SP).  
The forbidden 8-SP causes a critical system state, which is detected by the 
WaTrSim-Annual software. If such a critical state occurs, this is registered as rule viola-
tion. The dependent variable is the number of committed violations during the last three 
quarters (range 0-36). 
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The independent variable audit timing  
To test the hypothesis regarding the impact of the audit timing on the amount of 
safety-related rule violations, the participants were randomly assigned to two experimen-
tal conditions. After the 11-SP was declared as mandatory, the following 3 quarters 
(weeks 13 to 48) were divided into halves. Participants in the early-auditing condition 
(early auditing, EA) were audited in the first half (weeks 13-30), and those in the late-
auditing condition (LA) were audited in the second half (weeks 31-48). The temporal dis-
tance between the audits were the same in both conditions. Similar to the study by Mit-
tone (2006), participants in the EA group were audited in weeks 13, 15, 22 and 26, while 
participants in the LA group were audited in weeks 31, 33, 40 and 44. Before the partici-
pants began the operation in the first half, they were made aware that audits would be 
conducted to check compliance with the regulation prescribing the 11-SP as mandatory. 
They did not receive any additional information about the audit timing or the audit fre-
quency. 
 
Audit Feedback. To ensure that the participants did not alert each other (for ex-
ample by showing a surprised reaction to an audit), the audits were executed after all 
participants had finally started up the plant. As a signal that they had been audited, the 
participants received notification about the result of the audit (positive = rule compliance 
detected, negative = rule violation detected) via a pop-up window (Table 18). 
 
Table 18. Displayed notification of positive and negative audit feedback 
audit feedback 
positive negative 
Your plant has just been inspected by the 
audit team. They found that you complied 
with the company directives and used the 
prescribed procedure to start up the plant. 
You have therefore avoided the risk of opera-
tions being interrupted by an undesired reac-
tion. You therefore do not have to expect a 
fine.  
We would ask you to continue to comply with 
the company directives in the future; other-
wise, you will face a sanction of 1.00 €.   
Your plant has just been inspected by the 
audit team. They found that you did not com-
ply with the company directives and used the 
forbidden procedure to start up the plant. 
You have therefore run the risk of operations 
being interrupted by an undesired reaction. 
According to the company directives, this 
will be sanctioned with a fine of 1.00 €.  
We therefore ask you to comply with the com-
pany directives in the future; otherwise, you 
will face a sanction of 1.00 €. 
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The independent variable framing  
The framing was realised by manipulating the presentation of the achieved pro-
duction outcome (performance) and the earned salary. The performance displays af-
fected by the framing are highlighted in Figure 23b. The salary as well as production out-
come were displayed with altering points of reference (cf. Figure 24; e.g. “weekly salary in 
€”). In the gain-framed condition, the graphical and numerical production target (Figure 
24, graphical: thin line; numerical: “target”) was 485 litres of purified waste water (associ-
ated with a salary of 0.80 €). This target, and the salary, respectively, could be achieved 
by conducting the safe 11-SP. In contrast, in the loss-framed condition, the production 
target was 687 litres (associated with a salary of 1.00 €). This target could only be met by 
conducting the forbidden 8-SP. The currently achieved production output (Figure 24, 
graphical: bold line; numerical: “actual performance”) was communicated in real time, 
enabling participants to continuously observe whether or not the production target would 
be met. 
The reference point of the salary was also framed. The same salary was displayed 
differently depending on the framing condition. In the gain framing, the point of reference 
was 0.00 €, meaning that if the participant had achieved, for example, 0.80 €, this was 
displayed as 0.80 € in green digits. In the loss framing, the reference point was 1.00 €, 
meaning that if the participant had achieved a salary of 0.80 €, this was displayed as - 
0.20 € in red digits (cf. Figure 24).  
 
 
Figure 24. Framing of weekly salary and production target by conducting the 11 SP; left 
gain-framed illustration; right loss-framed illustration. 
  
To corroborate the framing, two more salary-related permanent displays were 
framed and integrated in the user interface (cf. Figure 25): the salary so far of the current 
quarter (cf. “quarterly total”) and the extrapolated salary for the entire year (cf. “annual 
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forecast”). The salary so far of the current quarter is the sum of the already earned sala-
ries in the respective quarter. In the gain framing, the reference point for the current quar-
ter was 0.00 €. In the loss framing, the reference point for the current quarter was 12.00 
€.  
The extrapolated salary for the entire year was calculated by adding the salary al-
ready earned to an expected salary for the upcoming weeks by assuming the achieve-
ment of an average performance (expected salary for average performance 0.80 € per 
week). The reference point in the gain-framed condition was 0.00 €; in the loss-framed 
condition it referred to the maximum possible salary of 48.00 €.  
 
 
Figure 25. Framing of the salary in the current quarter (see “quarterly total [in €]”, and 
framing of the extrapolated salary for the entire production year (see “annual forecast [in 
€]”); gain framing (left) and loss framing (right). 
 
At the end of each quarter, some framed main values were also listed in a quar-
terly report (Figure 26, “quarterly figures”). In the first line, the salary of the previous quar-
ter was listed (cf. Figure 26, “quarterly total”). The accumulated salary earned so far was 
listed in the second line (cf. Figure 26, “salary to date”).  
 
 
Figure 26. Framing of the quarterly figures displayed at the end of the quarters; gain 
framing (left) and loss framing (right), figure terms translated; other textual elements are 
displayed in the original German. 
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In the third line, the mean salary for all performed weeks was presented (cf. Figure 26, 
“mean per week”) and at the end of the quarterly report, the extrapolated salary for the 
entire year (cf. Figure 26, “annual forecast”) was listed. Concomitantly with the production 
year, the participants were asked to fill in these values in an accompanying paper-and-
pencil production protocol. This set of arrangements was important to ensure that the 
participants were aware of and exposed to the framed communication of the production 
outcome. 
Person-related control variables 
Cronbach (1957) proposed that a science of behaviour cannot be built on studies 
of variance of treatments or among individual differences alone. Organism and treatment 
are an inseparable pair and research should not dismiss one or the other as error vari-
ance (Cronbach, 1957, p. 683). Therefore, as control variables, a set of demographic 
information such as sex, age, duration of study (number of semesters completed), prior 
experience of interacting with simulated environments as examined by the participants’ 
gaming frequency (Item: "Do you play computer games?", 6-point Likert scale), general 
mental ability (Wonderlic, 2002), prior knowledge regarding water-related chemical proc-
esses (pre-test), general technical comprehension (Hesse & Schrader, 2000) and the 
performance and the theoretical knowledge regarding the different start-up procedures (8 
SP and 11 SP) were measured. The participant’s presence in the simulation environment 
was measured by the presence scale of Frank and Kluge (2014) with 11 items, e.g. “The 
simulation world triggered my emotions (e.g. anger, sadness, satisfaction).” 
Based on the findings of von der Heyde, Miebach and Kluge (accepted), the fol-
lowing constructs were selected as personality-based control variables: Cautiousness, 
which is a sub-construct of the integrity construct, was measured by 7 items (e.g. “I am 
reasonable rather than adventure seeking”) of Marcus` integrity scale (2006); self-interest 
was measured using an 8-item scale (e.g. “I think it is more important to follow my own 
interests than the interests of others”) by Mohiyeddini and Montada (2004). The regula-
tory focus at work was measured using a German version (translated by Solga, in prep.) 
of the Regulatory Focus at Work scale of Wallace, Johnson and Frazier (2009). This 
scale consists of 6 items for the prevention focus (“I focus on doing my duty at work”) and 
6 items for the promotion focus (“I focus on accomplishing a lot of work”). 
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General procedure 
Participants were welcomed, informed about the purposes of the study and told 
that they could discontinue participation at any time (in terms of informed consent). Then, 
prior knowledge regarding water-related chemical processes (pre-test), general technical 
comprehension, general mental ability, as well as several demographic variables such as 
sex, age and educational background were measured (cf. Table 19). 
 
Table 19. General procedure (CV=control variable; DV=dependent variable) 
 
 
Subsequently, participants were introduced to WaTrSim-Annual and trained to 
start up the plant using the 8-SP. Following the training, they had to start up the plant 
without any job aids to demonstrate their practical skills. Their theoretical knowledge 
about the simulation and the 8-SP was tested by a post-test including multiple-choice 
questions and graphics with blanks to fill in. After this, the first quarter began.  
After the first quarter, all participants received a note from the (simulated) com-
pany`s safety department. The note informed the participants that a deflagration had oc-
curred in one of the company’s plants. It was further stated that as the deflagration was 
Reception Time   
Measurement of  prior knowledge and general men-
tal ability, sociodemographic data 
30 
 
CV 
Introduction and training WaTrSim & 8 SP 55   
Performance and knowledge test regarding the 8 SP 15  CV 
System operation quarter 1 (weeks 1-12) 25  DV 
Break 5   
Deflagration and management directive 5   
Introduction & training of 11 SP 25   
Performance and knowledge test regarding the 11 
SP 
15 
 
CV 
Announcement of audits  5   
System operation quarters 2 – 4 (weeks 13-48) 75  DV 
Measurement of personality traits cautiousness, self-
interest, regulatory focus at work 
20 
 
CV 
Debriefing & farewell 5 = ∑ ca. 285 min. 
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due to the 8-SP, for the remaining three quarters, a new procedure, the 11-SP, would be 
mandatory. This safe procedure includes 11 steps, takes more time for start-up, and is 
therefore less lucrative than the previously trained and used 8-SP. To enable the partici-
pants to conduct the mandatory 11-SP, they received additional training concerning this 
procedure. After the training period, the practical skills and the theoretical knowledge re-
garding the 11-SP were tested by a second practical and theoretical test. Before the sec-
ond quarter started, the participants were made aware that audits would be executed 
randomly to check rule compliance. Furthermore, they were told that a detected rule vio-
lation would have the consequence of a total loss of the current week’s earnings (maxi-
mum 1€ per week).  
After the participants completed the remaining three quarters, cautiousness, self-
interest and regulatory focus at work were measured. Finally, the participants were de-
briefed and paid. On average, they earned a salary of 39.90 € (SD=1.66). Due to ethical 
considerations, all participants received 50 €, independently of their performance. The 
whole procedure is illustrated based on a time-line in Table 19. 
 
6.4.5 Results 
To ensure that the participants’ decision for the 8-SP or 11-SP was based on a 
deliberate choice, an exclusion criterion was defined: Every participant had to perform 
each procedure correctly at least twice, either during the training or during the production 
phase. Otherwise, the participant would be excluded from the data analysis. Based on 
this criterion, two participants were excluded. The further analyses were therefore based 
on 79 participants (41 male) with a mean age of 20.70 years (SD=2.50). 
Control of confounding variables  
The descriptive statistics of the measured control variables, as well as the pair-
wise comparisons of the experimental groups are displayed in Table 20. No significant 
differences between the different experimental groups were found, meaning that none of 
the control variables had to be considered as covariate in the further analysis. 
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Table 20. Descriptive statistics of the control variables, frequency/mean (SD)  
 
 
 
control variables (range) 
condition 
Sig. 
Gain/ early 
auditing 
(n=20) 
Gain/ late 
auditing 
(n=20) 
Loss /early 
auditing 
(n=20) 
Loss / late 
auditing 
(n=19) 
sex 8f 12m 8f 12m 9f 11m 13f 6m X2 p=.23 
age 19.75 (1.41) 21.05 (2.50) 20.65 (2.83) 21.47 (2.87) 
F(3,78)=1.74; 
p=.17 
semester 1.30 (0.98) 2.60 (2.30) 2.15 (2.74) 2.42 (2.73) 
F(3,78)=1.25; 
p=.30 
gaming frequency  (1-6) 3.00 (1.72) 3.10 (1.71) 3.25 (1.68) 2.42 (1.54) 
F(3,78)=0.92; 
p=.44 
pre-test (0-7) 5.15 (1.31) 5.20 (1.24) 4.85 (1.50) 4.68 (1.38) 
F(3,78)=0.64; 
p=.59 
technical comprehension 
(0-6) 
3.50 (1.85) 3.45 (1.82) 3.60 (1.46) 3.16 (1.46) 
F(3,78)=0.25; 
p=.86 
General mental ability (0-
50) 
25.75 (8.47) 31.50 (8.33) 28.30 (5.18) 27.21 (4.28) 
F(3,78)=2.53; 
p=.06 
post-test 8 SP (0-24) 17.60 (5.18) 16.45 (3.27) 18.35 (4.18) 17.50 (3.48) 
F(3,78)=0.73; 
p=.54 
performance 8-SP 
628.94 
(44.41) 
628.82 
(40.97) 
628.63 
(60,17) 
627.26 
(50.81) 
F(3,78)<0.01; 
p=.99 
post-test 11 SP (0-3) 2.85 (0.67) 2.85 (0.37) 2.95 (0.22) 3.00 (0.00) 
F(3,78)=0.65; 
p=.57 
performance 11-SP 
346.20 
(63.93) 
349.99 
(53.47) 
346.28 
(56.74) 
310.46 
(70.75) 
F(3,78)=1.77; 
p=.16 
presence (1-6) 3.68 (0.84) 3.36 (0.80) 3.57 (0.81) 3.37 (1.00) 
F(3,78)=0.70; 
p=.56 
cautiousness (1-5) 2.33 (0.60) 2.39 (0.65) 2.33 (0.50) 2.23 (0.60) 
F(3,78)=0.22; 
p=.88 
RFW-prevention (1-5) 4.13 (0.51) 4.10 (0.45) 4.10 (0.48) 4.00 (0.52) 
F(3,78)=0.34; 
p=.80 
RFW-promotion (1-5) 4.00 (0.60) 3.94 (0.59) 4.00 (0.64) 3.93 (0.51) 
F(3,78)=0.10; 
p=.96 
self-interest (1-6) 2.55 (0.71) 3.04 (0.97) 2.72 (0.96) 2.38 (0.92) 
F(3,78)=2.15; 
p=.10 
Notes: SP=step procedure; f=female; m=male; RFW=regulatory focus at work 
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Testing hypothesis 1 
A two-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses regard-
ing the impact of the audit timing on rule violations (Figure 27).  
Hypothesis 1, which predicts a higher tendency to violate safety-related rules if the 
audits are placed late in the production year, was not supported by the data. Although 
there was a difference in the amount of committed violations between the means of the 
EA condition (M=7.68, SD=8.47) and LA condition (M=10.67, SD=9.77) in the expected 
direction (Figure 27), this difference did not reach significance (F(1,78)=2.55 p=.12 
η2p=.03). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected.  
 
 
Figure 27. Mean amount of violations committed by the early-audit and the late-audit 
group 
 
Explorative analysis regarding the impact of audit timing on the rule violations in the first 
and second half of the production year 
To get a deeper understanding of the data, further explorative analysis were cal-
culated. In this regard at first a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the 
effect of the audit timing on rule violations committed in the first halve of the year after the 
11-SP was declared as mandatory after the first quarter (meaning weeks 13-30) and sec-
ond half of the year (meaning weeks 31-48). There was no main effect of the audit timing 
(F(1,77)=2.96, p=.09, η2p =.04), but a significant interaction of audit timing and the repeated 
measures factor half of the year was found (F(1,77)=11.49, p<.01, η2p =.13). The significant 
interaction indicates that the audit timing caused a significant difference in the amount of 
rule violations only in one half of the year. 
To determine the half in which the audit timing had an impact, a further ANOVA 
was conducted. Regarding the first half of the year, the ANOVA showed a significant 
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main effect of audit timing on the amount of committed rule violations (F(1,78)=10.41, 
p<.01, η2p =.12). In the first half, more than twice as many rule violations were committed 
by the LA group (M=5.79, SD=5.64) compared to the EA group (M=2.43, SD=3.39, cf. 
Figure 28). 
 
 
Figure 28. Mean amount of violations committed by the early-audit and late-audit group in 
the first half (weeks 12-30) and second half of the year (weeks 31-48). 
 
To compare the amount of rule violations committed in the first half with the 
amount committed in the second half within the EA group and the LA group, further re-
peated measures ANOVAs were conducted. At first a ANOVA was conducted to test the 
EA group regarding significant differences in the two halves of the year. The results show 
a significant main effect of the half of the year (F(1, 39)=11.45, p<.01, η2p=.23). The amount 
of rule violations in the EA condition rose significantly from the first half (M=2.43, 
SD=3.39) to the second half of the (M=5.25, SD=6.19). 
 A further ANOVA was conducted to test the LA group regarding significant differ-
ences in the two halves of the year. There was no significant main effect of the half of the 
year detected (F(1, 38)=1.69, p=.21, η2p=04). The amount of rule violations within the LA 
condition did not change significantly between the first (M=5.79, SD=5.64) and the sec-
ond half (M=4.87, SD=5.11). 
Testing hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2, which proposes an impact of the framing on rule violations, was 
supported by the data. The data analysis revealed a significant small main effect of fram-
ing (F(1,78)=9.70, p<0.01, η2p=.11). The comparison of the mean amount of rule violations 
in the gain-framed and loss-framed conditions showed that the amount of violations was 
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nearly twice as high in the loss-framed (M=12.18, SD=9.04) compared to the gain-framed 
condition (M=6.20, SD=8.46; cf. Figure 29).  
 
 
Figure 29. Mean amount of violations committed by the gain-framed and loss-framed 
group (range 1-36) 
 
Post hoc analysis regarding the impact of person-related variables 
All measured personality variables were tested regarding their coherence with rule 
violations. Of all considered personality variables, only the prevention focus (subscale of 
regulatory focus at work questionnaire) was negatively correlated with the amount of vio-
lations (r=-.27, p=.02). This means that people with high scores on the scale measuring 
the prevention focus committed rule violations less often than persons with low scores on 
this scale. A significant correlation was also found between rule violations and the per-
formance regarding the 11-SP (r=-.83; p<.001), indicating that the participants who per-
formed well with the 11-SP violated the rule less often. 
6.4.6 Discussion 
The purpose of the study was to explore the impact of early or late audit timing 
and framing on the total amount of rule violations. The hypothesis that an early audit ex-
perience will lead to more rule compliance overall within the whole production year was 
not supported by the current findings. However, a closer look at the rule violation fre-
quencies computed separately for each half of the production year revealed even more 
interesting results.  
The audit timing led to significant differences with respect to the amount of rule 
violations in the first half of the year. The participants who were audited early violated the 
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rule significantly less often in the first half of the year than the participants who were au-
dited late (small effect size). This finding is in line with the availability heuristic (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979). Due to the high availability of audits in the early-audited group, the 
probability of future audits was overestimated. This made the early-audited participants 
more risk-avoidant and led to a higher level of rule compliance in the first half of the pro-
duction year. In contrast to Hypothesis 1, which proposed that this effect would persist 
throughout the whole production year, the amount of rule violations increased in the sec-
ond half and reached the same level of violations committed by the late-audited group in 
the entire year. This evidence suggests that audits are a highly transient measure of 
safety management. Based on the current findings, it is assumed that audits only exert an 
influence if they are conducted quite regularly. When participants are given the impres-
sion that audits will no longer be conducted, the willingness to comply with rules de-
creases immediately. This is not consistent with previous investigations (Mittone, 2006; 
Spicer & Hero, 1985), which found that frequency and early auditing reduce the amount 
of rule violations in a sustained manner.  
The finding that participants who were audited comparatively late persisted with 
rule-violating behaviour even once the audits had started is consistent with the first hy-
pothesis. The lack of audit experience at the beginning of the production year led pre-
sumably to a persisting underestimation of the audit probability, which in turn led to con-
stantly more decisions favouring the rule violation option over the compliance option, re-
gardless of whether or not an audit had recently taken place. Due to their previous ex-
perience with rule violations and the related higher production output, they might have 
become convinced that rule violations were sufficiently remunerative to make the risk 
associated with the rule violation worthwhile. Furthermore, the late occurrence of audits in 
this condition might have led to the perception that audits are a temporary, exceptional 
phenomenon, which is usually followed by a period in which no audits are conducted, as 
was their experience in the first half of the production year. 
Regarding the impact of the framing of the production outcome, the current study 
is in line with the findings of previous investigations (Kluge et al., 2013; von der Heyde et 
al., submitted), which also revealed a small effect of framing on rule violations.  When 
people are evaluating their importance, the reference point is relevant rather than the 
total values of achieved production outcome/earned salary. If people become convinced 
that they will not reach their production goals, or assume that they will earn less com-
pared to a certain value (loss framing), this is perceived as so negative and aversive that 
they will decide more frequently to violate safety-related rules to meet the production 
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goals and avoid the loss of remuneration. The findings of the current investigation under-
line that the framing of the production outcome and the salary is a small but robust effect, 
which is valid across varying conditions.  
Limitations 
The violation of safety-related rules is very a sensitive investigation context. The 
potentially very severe consequences of violations, such as injury or death of people, 
make the systematic variation of organisational determinants in an organisational context 
impossible due to ethical and legal considerations. Nevertheless, the experimental varia-
tion of certain variables is needed to determine clear cause-and-effect relations. These 
relations in turn enable practical implications to be derived for rule-violation reduction in-
terventions to enhance safety. Hence, a laboratory setting was chosen for the present 
investigation.  
Stone-Romero (2011), Thibaut et al. (1974), and Weick (1965) suggest that re-
sults gained in a laboratory setting with high internal validity can be transferred to external 
conditions. To improve the external validity further, the simulation of a chemical plant was 
used as the experimental environment. Furthermore, only engineering students were in-
cluded in the investigation. Presumably, these students will work in such a context in the 
future, and are also quite similar to real-life operators regarding several characteristics.  
Although the external validity was enhanced by both the sample and the simula-
tion, the findings should be interpreted within these limitations. The rule-related behaviour 
of people in organisations is influenced by a complex interaction of impact factors, which 
cannot entirely be simulated in an experimental context. The current investigation fo-
cused on several person-related and situational determinants, but organisational influ-
ences like safety climate or organisational commitment could not be considered due to 
the experimental nature of the study.  
Practical implications  
The findings regarding the timing of audits suggest the following practical implica-
tions: (1) Audits should be conducted from the beginning, just after a new rule has been 
prescribed, and (2) audits should be conducted continuously and should not be stopped 
after a certain time period.   
Each organisation should make a cost-benefit analysis to determine either the 
amount of rule violations which they can tolerate, or deduce the expense which they are 
willing to sacrifice for audits. With this information and knowledge about the optimal timing 
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of audits, as supplied by the present investigation, the timing of audits can be optimised 
to achieve the best possible compliance rate with the available means.  
Organisations that wish to reduce the amount of safety-related rule violations 
should also consider the configuration of their goal and feedback system. To improve 
safety, the present study suggests that performance feedback should be displayed as 
gain. This could be accomplished by choosing appropriate reference points (goals) that 
can be achieved, or preferably even exceeded. This would lead to more rule compliance 
overall, but is potentially also associated with performance losses. In this respect, the 
organisation has to assign priorities: Employees cannot improve performance, safety and 
costs at the same time (cf. McCurdy, 2001).  
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7 General Discussion 
The general discussion is concerned with the findings gained in the four studies 
which are described in the empirical evidence part (cf. section 6) and will address four 
scopes. First, the internal validity, the external validity, as well as the practical relevance 
and usefulness of the findings will be discussed in the limitations section (cf. section 7.1.). 
Then, the empirical findings will be discussed in terms of the investigated situational and 
person-related determinants (cf. section 7.2). Subsequently, in the third section, the em-
pirical findings will be integrated into the different theoretical perspectives described in 
the general theory part (cf. section 7.3), and finally, in the fourth section the empirical evi-
dence will be used to derive field guidelines for practitioners who wish to implement evi-
dence-based safety-management measures to reduce safety-related rule violations in 
their own organisation (cf. section 7.4).  
7.1 Limitations 
The limitations of the empirical findings will be discussed according to the threats 
to internal validity described, for example, by Cook and Campbell (1979). Furthermore the 
practical relevance and usefulness dimensions suggested by Thomas and Tymon (1982) 
will be addressed, and finally, the degree of external validity will be evaluated. 
7.1.1 Internal validity 
Cook and Campbell (1979) describe several threats to internal validity. Four of the 
threats are relevant for experimental investigations, with only one measuring date: the 
effect of testing, the instrumentation effect, the statistic regression effect and the effect of 
selection. 
The effect of testing describes, according to Cook and Campbell (1979), the im-
pact of the act of measurement on the object of investigation. For example, the object of 
investigation might be influenced by the characteristics of the experimental environment, 
or the presence of the experimenter. In the goods at stake investigation, in which the cri-
terion was measured only once, the influence of the experimenter on the rule-related de-
cision was minimized by the following procedure: The experimenter left the laboratory 
under a pretext in order to make the participants feel more unobserved during their rule-
related decision. Although the experimenter did not leave the laboratory in the other stud-
ies, the experimenter concentrated during the simulated production year on other activi-
ties (like reading or working on the computer) and did not watch the participants` behav-
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iour. The presence of the experimenter was nevertheless necessary to ensure concentra-
tion and silence during the investigation. The quite high amount of rule violations in all 
conducted investigations (the participants decided to violate in about 30% of cases) sug-
gests that the participants did not feel constrained to comply with the rule because they 
felt observed and feared the moral condemnation of the experimenter.  
The effect of testing is also assumed to be potentially relevant with respect to the 
measurement of certain personality traits. It is conceivable that the measurement of cer-
tain variables has an impact on the subsequent (rule-related) behaviour. It is likely that 
the consideration of certain personality-related items influences the cognition or emotion 
in the rule-related decision subsequently. For example, items about integrity might make 
integrity-related values more cognitively available, which might lead to more rule compli-
ance than if the participants had not been confronted with the items. Due to this consid-
eration, the decision was made to measure the personality traits which were considered 
in studies 2-4 at the end of the investigation.  
In fact, it cannot be entirely ruled out that the effect of testing influenced the find-
ings of the present investigation somehow. However, the effect of testing was considered 
during the scheduling of the experiments in order to minimize the impact. 
The instrumentation effect refers to the reliability of the used instruments (cf. for 
example Cook & Campbell, 1979). The reliability of the applied scales was established by 
the choice of appropriate, meaning highly reliable, valid and objective scales. To test for 
the reliability of the applied scales, the Cronbach`s alpha indicators were calculated and 
reported in the methods section of each study. All in all, the reliability indices were satis-
factory to good; otherwise, the scales were not considered further. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the reliability of the applied instruments is adequate and the likelihood of 
the threat of instrumentation is minimized for the empirical evidence reported in the scope 
of the present investigation 
The statistic regression effect refers to the fact that an extreme score in a certain 
criterion is usually followed by a lower score, because there is a regression to mean val-
ues (Cook & Campbell, 1979). This effect can lead to a misinterpretation of the findings of 
studies with multiple measurement times, as some effects are not due to the variation of 
the independent variable after the first baseline measurement, but are only caused by the 
regression toward the mean. This could only be relevant in the two studies which investi-
gated the impact of audit probability and audit timing (cf. sections 6.3, 6.4), as in these 
studies, the criterion was measured multiple times. Since none of these investigations 
had a pretest-treatment-posttest design, this misinterpretation cannot have occurred. 
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The statistic regression effect can not only lead to misinterpretations; in addition, 
large-sized effects which are ascertained in only one study in which the criterion is meas-
ured only once are often overestimated. It is very likely that extreme effects will be fol-
lowed by much less extreme values, which would put the huge effect size into perspec-
tive and enable a more realistic estimate of the impact. This is especially relevant for the 
interpretation of the findings of the impact of goods at stake investigation. In this study, 
the criterion was based on only one measurement, as the participants were only once in 
the situation where they had to decide whether they wanted to violate or comply with the 
safety-related rule. It can be proposed that if the participants had been given more times 
to decide, they may have decided differently in the second or third trial. Therefore, it quite 
likely that effects might have been overestimated, underestimated or overlooked. The fact 
that no effect of goods at stake or framing was found might be due to coincidence rather 
than a lack of existence of the proposed effect. Since the framing effect was found by 
Kluge et al. (2013) as well as by the impact of audit probability and impact of audit timing 
investigation (cf. sections 6.3 and 6.4), it can be assumed that there is an effect of fram-
ing, which was simply not detected in the goods at stake study. The investigations in 
which WatTrSim-Annual was used (audit probability and audit timing study), the criterion 
measurement was not based on one decision, but on 36 rule-related decisions per par-
ticipant. This makes the findings of these investigations more robust and less susceptible 
to extreme values. With one limitation (the goods at stake study), the statistical regression 
should not diminish the significance of the findings.  
Selection effects refer according to Cook and Campbell (1979) to systematic dis-
tortions which are due to the non-randomized formation of experimental groups. Since 
the assignment of participants to experimental groups was randomized, it can be as-
sumed that the present findings are not affected by the threat of selection effects. 
In summary, it can be assumed that the internal validity of the studies presented in 
the scope of the present investigation is rather appropriate due to the benefits of experi-
mental control (such as consistent experimental conditions in the laboratory, or the 
measurement and control of several potentially confounding variables). The high internal 
validity enables the reliable deduction of cause-and-effect relations. Since the aim of the 
present investigations was to provide empirical evidence regarding the effect of the dif-
ferent determinants on rule-related behaviour, a high internal validity is especially impor-
tant.  
Stone-Romero (2011), who discusses the importance of internal and external va-
lidity of empirical investigations in general, even evaluates the achievement of internal 
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validity as sufficient (independent of the external validity) for the deduction of valid con-
clusions from experimentally gained findings to other people, situations and times. Never-
theless, the external validity of investigations should be considered and optimized by 
every investigator. The external validity of the studies will be discussed in the next sec-
tion.  
7.1.2 External validity 
Campbell and Cook (1979, p. 39) define external validity as “approximate validity 
with which conclusions are drawn about the generalizability of a causal relationship to 
and across populations of persons, settings and times.”  
High external validity can be achieved by conducting investigations in the field in-
stead of the experimental environment. If the impact of certain variables is found despite 
the complexity of the interaction of real-life influences, the generalization to similar con-
texts is more legitimate than if certain findings are gained in the controlled experimental 
context. On the other hand, the deduction of cause-and-effect relations of findings gained 
in a field context is difficult, because there are plenty of interfering factors which might be 
responsible for the findings instead of the actually investigated object.   
The violation of safety-related rules is a very sensitive topic. Field investigations of 
this phenomenon, which include not only surveys but the systematic variation of inde-
pendent variables, are practically impossible. The variation of variables, which will pre-
sumably lead to systematic differences in the amount of safety-related rule violations, and 
which in turn might result in the avoidable endangerment of human well-being, is morally 
reprehensible. Furthermore, industrial councils have reservations regarding the investiga-
tion of such topics, as they fear that employees who violate the rules can be identified 
and will have to bear sanctions for the rule violations. Besides these difficulties, the pre-
sent investigations are concerned with the identification of rule violation determinants, 
meaning that clear causal relations between the investigated determinant and the amount 
of rule violations should be measured. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic of rule vio-
lations, and as the discovery of causal relations in field investigations is very difficult, the 
current research question could not be investigated in the field, but had to be conducted 
in an experimental context.  
To increase the external validity a simulation was used for the investigation. In the 
simulation, the participants had to assume the role of a control room operator in a waste 
water treatment plant. They were introduced to their tasks, the characteristics of the plant 
and the goals of the organisation. Afterwards, the participants had to control the plant. In 
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the audit probability and the audit timing studies, even the daily work routine was simu-
lated by an advanced simulation version in which the participants had to operate the plant 
for one simulated production year. In this regard, it can be concluded that the participants 
were in situation which is quite similar to the working situation in organisations regarding 
different characteristics.  
In order to enhance the external validity of the findings further, only engineering 
students, who will presumably work in similar or the same context in the future, and pre-
sumably have similar characteristics to people who are currently working in comparable 
positions, were allowed to participate in the investigations. Only the survey which was 
conducted in the scope of the personality investigations as part of the pilot study was not 
restricted to this selected circle of participants. 
Although the external validity of the present investigations is limited due to the ex-
perimental character of the study design, it can be assumed that the simulation and the 
participant selection maximized the degree of external validity which can be achieved by 
an experimental investigation. Even though the external validity of the investigations is 
nevertheless estimated as being medium to low, this level of external validity in combina-
tion with the high internal validity (cf. section 7.1.1) is sufficient for discovering valid 
cause-and-effect relations which are assumed to apply in other, for example organisa-
tional, contexts (Stone-Romero, 2011).  
7.1.3 Practical relevance and usefulness 
Thomas and Tymon (1982) consider the practical relevance and usefulness of re-
search findings and suggest five dimensions with which the degree of the practical rele-
vance of empirical evidence can be described: the descriptive relevance, the goal rele-
vance, the operational validity, the non-obviousness and the timeliness. 
Thomas and Tymon (1982, p. 346) define descriptive relevance as “accuracy of 
research findings in capturing phenomena encountered by the practitioner in his or her 
organizational setting.” The descriptive relevance describes the degree to which the re-
search topic is relevant for practitioners, and is therefore connected to the external va-
lence term which was also addressed above (cf. section 7.1.2). The descriptive relevance 
is determined by the significance of the research topic for the practitioner and the con-
gruence between the experimental and the application context.  
The research topic of the present investigation is deduced from the broad empiri-
cal evidence regarding the incidence and consequences of safety-related rule violations 
in different industrial sectors (cf. section 4). This shows that the occurrence of safety-
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related rule violations is a big problem in many organisations across different branches 
and is not a phenomenon which is merely interesting for a narrow research community. It 
can be assumed that the current findings will attract wide interest from every practitioner 
who is responsible for the optimization of the human factors-related safety key figures. 
The second aspect of the descriptive relevance refers to the congruence between 
the investigation and the application context. Although the investigations were conducted 
not in an organisational, but in an experimental setting, the congruence between the in-
vestigation and the application context is also assumed to be high. Due to the use of the 
simulation of a chemical plant WaTrSim-(Annual), which was developed by specialists in 
process control engineering from the Dresden University of Technology, the interface and 
the process characteristics of the simulation are assumed to be highly ecologically valid 
(for the validation of WaTrSim cf. Burkolter et al., 2009). In other words, it can be as-
sumed that the characteristics of the decision situation in the experiment are quite con-
gruent with the characteristics of the decision situation of people working in comparable 
positions in the process control of real chemical plants.  
As the significance of the research topic for the practitioner and the congruence 
between the experimental and the application context are assumed to be high, the cur-
rent results can be seen as high in descriptive relevance.  
Goal relevance is defined by Thomas and Tymon (1982, p. 347) as “correspon-
dence of outcome (or dependent) variables in a theory to the things the practitioner 
wishes to influence”. Thomas and Tymon (1982) propose that the goal relevance of many 
investigations is low, as only humanity indicators are considered as goal criteria, but while 
efficiency or performance output figures are neglected. The studies conducted in the 
scope of the present investigation considered performance-related indicators in several 
respects. 
The decision situation of organisational members was simulated by creating a 
goal conflict between safety-related and performance-related goals. The participants 
were required to comply with the safety-related rule, but were also constrained to maxi-
mise their production outcome and their salary. In this regard, the participants had to de-
cide whether they wanted to comply with the safety-related rule, which is associated with 
safe production, but also lowers their performance output and salary, or to violate the 
safety-related rule to achieve a better production outcome and salary. The communica-
tion of conflicting goals is quite common in most organisations. Organisations want to be 
faster, better, cheaper (McCurdy, 2001), but simultaneously require the accomplishment 
of safety goals. The organisations and the practitioners charged with the improvement of 
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safety or performance indicators have to appreciate that the goal criteria cannot be 
maximized simultaneously, but rather have to be prioritised. The current findings regard-
ing the determinants of rule violations can be either interpreted as guidance for enhanc-
ing rule compliance and safety at the expense of performance, as it is suggested by the 
author, or they can be used to optimise performance indicators at the expense of safety. 
In this regard, the current findings provide a wide range of insights which can be used for 
the accomplishment of different objectives. 
The impact of the perceived performance and the perceived goal accomplishment 
was further investigated in the current studies as one determinant of rule-related behav-
iour. The impact of the framing of the production outcomes and the achieved salary as 
gain or loss on the amount of rule violations, which was associated with better production 
outcome and a higher salary, was investigated by three of the four studies (cf. sections 
6.1, 6.3, 6.4). 
In sum, performance as well as safety goals were prescribed in the simulation to 
achieve a more realistic investigation situation which is congruent with the decision situa-
tion in organisational contexts. Furthermore, the impact of performance feedback on rule-
related behaviour was investigated as independent variable, meaning that the goal rele-
vance of the current findings is assumed to be high.  
Operational validity is defined by Thomas and Tymon (1982, p. 348) as the “ability 
of the practitioner to implement action implications of a theory by manipulating its causal 
(or independent) variables”. All investigated determinants, such as the framing, the per-
sonality factors or the timing of safety audits, can used as starting points to derive con-
crete recommendations for action. The findings regarding the framing can be considered 
during the design and implementation of performance feedback systems and during the 
definition of performance goals (cf. 7.4.2); the findings regarding the impact of certain 
personality traits on rule-violations can be used during the personnel selection and the 
allocation of responsibilities (cf. 7.4.1); the findings regarding the accuracy of information 
about audit probabilities can be used to improve the communication regarding audits; and 
the findings regarding the timing of audits and the bomb crater effect can be used to ad-
vance the time scheduling of audits. Hence, the operational validity of the current findings 
is assumed to be high. 
Nonobviousness is defined by Thomas and Tymon (1982, p. 348) as “the degree 
to which a theory meets or exceeds the complexity of common sense theory already used 
by a practitioner”. As the hypotheses which were validated in the studies of the present 
investigation are all based on psychological theories and previous investigations, and are 
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not proposed on the basis of common sense assumptions, a high nonobviousness of the 
current findings can be assumed.  
Timeliness is defined by Thomas and Tymon (1982, p. 349) as the degree to 
which a theory is “available to practitioners in time to use it to deal with problems.” The 
current studies were conducted between May 2011 and December 2013. Parts of the 
investigations have already been published in conference papers (von der Heyde et al., 
2013; von der Heyde et al., 2012). The investigation described in 6.1 will only be pub-
lished in the present investigation. The studies described in the sections 6.2 and 6.3 are 
already published by the Journal of Ergonomics and Safety Science. The study described 
in 6.4 is at this time in preparation for submission. Although it can be assumed that the 
publication in journals will achieve more attention, all findings are at least available in this 
dissertation. As the investigated phenomena are assumed to be stable, the findings are 
and will remain relevant if they are published with delay of up to 3 or 4 years. 
As conference papers have already been published, and due to the comparatively 
quick publication in the scope of this dissertation, the planned publication in journals 
(which is admittedly more delayed due to the time requirements of the review process), 
and the assumed stability of the impact factors, it can be assumed that overall, the timeli-
ness criterion is met. 
Since all criteria of the practical relevance dimensions described by Thomas and 
Tymon (1982) are met, the practical relevance of the findings presented in the scope of 
the present investigation is assumed to be high. To enhance the practical relevance fur-
ther, the findings will be summarized with regard to the respective determinant (cf. section 
summary of the empirical findings 7.2), and finally the implication for practitioners will be 
outlined in a special section (cf. 7.4). 
7.2 Discussion of the empirical evidence according to the investi-
gated determinants   
In the following paragraphs the findings of the empirical evidence part will be 
summarized and discussed according to the investigated influencing factor.  
7.2.1 Framing 
The framing of the production outcome and salary was investigated in the goods 
at stake, the audit probability and the audit timing study. Whereas in the goods at stake 
investigation (cf. 6.1) no framing effect occurred, in the audit probability (6.3) and audit 
timing study (6.4) the framing effect was demonstrated. The participants whose produc-
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tion outcome and salary was loss-framed violated the rule significantly more often than 
those in the gain-framing condition.   
It can be argued that the inconsistency between these findings was triggered by 
the differences between the applied WaTrSim simulations. Whereas the goods at stake 
study used a basic version of WatrSim, in which each participant had to decide only once 
whether to violate the rule, in the audit probability and audit timing investigation, in which 
the framing effect was found, a whole production year was simulated by the extended 
version WatrSim-Annual. Within this simulation, each participant had to decide 36 times 
whether to comply with or violate the safety-related rule. However, a previous investiga-
tion which also only applied the basic version of WatrSim (Kluge et al., 2013) did find an 
effect of framing on rule violations.  
As only one investigation found no effect, while the two other studies reported in 
the scope of the present investigation as well as the other study of our research group 
(Kluge et al., 2013) did find an effect of framing, it can be assumed that the framing of the 
production outcome and salary has quite a robust influence on the amount of rule viola-
tions. When people get the impression that they are behind their production goal or will 
lose money (loss framing), they are more prone to safety-related rule violations than if 
they believe that they will meet their goals (gain framing).  
7.2.2 Goods at stake 
The results of the investigation of the impact of the goods at stake (cf. section 
6.1), if a rule is violated, indicated no effect of this influencing factor. It seems to have no 
influence on the decision to comply with or violate a safety-related rule whether the goods 
at stake are material property or people’s well-being. What might be the reason for this 
finding? 
There are two different explanatory approaches: Either the goods at stake simply 
do not affect the rule-related decision, or the effect was simply not detected, possibly due 
to the experimental nature of the investigation context. Since this was the first investiga-
tion to address the impact of the goods at stake on safety-related rule violations and due 
to the fact that the findings were gained in an experimental study, the current findings 
should be interpreted with caution. They should be seen as an indicator, but not as proof, 
that the goods at stake are generally irrelevant for rule-related decisions. 
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7.2.3 Personality traits as predictors 
In all investigations reported in the empirical evidence section, personality traits 
were considered as control variables. In the first investigation, in which the impact of the 
goods at stake was investigated (cf. 6.1), conscientiousness, empathy and risky decision 
making, or more precisely risk-taking propensity, were measured. None of these person-
ality traits correlated significantly with the rule-related behaviour.  
The pilot study, reported in the impact of personality section (cf. 6.2), tested a host 
of personality traits regarding their ability to predict the intention to violate a rule (self-
control; belief in a just world; sensitivity toward injustice; self-interest; self-responsibility; 
regulatory focus at work and the integrity subscales: low distribution, non-rationalization, 
reliability, cautiousness and conflict avoidance). Only the integrity subscales cautious-
ness, non-rationalization, reliability, as well as self-interest and injustice sensitivity 
emerged as significant predictors of the intention to violate a safety-related rule.  
In the assessment reported in the main study of the impact of personality section 
(cf. 6.2), as well as in the study reported in the impact of audit probability section (cf. 6.3), 
cautiousness, self-interest and injustice sensitivity were measured as personality predic-
tors of safety-related rule violations in the process control environment. Only the integrity 
subscale cautiousness was significantly correlated with the amount of committed rule 
violations. The lower the cautiousness, the more often people decided to violate the 
safety-related rule. 
In the study reported in the impact of audit timing section (cf. 6.4 ), cautiousness 
and regulatory focus at work were measured. The data analysis revealed a significant 
negative correlation between prevention focus at work and the amount of committed rule 
violations. The more people were prevention-oriented (focus on the achievement of 
safety and compliance and avoidance of failure) the less often they violated the rule. In 
contrast to the previous investigation, cautiousness was not related to the amount of rule 
violations. 
Ultimately, the personality traits cautiousness (although the findings were partially 
inconsistent) and prevention focus at work turned out to be most promising predictors of 
safety-related rule violations in organisations. Nevertheless, more evidence is needed to 
determine whether or not these personality traits are actually valid predictors of safety-
related rule violations.  
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7.2.4 Other person-related predictors 
In all studies presented in the scope of the present investigation, sex and age 
were measured. Furthermore, in all the studies excerpt the pilot study described in the 
impact of personality section (cf. 6.2), general mental ability, prior knowledge about 
chemical processes in general, task-related knowledge after the training (post test) and 
the performance regarding the two procedures were measured as control variables. The 
posttest knowledge is an indicator of the knowledge about the simulation and task, and 
the performance measures are indicators of the skills and abilities which are necessary to 
operate the plant using the different procedures. In the final investigation, which investi-
gated the impact of audit timing (cf. 6.4), technical apprehension was additionally meas-
ured.  
As the variance in terms of age was only small in the investigated student sam-
ples, it can be assumed that if there is an effect of age, it is barely detectable using the 
samples which were assessed and described within the scope of the present investiga-
tions.  
Sex was only significantly associated with the decision to violate a rule in one in-
vestigation (impact of audit probability, cf. section 6.3). In this investigation, males vio-
lated the rule significantly more often than females, which is consistent with the literature 
(cf. for example Alper & Karsh, 2009; Reason, 2008). The fact that the correlation was 
only small, and furthermore only found in one investigation, suggests that sex is only a 
weak (if at all) influencing factor with respect to the violation of safety-related rules.   
Prior knowledge, general mental ability, and technical comprehension were not 
correlated with the safety-related rule violations in any of the investigations. Hence, ac-
cording to the current findings, the basic cognitive abilities and prior knowledge seem to 
have no direct influence on safety-related rule violations.  
On the contrary, the knowledge about the task and the simulation and the operat-
ing skills, which was measured by performance indicators regarding the 8-step procedure 
and 11-step procedure, was quite influential with respect to the determination of safety-
related rule violations. The skills of operating the plant with the more complex 11-step 
procedure were negatively correlated with the amount of committed rule violations in all 
three experimental studies of the present investigation. Poor performance in operating 
the plant with the 11-step procedure was associated with a high amount of safety-related 
rule violations. In one investigation, the goods at stake study (cf. 6.1), there was also a 
negative correlation between the knowledge about the simulation (posttest knowledge) 
and the decision to violate the safety-related rule. In this investigation, a high amount of 
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knowledge about the simulation was associated with a low level of rule violations. These 
findings suggest that in particular, a good skill level, which can be achieved by regular 
training measures, reduces the amount of safety-related rule violations.  Since the corre-
lation between violations and knowledge about the task and the simulation was only 
found in one investigation, knowledge seems to be a less important and not always rele-
vant determinant of rule violations.  
7.2.5 Implementation of audits and communication of audit probability  
The impact of audits and the effect of different implementation and communication 
mechanisms were investigated in the audit probability and audit timing study (cf. sections 
6.3, 6.4.). Below, first, the impact of audit frequency, audit timing and audit experience 
will be outlined, followed by a description of the impact of audit communication. 
When organisations consider the implementation of audits, they want to achieve a 
maximum effect with a minimum amount of audits. Therefore, they consider what amount 
of audits they should place within defined time span (determine the audit probability), and 
at what point in time they should implement audits (audit timing).  
In the study investigating the impact of audit probability, the amount of audits was 
varied in certain time periods in a within-subject design. All participants were audited in 
one simulated quarter at 1 of 12 possible times, and in two quarters at 3 of 12 possible 
times. When the participants received no information about the variation of the audit fre-
quency, the frequency had no impact on the amount of rule violations committed in the 
different periods. This indicates that audited participants either did not detect relatively 
small differences in the amount of conducted audits, or they considered this information 
as irrelevant with respect to their rule-related decision. Probably, they would have de-
tected larger differences if, for example, the audits had been accomplished 6 in 12 times 
or 1 in 12 times, but the differences in the frequencies which were investigated here had 
no impact. This suggests that a quite small amount of rule violations is sufficient. Whether 
an audit is conducted 1 in 12 times or 3 in 12 times makes no difference; if the amount of 
rule violations should be reduced the audit frequency must be increased more intensely. 
The investigation regarding the audit timing (cf. section 6.4) revealed that it is ef-
fective to conduct audits immediately after the rule has been prescribed. If audits are ex-
perienced early on, people comply with the rule in this early time period more frequently 
than if their first audit is comparatively late. Based on the findings of the present investi-
gation, the late implementation of audits is very ineffective. In the beginning participants 
violated because they had not been audited, but even once the audits had started later 
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on, they did not change their behaviour: They violated equally frequently even though 
audits had now taken place. 
Nevertheless, the early start of auditing is not sufficient; audits have to be con-
ducted regularly, as if the audits stopped after a certain time period, participants quickly 
began to violate the rule.  Hence, due to the transient effect of audits, audits can be in-
deed reduced if necessary, but it is recommended to not stop them entirely. 
Regarding the scheduling of audits, the bomb crater effect, which was proved by 
the impact of audit probability study (cf. section 6.3), should also be considered. People 
tend to violate the rule especially often when they have just been audited, as they as-
sume that audits will not be subsequently carried out. It would be effective to occasionally 
perform two audits in succession to demonstrate that audits are equally probable every 
time, even when an audit has just occurred.  
To maximize rule compliance with a minimum amount of audits, not only the tim-
ing, but also the communication with respect to audits and their probabilities should be 
considered. As mentioned above, the frequencies of audits need to differ quite substan-
tially if they are to reduce the amount of rule violations. If not only the audit probability is 
changed, but additionally information about audit probability is supplied, more rule com-
pliance can be achieved with no or only minor changes in the audit frequencies. 
As the impact of audit probability study demonstrated (cf. section 6.3), the 
changes in audit frequency only had an effect on the amount of committed rule violations 
when the participants received either precise (e.g. they were made aware of the frequen-
cies, i.e. there will be an audit in 1 in 20 cases) or vague information (e.g. the audit prob-
ability is low) about audit probability. Since the total amount of audits was the same in the 
quarter in which a medium, or 3 in 20, probability was announced and the quarter in 
which a high, or 5 in 20, probability was announced, but the participants nevertheless 
violated significantly more often in the medium/3 in 20 probability condition, it can be as-
sumed that not the real frequencies, but only the information about audit probability is 
relevant for the rule-related decision. The communication of high audit probabilities can 
be used to reduce safety-related rule violations. Nevertheless, the real and the communi-
cated rule frequencies/probabilities should not differ too much because it can be as-
sumed that people will detect the deception.  
Not only the information about audit probabilities is decisive, but also the accuracy 
of information about audit probabilities which is provided. It was demonstrated that a high 
degree of accuracy leads to a comparatively high amount of rule violations. It is assumed 
that the highly accurate information makes people feel able to make better estimates re-
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garding the probability of audits, and they then perceive the risk as more controllable and 
therefore less threatening. The participants who received precise information violated the 
rule significantly more often than those who received no or vague information. The 
amount of rule violations did not differ significantly between participants who received no 
information and those who received vague information. It can be summarized that it is 
advisable to provide information about audit probabilities, but the information should be 
only vague to achieve maximum rule compliance.   
7.3 Integration of empirical findings into the theoretical back-
ground 
In the following section, the empirical findings which were gained in the scope of 
the present investigations will be integrated into the theoretical background described in 
the general theory part. The models which are considered as most relevant in the differ-
ent perspectives are the Process Level Model of Violations (PLMV, proposed by the au-
thor) described in the Human Factors Perspective and the Integrated Model of Behav-
ioural Prediction applied to Violations (IMV, Kluge, 2010; Kluge, 2010), which is ad-
dressed in the Decision-Making Perspective. The current findings will be integrated in the 
PLMV in section 7.3.1 and in the IMV in section 7.3.3.  
Whereas the PLMV summarizes the theories, models and insights of the Human 
Factors perspective and the IMV can be seen as the most relevant theory with respect to 
the description of the decision-making regarding rule violations, there is no comparable 
central theory in the area of Industrial and Organisational Psychology. Since the person-
ality traits which were investigated in the impact of personality section were selected due 
to their correlation with deviant behaviour investigated in the area of industrial and organ-
isational psychology, the findings of this study will be used to determine the correlation 
between safety-related rule violations and deviant behaviour summarized under the gen-
eral term of counterproductive work behaviour (CWB), which is the most central construct 
in the Industrial and Organisational Psychology perspective (cf. 7.3.2). 
7.3.1 Integration of findings into the Human Factors Perspective 
The PLMV was already described in the Human Factors perspective (cf. section 
5.1.6). Hence, the following section will address only the aspects of the model for which 
the present investigation provides new evidence. The adapted PLMV is displayed in Fig-
ure 30. All variables which were investigated in some way within the scope of the present 
investigation are displayed in red font. The investigated determinants which were previ-
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ously not part of the model, but are included due to the present investigation, are addi-
tionally underlined.   
 The empirical investigations addressed level-related as well as process-related 
determinants of safety-related rule violations depicted in the PLMV. First, the level-related 
aspects will be addressed, followed by a description of the process-related aspects. 
Empirical evidence regarding the level-related aspects of the PLMV 
On the individual level, the impact of (audit-) experience, (task-related) knowledge, 
skills, gender and personality was investigated. Since the gender, and the task-related 
knowledge were associated with safety-related rule violations in only one of the three 
experimental assessments, it is assumed that both determinants have only a minor influ-
ence on the rule-related behaviour.  
Additionally, the influence of personality traits is assumed to be marginal. Only two 
of the large number of investigated traits were identified as influential with respect to the 
determination of rule violations. One of these, the regulatory focus at work subscale pre-
vention focus, was only investigated in one study. The subscale of integrity cautiousness 
was investigated in two studies, but was only a significant predictor of safety-related rule 
violations in one of the studies. This shows that personality-related aspects are some-
what relevant, but play a minor role, at least with respect to the determination of safety-
related rules as they were investigated in the present investigation.  
On the individual level, the determinants experience and skill seem to be much 
more influential. The experience factor, which was investigated in the current studies, 
does not refer to experience in terms of work, but rather to audit experience. It was inves-
tigated whether participants who had just experienced an audit were more likely to violate 
a rule at the next opportunity, or whether an early audit experience (audits experienced 
just after a rule has been prescribed) would lead to more rule compliance overall. Based 
on the findings, the audit experience is very influential. When participants had just experi-
enced an audit, they underestimated the probability that another audit would follow sub-
sequently, and therefore violated the rule more frequently shortly after they had experi-
enced a safety audit. On the other hand, the early implementation of audits led to more 
compliance with rules at least as long as the audits were continued at relatively regular 
time periods. This seems to be contradictory at first glance, but whereas the increase in 
rule violations after an audit has just occurred is a short-lasting effect which refers only to 
the next possibility to violate the rule, the effect of early audit experience acts in a more 
long-lasting manner as it leads to a decrease in rule violations on the next few occasions. 
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When audits are not accomplished regularly, even this effect diminishes after a while. 
Although there was an increase in violations when an audit had just occurred, in general, 
early and continuous auditing is good method to reduce the amount of rule violations. By 
contrast, if there was a lack of audit experience, just after the rule had been prescribed, 
people decided more frequently to violate the rule, even if they were audited after a cer-
tain time. This may be not only an effect of audit experience but also of violation experi-
ence. As the participants violated the rule quite frequently, violation became a habit. Fur-
thermore, they became accustomed to the benefits associated with rule violation. When 
audits started late, the experience regarding audits (occurring not at all or only rarely) as 
well as their experience regarding violation (associated with benefits almost every time 
and is never or only rarely linked to negative consequences) led to a persistently high 
amount of decisions in favour of a rule violation.  
All of this evidence proves the importance of (audit) experience as factor which in-
fluences (safety-related) rule violations. The degree of experience seems to be an impor-
tant informational resource which is used to estimate future situations and the probability 
of certain events, which in turn influence the rule-related decision. Future investigations 
should focus on the impact of other facets of experience, such as work experience or 
violation experience.  
The skill determinant was added to the PLMV on the basis of the present investi-
gation. The PLMV already contains the determinants training and education, which can 
be interpreted as an influence of skill. But actually, the same amount and type of training 
and education can result in different skill levels. Although all of our participants received 
the same training, they differed with respect to their skill level acquired during training. 
Since all investigations showed that at least the skill with respect to the more complex 11-
step procedure was significantly negatively related to the amount of committed rule viola-
tions, it is assumed that it is beneficial to add the skill determinant to the individual level of 
the PLMV. 
On the situational level, the impact of the PLMV components organisational rule 
characteristics, safety audits and financial resources and organisation goals (framing), as 
well as the impact of social norms and conflicting goals were considered by the studies 
conducted within the scope of the present investigations.  
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Figure 30. Adapted Process-Level-Model of Violations PLMV (investigated processes and determinants are marked in red) 
Personality cautiousness, 
prevention focus at work 
(Lawton, 1998)
individual level
(Alper & Karsh, 2009)
external environment level
(Alper & Karsh, 2009)
rule characteristics 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)
contextual conditions
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)
Focus of attention 
and perception of risk
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)
expectation
(Parker, Verschuur and Lawton, 1996)
powerfulness
(Parker, Verschuur and Lawton, 1996)
opportunity
(Parker, Verschuur and Lawton, 1996)
attitude 
(Lawton, 1998)
behaviour 
modifiers
(Mason, 1997)
direct 
motivators
(Mason, 1997) benefits & costs of 
violations
(Reason, 2008, Reason Parker & 
Lawton, 1998), Phipps et al., 2008)
situational route  (Lawton, 1998)
•Audit Experience, task-related 
knowledge, skills training, education
•Size, weight, reach, strength
•Age, gender, ethnicity, language
•Needs, biases, attitudes, mood
(Alper & Karsh, 2009)
situation
(Lawton, 1998)
skill-based/routine violations
(Reason, 2008)
rule-based/situational/necessary violations
(Reason, 2008)
knowledge-based/exceptional violations
(Reason, 2008)
thrill seeking, optimizing violations
(Reason, 2008)
•Task demands, complexity, difficulty
•Time and sequence demands
•Availability of usable technology
• Department goals
•Noise, temperature, lighting, Physical 
layout and geography
•Organizational policy/rules, 
•Safety audits 
•Organizational structure
•Financial resources & organizational 
goals (Framing of the production 
outcome and salary)
•Management structure
•Training provided, Staf fing levels
•Social norms and pressures, Social 
climate/culture
(Alper & Karsh, 2009),
Likelihood that a given rule will 
be selected for violations
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)
situational/organisational  level
(Alper & Karsh, 2009)
work planning
(Parker, Verschuur and Lawton, 1996)
conflicting goals
(Battmann & Klumb, 1993, Reason, Parker 
& Lawton, 1998)
beliefs/illusions
(Reason, 2008)
actual
(Mason, 1997)
perceived
(Mason, 1997)
task-related knowledge
(Lawton, 1998
unintentional/erroneous violations
(Reason, 1990)
attitudinal  route (Lawton, 1998)
attitudinal route     (Lawton, 1998)
knowledge route (Lawton, 1998))
situational route  (Lawton, 1998)
personal route
personal route
situational route
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The characteristics of organisational rules were considered, as the effectiveness 
of the rule prescription was compared with respect to the information which was provided 
during the prescription of the organisational rule. It was compared whether the conse-
quences which are hazarded when a rule is violated change the rule-related decisions. In 
this regard, it was compared whether the rule violation can trigger the destruction of 
property or the endangerment of the health of residents (goods at stake). It was hypothe-
sised that due to the activation of different social norms, which are also considered as 
one situational component in the PLMV, the endangerment of human health would result 
in more rule compliance. As the rule characteristic goods at stake had no significant im-
pact on the rule-related decision, for the time being, it has to be assumed that this rule 
characteristic is irrelevant for the rule-related decision. Since this effect was assumed to 
be due to social norms, it may be further assumed that social norms are less influential 
than assumed in the previous PLMV. This determinant was not removed, as this was only 
found by one investigation. Further studies should be conducted to clarify whether these 
situational determinants really play such a minor role as the present findings suggest. 
As a further situational determinant, the impact of safety audits and the communi-
cation of audit-related information was investigated and added as a new situ-
ational/organisational determinant of rule violations to the PLMV. Depending on the per-
spective, the factor safety audit can be either assigned to the individual level as an impact 
of audit experience, or to the situational level as an impact of the organisation`s sched-
uled implementation and communication regarding safety audits. Hence, as the impact of 
audit timing, as well as the bomb crater effect was already described in the section about 
audit experience, in the following, only the impact of audit frequency and accuracy of in-
formation about audit probability investigated in the current study will be addressed.  
The current findings suggest that minor variations of audit frequencies have no 
impact on the rule-related decision. Only when changes in the audit frequencies were 
communicated did the participants adapt their rule-related behaviour to the changing 
probabilities. The investigation of the impact of the accuracy of information about audit 
probability provided the insight that precise information leads to significant more rule vio-
lations than if only vague or no information about audit probability was supplied. Since the 
timing of audits, the communication of different audit probabilities as well as the accuracy 
level of information about audit probability had a significant influence on the frequency of 
rule violations, it is assumed that safety audits are a very influential determinant of rule 
violations and need to be considered as a situational/organisational influencing factor in 
the PLMV.  
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The situational influences financial resources and organisation goals are consid-
ered by the investigation of the framing of the production outcome and salary as gain or 
loss (the perception of gain or loss emerges due to the comparison of the organisational 
goals with achieved performance and the gained financial resources/salary). By varying 
the reference points, which are the goals prescribed by the organisation, participants 
were given the impression that they were behind the organisational goals and would lose 
financial resources (loss framing) or that they would meet the prescribed goals and gain 
financial resources (gain framing), even though they achieved the same production out-
put and earned the same salary in both conditions. The findings reported within the scope 
of the present investigation corroborate the impact of framing, as in two of the three stud-
ies which investigated the framing, the loss framing led to significantly more rule viola-
tions than the gain framing. Since the framing effect was furthermore also found by Kluge 
et al. (2013), it can be assumed that the effect of framing is stable across different condi-
tions and is therefore added to the PLMV as an example of the influence of organisational 
goals and financial resources. 
Conflicting goals, which are also a determinant on the situational level of influ-
ences of the PLMV, were considered because in all experimental studies of the present 
investigation, the participants were confronted with incompatible goals. They had to de-
cide whether to maximise the performance (which was requested by the organisation and 
would presumably determine the financial compensation for participation) or to comply 
with the safety procedure (which is also an organisational request, guarantees safety, but 
is associated with less performance and a lower salary).  
Based on the assumption that goal conflicts are very common in most organisa-
tions, a goal conflict was induced to improve the validity of the experimental environment 
and to create the necessity to violate the safety-related rule. It can be assumed that in the 
majority of the cases, people will comply with the rule in an experimental environment in 
which they feel observed and evaluated, unless there are incentives which betray them to 
violate. This goal was accomplished, as a quite high variance in rule-related behaviour 
was achieved in all investigations. In the study investigating the impact of the goods at 
stake, 29% of the participants decided to violate the rule (in this investigation, the partici-
pants had to decide only once, meaning that only the between-subject value can be cal-
culated). In the studies conducted to investigate the impact of audit probability and audit 
timing, the participants violated the rule on average in 25 % (audit timing study) and 37 % 
(audit probability study) of the 36 times they had to make the rule-related decision. The 
quite high level of rule violations, despite the fact that the participants were aware that 
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they were in an investigation situation, suggests that goal conflicts promote rule viola-
tions. Moreover, it can be seen as indicator that the participants did not know that the 
financial remuneration was not really performance-based (cover story), but was the same 
for all participants.   
Empirical evidence regarding the process-related aspects of the PLMV 
The process-related aspects of the PLMV which were investigated within the pre-
sent studies are the impact of the contextual conditions (e.g. the framing, audit probability 
or audit timing), which are either perceived as direct motivators (e.g. the variation of audit 
frequencies, which changes the actual benefits and costs of violations) or behaviour 
modifiers (e.g. the variation of information about audit probability, which only changes the 
perceived benefits and costs of violations). The current investigations found evidence for 
the significance of the behaviour modifiers (such as the information about audit probabil-
ity or the impact of framing) on skill-based/routine violations. The current studies found 
that the perceived, and not the actual, benefits and costs of violations are more influential 
regarding the determination of rule violations.  
Based on the current findings, a new rule violation path also has to be added to 
the PLMV. The current studies addressed the determinants of skill-based/routine rule 
violations. As the previous sections already demonstrated, the rule violations were influ-
enced not only by personal and attitudinal influences as it was previously proposed, but 
also by various situational/organisational determinants (such as safety audits, framing). 
Hence, the situational routes/paths are proposed to lead not only to rule-based and 
knowledge-based but also to skill-based/routine violations (cf. red arrow, Figure 30).  
7.3.2 Integration of findings into the Industrial and Organisational Psy-
chology Perspective 
On the basis of the findings of the studies conducted to determine the impact of 
personality (cf. section 6.2), the construct of safety-related rule violations will be related to 
various constructs investigated in the area of industrial and organizational psychology. 
The personality traits were selected due to their correlation with several deviant behav-
iours (cf. Table 22). It is assumed that the personality traits which correlate with these 
deviant behaviours are also associated with deviations from safety-related rules (safety-
related rule violations).  
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Table 21. Summary of investigated personality traits, their association with deviant behav-
iour and their correlation with the rule violation intention and rule violation behaviour 
Personality trait 
Associated  
behaviour 
Correlation with  
intention  
Correlation with 
behaviour  
Self-control (-) various criminal or im-
prudent behaviours 
(Arneklev et al., 1993) 
No No 
Integrity  (-) CWB (Marcus et al., 
2013) 
Yes, (-), medium, 
with subscales 
cautiousness, 
non-
rationalisation 
and reliability 
(Only cautiousness 
measured),  Yes, (-) 
low (in one of two 
studies in which the 
trait was measured, 
in the other no cor-
relation) 
Belief in a just world (-) use of unjust means to 
achieve long term goals 
(Hafer, 2000), 
No Not measured 
Sensitivity towards 
injustice 
(-) prosocial and (+) unso-
cial behaviour (Gollwitzer 
et al., 2005) 
Yes  (-), medium Not measured 
Self interest (+) lying behaviour(Grover 
& Hui, 1994), 
Yes (+), medium No 
Self-responsibility (+) performed safety ob-
servations (DePasquale, 
1999) 
No Not measured 
Regulatory 
focus at 
work 
Prevention 
focus 
(+) safety-performance 
(Wallace, Johnson, & Fra-
zier, 2009) 
No Yes (-), low  
Promotion 
focus 
(+) productivity and (-) 
safety performance (Wal-
lace et al., 2009) 
No No  
 
Note. (-) negative correlations, (+) positive correlations, low = .10 > r <.30; medium = .30 > r <.50 
 
In the pilot study of the impact of personality investigation, the personality traits 
were correlated with the intention to violate a rule in daily life situations. Regarding the 
intention to violate a rule, the personality traits integrity (subscales cautiousness, non-
rationalisation and reliability), sensitivity towards injustice and self-interest turned out to 
be relevant determinants (cf. Table 22). These personality traits are related to CWB, anti-
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social behaviour and lying behaviour. Hence, it can be assumed that rule violations in 
these daily life situations (which are covered by the scale assessing the intention to vio-
late a rule) might be associated with CWB, antisocial behaviour and lying behaviour. To 
ascertain whether there are correlations between rule violations and these deviant behav-
iour patterns, further investigations should be conducted.  
Based on the findings of the prestudy and the different analyses several personal-
ity traits were investigated with respect to their correlation with rule-related behaviour in 
the simulation (for a summary of the results, cf. right column of Table 22). Only the traits 
cautiousness and the regulatory focus at work subscale prevention focus correlated sig-
nificantly with safety-related rule violations. Hence, it can be assumed that safety-related 
rule violations as they were investigated in the scope of the present investigation may be 
negatively related to CWB (assumption based on the negative correlation between integ-
rity and CWB) and positively related to safety-performance (assumption based on the 
positive correlation between prevention focus and safety performance).  
Although most personality traits, which were selected due to findings from the 
area of industrial and organisational psychology, cannot be used to predict safety-related 
rule violations in a process-control task, the researcher of industrial and organisational 
psychology as well as the human factors researcher should consider the findings in the 
respective other area in order avoid repeatedly investigating the same objects. Further-
more, the respective other perspective can be used to generate new research objectives. 
 
7.3.3 Integration of findings into the Decision-Making Perspective 
To improve the validity of the Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction applied 
to violations (IMV) of Kluge (2010) and Kluge et al. (2013), and consequently also the 
understanding of the decision-making process regarding rule violations, the current find-
ings will be integrated into the IMV in the following section. As the IMV was already de-
scribed in detail in a previous section (cf. 5.3.4), in the following, only the modifications 
made due to the empirical evidence of the present investigation will be described. The 
modified IMV is displayed in Figure 31, the investigated aspects are depicted in red font, 
the new added aspects are underlined, the significant aspects are in bold, and the insig-
nificant aspects are crossed out. 
In the empirical investigations, the variables age and sex are summarized under 
the new heading Demographics. Since there was almost no variance regarding age due 
to the student sample, the impact of age on rule violations could not be determined. Al-
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though sex showed a small correlation with rule violations in one investigation (indicating 
that men are more prone to rule violations than woman), on the basis of the current find-
ings it is assumed that the demographic determinant sex has only a minor impact on the 
occurrence of safety-related rule violations. To explore the impact of other demographic 
factors, further investigations should assess a sample which is more diverse regarding 
several demographic variables like age, cultural or educational background, citizenship or 
family status. 
 
 
Figure 31. Adapted Integrated Model of Behavioural Prediction, the investigated determi-
nants are depicted in red, the newly added components are underlined, the bold-marked 
factors have an impact on the behaviour, the factors which had no impact are crossed out 
 
The next cluster of influences of the IMV refers to the impact of personality on rule 
violations. In the present investigation, several personality traits were ascertained (for an 
overview of all investigated personality traits cf. section 7.2.3). Conscientiousness, which 
was assumed to be negatively correlated with rule violations in the previous IMV, turned 
out to be unrelated to the rule-related behaviour according to the present findings. There-
fore this trait was crossed out in the model (cf. Figure 31). Since cautiousness and pre-
vention focus correlated negatively with rule violations, these two traits were added as 
new determinants to the IMV.  
Personality
• Integrity 
(cautiousness)
• prevention focus 
at work
• Conscientiousness
• Anxiety
(Berry et al., 2007; 
Markus et al., 2002; 
Zeitlin,1994)
Demographics
Age & Sex (male) 
(Reason, 2008),
Past Behavior
Audit experience 
(bomb crater effect)
The individual history 
of incidents and 
accidents (Reason, 
2008)
Control Beliefs
• Do I think that I can 
manage the situation?
• Do I have a high opinion 
of my own work skills? 
(Reason, 2008; Verschuur et 
al., 1996)
Normative Beliefs and 
Motivation to Comply
Am I constrained by what 
other people think? (Reason, 
2008)
Behavioral Beliefs and 
Outcome Evaluations
• Will come cutting lead to 
the desired goal state?
• How high is the risk of a 
negative consequence 
(losing all/everything)?
• Is violating the only way 
to get the job done at 
all? (Verschuur et al., 1996)
Attitudes
Competence 
• Task-related skills 
• Abilities (general mental 
abilities, technical 
apprehension) 
• Knowledge (prior 
knowledge, task-related 
knowledge)
Environmental Conditions
• Safety Audits (Timing & 
Accuracy of information 
about audit probabilities
• Time availability
• Framing of production goals/ 
salary
• Lack of supervisor surveillance 
(Verschuur et al., 1996)
• Inadequate work planning 
(Verschuur et al., 1996)
Norms ?
Self-
efficacy
BehaviorIntention
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With respect to the past behaviour cluster, the impact of audit experience was 
considered in the empirical evidence part. Audit experience was added as new determi-
nant to the model since the investigation of the bomb crater effect as well as the audit 
timing revealed that audit experience is quite influential with respect to the determination 
of rule-related behaviour. When people experience audits early after the rule has been 
prescribed and at regular intervals, they violate the rule less often. By contrast, when 
people initially experience an audit later on, this leads to more rule violations not only in 
the early period when they have not experienced an audit, but also later on once the au-
dits have begun. Furthermore, people who have just experienced an audit decide more 
frequently to violate a rule subsequently (bomb crater effect). Both effects corroborate the 
impact of past experience on rule violations. Whereas the previous IMV only considered 
the past behaviour with respect to accidents and incidents, the current findings suggest 
that audit experience also influences rule related behaviour.  
The influence of norms was addressed in the study described in the impact of 
goods at stake section. It was assumed that the description of different consequences of 
rule violations (goods at stake), which are either the destruction of property or the injury 
of residents, will activate different norm types, which result in more rule compliance when 
people can be endangered by the rule violation. The fact that no effect of the goods at 
stake was detected can be either due to the fact that norms have no influence on the 
rule-related decision, or that the manipulation of the goods at stake did not activate differ-
ent norm types. Furthermore, the investigation context might be responsible for the re-
sults (cf. section 6.1). Either way, the impact of norms on rule violations should be ex-
plored by further investigations.  
The main goal of the empirical evidence part was to explore the impact of several 
environmental conditions. Safety audits were investigated with respect to the best imple-
mentation method, which refers to the frequency (audits were accomplished 1 of 12 or 3 
of 12 possible times) and timing of audits (early vs. late; bomb crater effect) as well as the 
best communication method, which refers to the accuracy of information supplied about 
audit probability (no, vague or precise information). Since significant effects regarding the 
accuracy of information about audit probability, as well as audit timing were found (al-
though they were not congruent with the proposed hypothesis) and, moreover, the bomb 
crater effect was also detected, the impact of safety audits on rule violations is assumed 
to be high. Additionally, the framing of the production outcome and salary, which is as-
signed to the environmental conditions, influenced the rule-related behaviour in two of the 
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three studies conducted within the scope of the present investigation in which the framing 
was explored.  
The environmental conditions safety audits, as well as the framing of the produc-
tion outcomes, influence the occurrence of rule violations. It is assumed that they do not 
only influence the behaviour directly. Furthermore, it is assumed that the impact of the 
environmental conditions, such as the implementation and communication of safety au-
dits or impact of framing, are mediated by a person`s behavioural beliefs. For example, it 
is assumed that for example the timing of audits or a loss-framed depiction of the produc-
tion outcome influence the evaluation of the riskiness of rule violations, or the attractive-
ness of the compliance option, respectively. The behavioural beliefs in turn influence the 
attitudes, which determine the intention, which influences the rule-related behaviour. To 
represent the assumed relationship between the environmental conditions and the behav-
ioural beliefs, a red arrow from the environmental conditions to the behavioural beliefs is 
added to the model (cf. Figure 31).  
The previous model proposed the skills and abilities of a person as influencing 
factors, which determine whether or not the rule-related intention is realized or not. This 
cluster is supplemented by several new determinants which were explored within the 
scope of the present investigation. Under the added heading Competence, the impact of 
task-related skills, abilities (general mental ability, technical comprehension) and knowl-
edge (prior knowledge and task-related knowledge after the training) on rule-related be-
haviour was summarised. In all three experimental studies conducted within the scope of 
the present investigations, the skills regarding the more complex 11-step procedure was 
negatively related to rule violations. People`s abilities (general mental ability as well as 
the technical comprehension) were not related to rule violations at all. In one investiga-
tion, the task-related knowledge after the training was weakly negatively related to rule 
violations, whereas the prior knowledge had no impact across all three experimental in-
vestigations. All in all, according to the present findings, mainly the skill level, and possi-
bly the task-related knowledge, seem to be relevant for the determination of rule viola-
tions.  
Competence is assumed to influence the behaviour though the mediator control 
beliefs (as it is assumed that the impact of environmental constraints is mediated by the 
behavioural beliefs). Hence, a red arrow symbolising the proposed cause-and-effect rela-
tion was added to the model (cf. Figure 32).  
Future studies should address the assumed mediating roles of the behavioural be-
liefs/control beliefs for the impact of environmental conditions/competences on rule viola-
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tions. Furthermore, the impact of the beliefs on the attitudes, norms and self-efficacy and 
their impact on the intention to violate a rule should be investigated.  
7.4 Practitioner summary 
In accordance with leading Journals in Human Factors and Ergonomics, which 
encourage authors to be explicit about the implications for practice,  the following section 
gives guidance to practitioners who wish for a short overview of how to use the findings of 
the present investigation to implement evidence-based safety-management measures to 
reduce safety-related rule violations.  
7.4.1 How to consider person-related determinants 
To improve safety by achieving a high level of compliance with safety-related 
rules, it is recommended to select employees who score high on cautiousness (measured 
by the subscale of the German integrity questionnaire of Marcus, 2006) and have a high 
prevention focus at work (measured by a subscale of the prevention focus at work ques-
tionnaire of Wallace et al., 2009). Since a high skill level as well as good knowledge 
about the work task is also associated with a high level of rule compliance, it is recom-
mended to select employees with a high skill level and good knowledge, and to regularly 
implement human resource development measures to maintain and improve the compe-
tence of the employees.  
7.4.2 How to determine goals and give performance feedback 
When the depiction of the production outcome and salary leads to the impression 
that the production goal will not be achieved, or that money will be lost (loss framing), 
people violate the safety-related rule more frequently. This information can be used for 
different purposes. If the goal is to enhance safety, it is recommended to give perform-
ance feedback in a gain-framed manner, meaning that the reference point (prescribed 
goal) should be sufficiently low that the employees will have the impression that they will 
certainly achieve or even exceed their production goals and the expected salary. If, on 
the contrary, the achievement of performance goals is prioritised over safety goals, the 
loss-framed depiction of performance goal, which can be achieved by comparatively high 
goals which cannot or only barely be achieved, is recommended.  
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7.4.3 How to implement and communicate safety audits 
Regarding the implementation of audits the following insights should be regarded. 
The results of the present investigation suggest that a quite small amount of safety audits 
is sufficient. There is no difference whether an audit is conducted 1 in 12 or 3 in 12 times. 
If the amount of rule violations should be reduced to a significantly lower level, the fre-
quency of audits must be increased more intensely. Moreover, audits should be con-
ducted just after the rule has been prescribed. If a reduction in the amount of audits is 
essential, this could be done, but it is highly recommended not to stop the conducting of 
audits entirely since the amount of rule violation will increase immediately. Furthermore, it 
should be demonstrated that audits can occur at any time, even when an audit has just 
taken place. In this regard, sometimes two audits should be conducted in succession.  
The communication of increased audit probabilities either in a precise or in vague 
manner will reduces the amount of rule violations, independently of the real audit fre-
quencies. Since precise information about the probabilities of audits (e.g. there will be an 
audit in 1 in 20 cases) leads to significantly more rule violations independently of the in-
formation which is communicated, it is mostly recommended to provide vague information 
(such as the audit probability is small, medium or large) about increasing audit probabili-
ties to achieve maximum rule compliance.  
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11  Appendix of the empirical evidence parts 
11.1 Appendix of the Impact of Goods at Stake, Impact of Audit 
Probability and Impact of Audit Timing  
The amount of material used in the three experimental investigations (cf. 6.1,6.3 
and 6.4) is vast, as in every experimental condition, different documents were used in 
order to manipulate the different independent variables. Moreover, all of the documents 
are in the German language. For these reasons, it was decided not to include the docu-
ments as an appendix in the present investigation. Nevertheless, interested readers are 
invited to request the documents from the author or her reviewer at an-
anda.vonderheyde@googlemail.com or annette.kluge@rub.de. 
11.2 Appendix: Impact of Personality 
11.2.1 Self-control 
Seipel, C. (1999). Die Bedeutung von Gelegenheitsstrukturen in der 'general theory of 
crime' [The importance of opportunity structures in the ‘general theory of crime’] by Mi-
chael  R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi. Soziale Probleme, 10(2), 144-156.  
 
Seipel (1999) derived the scale from:  
Grasmick, H. G., Tittle, C. R., Bursik, R. J., & Arneklev, B.J. (1993). Testing the core em-
pirical implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime. Journal of Re-
search in Crime and Delinquency, 30(1), 5-29.  
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Not at all true” to (5) “Completely true”.  
I frequently say ill-considered things. Not at all true  
Completely 
true 
I never allow myself to lose control. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I am good at making myself get tasks done which I 
don’t really like working on. 
Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I find it difficult to say no. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
Other people would describe me as impulsive. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I wish I had more self-discipline.  Not at all true  Completely 
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true 
I am reliable. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I don’t let myself be led too much by my feelings. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I do lots of things on the spur of the moment. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
Other people would say that I have iron self-
discipline. 
Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I find it difficult to complete tasks that I don’t enjoy. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I have trouble concentrating. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I lose patience too quickly. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I often interrupt other people. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
I am always punctual. Not at all true  Completely 
true 
 
11.2.2 Integrity 
Marcus, B. (2006). Inventar berufsbezogener einstellungen und selbsteinschätzungen 
(IBES). Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
 
a. Low Distribution 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (5) “Agree completely”.  
Sometimes one hears about criminal machinations in 
industry, but I think that these are really rare excep-
tions.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
There are more criminals in the world than most 
people suspect.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Pretty much everybody has committed a little theft or 
fraud at some point if there was a good opportunity.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
People who earn their money with honest work are 
nowadays in the minority.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
If someone gets their luggage stolen on holiday, they 
mostly claim to the insurance company that the 
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
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damage is higher than it really was.  
Pretty much everyone cheats on their tax return.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
If everyone who steals at work got fired then compa-
nies would be fairly empty.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
 
 
b. Non-Rationalization 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (5) “Agree completely”. 
 
Lots of employers take advantage of their employees 
wherever they can. They shouldn’t be surprised when 
employees act in just the same way in return.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
To be successful in one’s professional life, one mustn’t 
be too particular about rules and guidelines.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
The fact that an employee feels underpaid is no rea-
son to improve his/her wages through illegal activities.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Whoever is smart and works hard gets furthest in their 
professional life with honesty.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Our companies must work with all the tricks, be they 
legal or illegal, to survive in the face of international 
competition.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Some employers simply don’t deserve honest employ-
ees.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
 
c. Reliability 
 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (5) “Agree completely”. 
 
When I enter into a commitment, I can be relied upon 
one hundred percent.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
I often act in the moment without stopping and think-
ing.   
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I think long and carefully before I make a decision.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
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I work on tasks quickly rather than thoroughly.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I would waste less time at work if I had someone look-
ing over my shoulder.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Before I start something I consider carefully how I 
want to proceed.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I don’t agonise over decisions, rather I do them first 
and then see what happens.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
 
d. Cautiousness 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (5) “Agree completely”.  
 
I am sensible rather than adventurous.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
Sometimes I find it exciting to do risky things in order 
to feel a thrill.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
At the fairground, I’d rather go on the rollercoaster 
than the Ferris wheel.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
When the situation gets a bit exciting, that’s when I 
really flourish.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I’d rather be a cameraman on a film than a stuntman. 
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I love variety in life.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
Peace and quiet are more important to me than fun 
and excitement. 
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
 
e. Conflict avoidance 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (5) “Agree completely”.  
 
If I deem somebody to be incapable then I tell him/her 
so.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
I don’t mind getting into an argument with someone if I 
have a different opinion.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I could never tell somebody that I can’t stand them to 
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
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their face.  
I try to avoid conflict if possible.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
It happens that I make others my enemy for the sake 
of something which is important to me.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I’m rather a person with rough edges.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
I prefer not to get into arguments with people who 
have power over me.  
Do not agree 
at all  
Agree com-
pletely 
 
11.2.3 Belief in a just world 
Schmitt, M., Maes, J., & Schmal, A. (1997). Gerechtigkeit als innerdeutsches Problem: 
Analyse der Meßeigenschaften von Meßinstrumenten für Einstellungen zu Verteilungs-
prinzipien, Ungerechtigkeitssensibilität und Glaube an eine gerechte Welt. Universität 
Trier: Fachbereich I - Psychologie. [Justice as an inner-German problem: Analysis and 
measurement properties of measurement instruments for attitudes towards distribution 
principles, injustice sensitivity and belief in a just world] Universität Trier: Fachbereich I - 
Psychologie.] 
 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements about justice and injustice in life 
apply to you! Please mark a number from (1) “Does not apply at all” to (5) “Completely 
applies”.  
 
What goes around comes around.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
There’s barely any crime that wouldn’t be punished in 
the long run.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
At some point you have to atone for all the bad things 
you’ve done.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
Anyone who does wrong will be called to account for it 
one day.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
Anyone who brings suffering to others will one day 
have to pay for it.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
Anyone who gets rich at the expense of others will pay 
bitterly for it in the end.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
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11.2.4 Sensitivity towards injustice 
Schmitt, M., Maes, J., & Schmal, A. (1997). Gerechtigkeit als innerdeutsches Problem: 
Analyse der Meßeigenschaften von Meßinstrumenten für Einstellungen zu Verteilungs-
prinzipien, Ungerechtigkeitssensibilität und Glaube an eine gerechte Welt. Universität 
Trier: Fachbereich I - Psychologie. [Justice as an inner-German problem: Analysis and 
measurement properties of measurement instruments for attitudes towards distribution 
principles, injustice sensitivity and belief in a just world] Universität Trier: Fachbereich I - 
Psychologie.] 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements about justice and injustice in life 
apply to you! Please mark a number from (1) “Does not apply at all” to (5) “Completely 
applies“.  
 
It bothers me if I get something that someone else 
deserves.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
I feel guilty when I get recognition that others have 
earned.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
I find it difficult to bear when I unilaterally profit from 
others.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
It takes me a long time to forget when others have to 
iron out my negligence.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
It saddens me when I get more opportunities to de-
velop my skills than others.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
I feel guilty when I am undeservedly better off than 
others.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
It bothers me when things fall into my lap which others 
have to toil for.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
I mull over it for a long time if I am treated in a more 
friendly way than others for no reason.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
It burdens me when others are criticised for things 
which are overlooked for me.  
Does not 
apply at all 
 Completely 
applies 
 
11.2.5 Self-interest 
Mohiyeddini, C., & Montada, L. (2004). " Eigeninteresse" und" zentralität des wertes ge-
rechtigkeit für eigenes handeln": Neue skalen zur psychologie der gerechtigkeit. Universi-
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tät Zürich: Fachrichtung Persönlichkeitspsychologie und Diagnostik. Universität Trier: 
Fachbereich 1. Psychologie: Fachbereich I - Psychologie.[“Self-interest” and “centrality of 
the value of justice for one’s own actions”: New scales on the psychology of justice] Uni-
versität Zürich: Fachrichtung Persönlichkeitspsychologie und Diagnostik. Universität Trier: 
Fachbereich 1. Psychologie: Fachbereich I - Psychologie. 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to 5 “Agree completely”.  
 
It is more important for me to follow my interests than 
to be fair.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
I think it is more important to follow my interests than 
the interests of others.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Asserting my interests is more important to me than 
the relationship with my friends.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
In the conflict between my own interests and fairness, 
I will decide in favour of my interests.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
To protect my interests, I would be prepared to decide 
against the interests of people close to me.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
 
11.2.6 Self-responsibility 
Bierhoff, H., Wegge, J., Bipp, T., Kleinbeck, U., Attig-Grabosch, C., & Schulz, S. (2005). 
Entwicklung eines Fragebogens zur Messung von Eigenverantwortung oder:“Es gibt 
nichts Gutes, außer man tut es”. [Development of a questionnaire for the measurement of 
self-responsibility or: “Actions speak louder than words”] Zeitschrift Für Personalpsy-
chologie, 4(1), 4-18.  
Please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to you! Please mark a 
number from (1) “Do not agree at all“ to (5)“Agree completely“ 
.  
If one is pursuing an important goal and meets resis-
tance, it is justifiable to use arguments whose validity 
cannot be proven.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
One can contribute a great deal to achieving one’s 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
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goals in life.  
If wearing a seat belt was voluntary, I would not regu-
larly buckle up.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
I always try to prepare for a decision by intensively 
thinking about advantages and disadvantages.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
I think everyone can contribute to improving their daily 
life.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
Before I decide on an alternative, I reflect for longer 
than most people do.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree com-
pletely 
 
11.2.7 Regulatory focus at work 
Solga, M. (in prep.). Felt accountability and job performance: The mediating effects of 
work regulatory focus. 
Solga (in prep) derived the scale from: Wallace, J. C., Johnson, P. D., & Frazier, M. L. 
(2009). An examination of the factorial, construct, and predictive validity and utility of the 
regulatory focus at work scale. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 30, 805–831. 
 
How frequently do you concentrate on the following things at work? For each state-
ment, mark a number from 1 to 5.  
 
I concentrate on … 
 
rfaws01  1. following the rules and regulations at work. 
(prevention focus)  
never  always 
rfaws02  2. accomplishing a lot at work. (promotion fo-
cus) 
never  always 
rfaws03  3. completing work tasks correctly. (prevention 
focus) 
never  always 
rfaws04  4. getting the work done, no matter how. (pro-
motion focus) 
never  always 
rfaws05  5. meeting the work obligations. (prevention 
focus) 
never  always 
rfaws06  6. completing lots of work in a short time. (pro-
motion focus) 
never  always 
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rfaws07  7. fulfilling responsibilities at work. (prevention 
focus) 
never  always 
rfaws08  8. devoting myself to things which get me ahead 
at work. (promotion focus)  
never  always 
rfaws09  9. fulfilling duties at work. (prevention focus)  never  always 
rfaws10  10. performing, achieving successes. (promo-
tion focus) 
never  always 
rfaws11  11. satisfying the details at work. (prevention 
focus) 
never  always 
rfaws12  12. completing as many work tasks as possible. 
(promotion focus)  
never  always 
 
11.2.8 Rule violation Instrument 
The following statements are about moral conflicts. Please indicate to what extent the 
statements apply to you! Please mark a number from (1) “Do not agree at all” to (4) 
“Agree completely”.  
 
I would rather risk being caught speeding than be late 
for an important appointment. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Although I have a blood alcohol level of 0.8 per cent 
(blatantly above the legal limit), I give my injured friend 
a lift to the hospital. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Although an opposing player lies injured on the ground 
due to my foul, I continue the match to make the final 
score for my team. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
I would cross the street when the lights are red in or-
der to catch the bus, even though a family with small 
children is standing next to me.  
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
I would rather risk missing the last train than get on it 
without a valid ticket. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
I would rather risk failing an important exam than 
cheat using illegal means. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Although I notice that I’ve damaged another car while 
backing out of a parking space, I drive on so that my 
insurance doesn’t go up. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Although I suspect the Smart phone (list price 600€) Do not agree  Agree 
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being offered to me by an acquaintance for 200€ is 
stolen, I buy it 
at all completely 
Since my favourite film is out of stock in the shops, I 
download it illegally off the internet 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
Although I do not feel well, I offer my bus/train seat to 
a frail person. 
Do not agree 
at all 
 Agree 
completely 
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